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ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores how experience and environment impact behavior. In
the first chapter, I provide behavioral foundations for a model of taste uncertainty
with endogenous learning through consumption. In this setting, uncertainty is over an
unobservable, subjective state space. Preference over lottery-menu pairs is sufficient
to identify the state space and the learning process. In this model, the agent is
viewed as if he learns the utility of an object upon its consumption. This information
is used to improve choice from the follow-on menu. This implies a trade-off between
consumption value and information leading to experimentation. I provide a behavioral
definition of experimentation. While the literature focuses on identifying subjective
states through a demand for flexibility, I show that experimentation also (partially)
identifies taste uncertainty.
The second chapter explores the potential for social networks to affect decisions of
political leaders. To this end we construct a database linking European royal kinship
networks, monarchies, and wars to study the effect of family ties on conflict. To
v
establish causality, we exploit decreases in connection caused by apolitical deaths of
network important individuals. These deaths are associated with substantial increases
in the frequency and duration of war. We provide evidence that these deaths affect
conflict only through changing the kinship network. Over our period of interest, the
percentage of European monarchs with kinship ties increased threefold. Together,
these findings help explain the well-documented decrease in European war frequency.
The final chapter builds on the robust finding from the psychology literature
that the co-presentation of products causes consumers to associate them. Associ-
ated products are evaluated more similarly. Supposing that agents behave according
to this evidence, I axiomatically derive a tractable utility model of this association
effect. In an application, I study a two-product monopolist that can strategically
choose whether or not to offer his products under the same brand. I demonstrate
that psychological association can provide strict incentives for either brand extension
or brand differentiation depending on the distribution of product valuations in the
market. Appropriate branding strategies allow firms to extract more surplus from
consumers when psychological association is present.
vi
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Chapter 1
Preference discovery and
experimentation1
1.1 Introduction
Traditional economic models of uncertainty treat agents as knowing their preferences
and having uncertainty over the extrinsic state of the world. However, individuals
can also face uncertainty over their own preferences. This taste uncertainty may exist
despite perfect information about the extrinsic state of the world. Importantly, taste
uncertainty is over a subjective state space which is unobservable to the analyst. This
paper studies the choice behaviors which can be used to make inferences about an
agent’s taste uncertainty.
The literature has shown that subjective states can be inferred from preference
over menus [Kreps (1979), Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001) (henceforth DLR)].
When an agent displays a preference for flexibility, strictly preferring a menu to all of
its subsets, he can be viewed as having uncertainty over the ranking of objects in the
menu. Under this interpretation, it is the anticipated resolution of that uncertainty
which drives the demand for flexibility. Typically the subjective state space is viewed
as a set of preference relations. Seemingly, taste uncertainty is a natural application
of such models. However, these models make use of an implicit and exogenous in-
formation process. When information is exogenous to the agent’s choices, any form
1This chapter has previously appeared as an article in Theoretical Economics. [Cooke (2017)]
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of learning through consumption is precluded. I contend that endogenous learning
through consumption is an essential ingredient in a model of taste uncertainty. Intu-
itively, the act of consuming an object of unknown value must provide information.
Therefore, a main goal of my analysis is to show how the DLR framework can be
adjusted to accommodate learning through consumption. To facilitate this goal, I
extend the DLR domain from preference over menus to preference over consumption-
menu pairs, (c, A). This extended domain allows several notable behaviors to be
captured.
First, I observe that learning through consumption means that the demand for
flexibility may depend on consumption. For instance, suppose Alice lives in a city
where the Uber ride sharing company has just entered the market. She can commute
to work by bus, b, or by Uber, u. She knows her tastes for buses, but is uncertain of
whether she will like Uber or not. Further, suppose that she believes the bus is most
likely better than Uber. Then we might expect to observe
(b, {b, u}) ∼ (b, {b}) and (u, {b, u})  (u, {b}). (1.1)
That is to say, if Alice plans to take the bus today (and gain no taste information)
she is indifferent between committing to use the bus tomorrow (perhaps by buying
a monthly pass) or being able to choose between the bus and Uber when tomorrow
comes. However, if she plans to try Uber today she may wish to keep the option
open of taking Uber again tomorrow, in case she discovers that Uber is awesome!
Experiencing Uber induces a demand for flexibility which the bus does not.
Secondly, flexibility may be demanded even when today’s consumption is not
included in tomorrow’s menu. Suppose Alice is on a trip today where she expects to
use Uber’s competitor, Lyft, l. If she believes her tastes for all ride share services are
2
correlated, we may well observe,
(l, {b, u})  (l, {b}) % (l, {u}). (1.2)
Here the larger menu is strictly preferred to committing to either the bus or Uber for
tomorrow. This is because Alice believes that experiencing Lyft will inform her about
her taste for Uber. This indirect learning results from a correlation in Alice’s prior
beliefs about her tastes. More generally, every consumption choice of (subjectively)
uncertain value provides information to the agent. This information can be used to
update beliefs and improve decision making in the future.
Finally, learning through consumption leads to a trade-off between current con-
sumption utility and (endogenously generated) taste information. This can lead to
experimentation: purposeful action with the goal of resolving uncertainty. Formally,
experimentation can be captured by the following preferences:
(b, {w})  (u, {w}) and (u, {b, u})  (b, {b, u}). (1.3)
To understand experimentation in this context, consider the following example:
Tomorrow Alice plans to start a new job to which she will walk, w. She still has to
get to work today. She can take either the bus or the new Uber service. We observe
her taking the bus to work. This corresponds to (b, {w})  (u, {w}). A standard
revealed preference approach would conclude that Alice prefers the bus to the Uber.
However, during the workday she finds out she’ll be with her current company
for a few extra weeks. Knowing that she will face the choice between the bus and
the Uber several more times, we see her take the Uber home from work. That is
(u, {b, u})  (b, {b, u}). Now we might conclude Alice is revealing a preference for
Uber over the bus. Is this consistent with what we observed before?
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Yes, there is an important informational difference between these situations. In
the first situation, Alice expected the Uber to only provide current consumption value.
However, in the second situation Alice expects to face the bus/Uber choice again in
the future. This means taking the Uber provides Alice with taste information that
will be useful in her future decisions. This information may be valuable enough to
sway Alice’s decision, causing her to experiment.
To accommodate these behaviors, I extend the DLR framework to include con-
sumption prior to the choice from the menu. Formally, I study preference over pairs
of current consumption lotteries and follow-on menus (of lotteries). A typical choice
object is denoted (p,A), where p is a lottery over current consumption and A is a
follow-on menu. Each (pure) current consumption alternative is viewed as inducing a
positive additive expected utility (PAEU) preference over menus (as in DLR). While
in principle consumption can reveal information in a variety of ways, I model the
agent as if he learns u(c) after consumption of alternative c. In other words, prior
to consumption the agent has a rough idea of his utility function; he knows it lies in
set U and has formed a prior probability, µ, over this set. Now suppose p resolves
to yield a current consumption of c. Following consumption of c, the agent expects
to learn u(c). Given this information, he will be able to refine his knowledge (and
update µ accordingly) to the smaller set Pc(u) ⊂ U in which u′ ∈ Pc(u) if and only
if u′(c) = u(c). Using this new information he then selects tomorrow’s consumption
q from the previously chosen follow-on menu A. Importantly, A is selected prior to
consumption. Thus the agent is concerned with its ex-ante value. This ex-ante value
is the expected utility of the menu conditional on the endogenous information gener-
ated by the choice of current consumption. This process is captured by the preference
4
discovery (PD) representation:
W (p,A) = Ep
∑
u∈U
u(c) + δ max
q∈A
∑
u′∈Pc(u)
u′(q)µ(u′|Pc(u))
µ(u)
where Pc(u) = {u′ ∈ U : u′(c) = u(c)}
A notable feature of the above representation is that there is no exogenous set of
states. Rather, the agent’s state space, U , is subjective and can be identified through
choice over consumption-menu pairs. When we think about taste uncertainty, the
natural state space to consider is the set of possible utility functions which is by
nature subjective. However, subjective states are unobservable. So not only is a
subjective state space natural, but in fact this unobservability precludes the use of an
objective state space. To see this, note that in the Savage and Anscombe-Aumann
settings the role of the objective state space is to allow event-contingent claims to be
used to identify an agent’s utility and subjective probability. However, in the case of
taste uncertainty there is no longer an incentive compatible way to condition payoffs
on particular events because the events are subjective and unverifiable. Therefore, a
subjective state space framework, like DLR, is necessary to study taste uncertainty.
After introducing the model and studying some of its implications, I turn to the
question of eliciting parameters. Specifically, because full menu choice data is not
always available, I focus on providing results which aid in revealing taste uncertainty
with limited choice data. First, I show that experimentation can partially identify
the agent’s taste uncertainty. Thus, in a repeated choice context, observed prefer-
ence reversals are enough to reveal an agent’s taste uncertainty without needing to
directly observe an agent’s choice of follow-on menu. This means experimentation is
a potential behavioral alternative to flexibility that may be more readily observable.
The parameters of the PD model cannot be uniquely identified by experimentation
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behavior alone, however I show that preferences over a special class of small menus
(analogous to financial options) can be used to construct an agent’s entire subjective
state space.
The paper will proceed as follows: Section 1.2 discusses the related literature.
Section 1.3 begins by describing the setting, preference domain, and timing assump-
tions. I then describe the baseline model, a simple extension of the DLR framework
to include a prior consumption stage. The baseline model puts very few restrictions
on the learning process. The PD model restricts learning to be Bayesian, this model
is introduced in Section 1.4. This section also characterizes a special case of the PD
model in which there is no indirect consumption learning (Theorem 1.1). Section 1.5
uses this restricted PD representation to introduce the potential value concept. Sec-
tion 1.6 uses this concept to explore the case of indirect consumption learning. This
leads to the main representation result (Theorem 1.2). Examples of several types of
taste uncertainty permitted by the PD model are discussed.
Finally, section 1.7 focuses on eliciting the parameters of the PD model, with
a particular focus on limited data settings. The axioms imply that an agent with
taste uncertainty has an experimentation incentive. A behavioral definition of ex-
perimentation is provided. By observing this experimentation behavior, I show taste
uncertainty can be (partially) identified. I then give a graphical interpretation of the
potential value concept. This points to the final result of the paper: the parameters of
the PD representation can be elicited with a ‘small’ set of choice data (Theorem 1.3).
Proofs are provided in the main text when useful, all omitted proofs are collected in
an appendix. Additionally, there is an appendix discussing the independence of the
axioms and their relation to alternate learning processes.
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1.2 Related Literature
Subjective state space models were introduced by Kreps (1979). His study of prefer-
ences over menus yielded a representation featuring the agent’s implicit view of the
world. A seminal contribution of that paper was to suggest that it is possible to model
uncertainty without needing to assume a particular form for that uncertainty (i.e. an
objective set of states). However, Kreps’s state space was not unique. This made
the interpretation of his representation difficult. This issue is addressed by DLR.
By expanding the domain from Kreps’s menus of alternatives to menus of lotteries,
they show that under minimal assumptions (weak order, continuity, indifference to
randomization (IR), and non-triviality) this additional structure delivers a unique
state space consisting of a set of preference relations. When DLR strengthen IR to
independence and rule out a preference for commitment (preferring smaller menus)
they get a Positive Additive Expected Utility (PAEU) representation. The PAEU
representation provides the backbone of the model I describe in this paper. My main
point of divergence from that model is the addition of the prior consumption period;
this allows the information process to be endogenous to consumption. Behaviorally,
endogenizing information acquisition leads to a taste for experimentation.
Hyogo (2007) axiomatizes a model of experimentation. Hyogo studies an envi-
ronment with an abstract set of first stage actions which delivers a subjective sig-
nal about the objective state of the world. This information is used to choose an
Anscombe-Aumann act from a follow-on menu. Conceptually, this is quite similar
to the environment I study. In fact, I begin my analysis by adapting his model to
the subjective state space context. Nonetheless, the choice data we utilize is quite
different. First, I do not require an objective set of states. This permits the inter-
pretation of my model as one of taste uncertainty. This interpretation is precluded
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when states are assumed to be directly observed. Second, I restrict his abstract first
period actions to be consumption alternatives drawn from the same domain as the
elements of the follow-on menu. This restriction tightly links my model to the idea
of learning through consumption. Most importantly, I focus on a particular signal
process in which the agent’s realized consumption utility acts as the signal.
A key point of interest in my paper is the axiomatic characterization of Bayesian
updating in a subjective state space framework. Riella (2013) studies a closely related
question. In standard objective state space models, imposing dynamic consistency
ensures Bayesian updating. However, Riella points out that the standard dynamic
consistency axiom relies on objective states. He develops an alternative formula-
tion, which he calls flexibility consistency, that plays the same role in a subjective
state space environment. My paper differs from his in several ways. First, he works
with exogenous, objective information. Instead, I study a setting where subjective
information is endogenously generated through consumption. Additionally, we use
different timing assumptions. In his model, an event is observed prior to the selection
of the menu. My framework focuses on partitional information where the event is
realized only after the menu is selected. This timing assumption is also adopted in
Dillenberger, Lleras, Sadowski and Takeoka (2014) and Krishna and Sadowski (2014).
However, both of these papers focus on exogenous information processes and require
a set of objective states. Since information is exogenous to the agent’s actions, these
papers preclude the experimentation behavior that motivates my work.
The most closely related papers to mine are Ke (2013) and Piermont, Takeoka, and
Teper (2016). Both of these studies explore the role of consumption in determining
future preference. Ke models consumption externalities more generally. For instance,
his framework allows first period consumption to affect future preference through a
preference for variety or consumption complementarities. I instead focus specifically
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on the informational channel. Also, Ke works in a 2-period Krepsian world. This
leads to the same non-uniqueness as in Kreps (1979).
In contemporaneous work, Piermont et al. (2016) also focus on a setting with
taste uncertainty in which information is only generated through consumption. In
their model, after an agent tries two alternatives he learns his ordinal preference
between them. This process implies that an anticipated consumption stream induces
an ex-ante partition of the agent’s subjective state space. This generates a demand for
flexibility over menus which follow the consumption stream. Observing this demand
for flexibility allows the analyst to infer the induced partition and thus identify the
agent’s anticipated information process. Their main analysis takes place in a recursive
menu framework which allows them to identify the agent’s anticipated conditional
learning process. That is, conditional on a certain signal realization they can infer
which future signals the agent believes possible.
My analysis differs from Piermont et al. (2016) in several ways. Conceptually, our
models differ in the type of learning that we study. In my representation, the agent
learns the cardinal utility of the object he consumes rather than simply its ordinal
ranking relative to previously experienced goods. This means the agent expects to
learn about his preferences after a single instance of consumption. However, I do
not explore multiple consumption periods which means I cannot identify the agent’s
anticipated conditional learning process. Additionally, I offer a behavioral definition
of experimentation and show how this relates to the parameters of my model. My
technical analysis is also distinct. By focusing on a setting with lotteries and universal
best and worst alternatives, I show how the parameters of the model can be elicited
with much less choice data than is typical in the literature.
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1.3 The Baseline Model
In this paper, I study an agent with taste uncertainty. I investigate the choice be-
havior such an agent exhibits when some of his uncertainty can be resolved through
experience. By imposing axioms consistent with experiential learning, I derive a
utility representation with the interpretation that the act of consumption allows the
decision maker (DM) to learn about his own preferences.
Formally, consider a finite set of consumption alternatives C. Let ∆C denote the
set of lotteries over C and K be the collection of non-empty, compact subsets of
∆C. Endow ∆C with the standard Euclidean topology. The collection of menus,
K , is endowed with the Hausdorff topology2 and a mixture operation such that for
α ∈ [0, 1]
αA+ (1− α)B = {αp+ (1− α)q | p ∈ A, q ∈ B}.
The product space ∆C ×K has the product topology.
Notice each c ∈ C can be naturally identified with the the degenerate lottery
δc ∈ ∆C and each lottery p ∈ ∆C can be identified with the singleton menu {p} ∈ K .
Where it does not cause confusion, I abuse notation and write c instead of δc. Likewise,
the set of degenerate lotteries is denoted C and each singleton menu, {p}, is identified
with its unique element p.
I take a binary relation % on ∆C ×K as primitive. A typical choice object is
(p,A). Here p is a lottery over possible consumption alternatives. The realization
of this lottery is consumed prior to the agent’s choice from the follow-on menu, A.
Therefore, different lotteries provide potentially different information to the agent
2The topology induced by the Hausdorff metric:
dH(A,B) = max{ sup
a∈A
inf
b∈B
d(a, b), sup
b∈B
inf
a∈A
d(a, b) }
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and thus induce different preferences over menus. Let this induced preference, %p, be
defined such that:
A %p B iff (p,A) % (p,B).
The timing is as follows:
Choose
(p,A)
Lottery p resolves,
yielding c
c
Consumed
Value of c
revealed
Choose
q ∈ A
Lottery q resolves,
yielding c′
c′
Consumed
First, the agent chooses a consumption lottery and a follow-on menu of lotteries.
After the realization of the first period lottery, consumption occurs. The agent ob-
serves the utility of the consumed object and updates his beliefs accordingly. Then,
in an unmodeled second period, he chooses an option from the follow-on menu.
The induced preferences will be assumed to be representable in the following way:
Definition 1.1: Say (U , µ) is a finite positive additive expected utility
(fPAEU) representation of the induced preference %c if there exists a finite set
of expected utility functions, U , and a strictly positive measure positive measure, µ,
such that the function
Vc(A) =
∑
u∈U
max
a∈A
u(a)µ(u)
satisfies A %c B iff Vc(A) ≥ Vc(B) for all A,B ∈ K .
The above representation was introduced in DLR (2001; 2009). In these papers
it is shown that it is equivalent to the induced preference, %c, satisfying weak order,
continuity, independence, monotonicity (i.e. a preference for flexibility), and a tech-
nical finiteness condition. These conditions are stated formally in the appendix. The
major point of interest is that the set of utility functions, U , acts as a subjective state
space. Here the uncertainty can be understood to be over preferences, this provides
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a natural starting point for a model of taste uncertainty.
Under this interpretation of the fPAEU model, the agent should be viewed as
expecting the true state, u ∈ U , to be revealed prior to choosing from the menu.
Therefore, the demand for flexibility is driven be an unmodeled, exogenous informa-
tion process. However, as argued in the introduction, taste uncertainty is resolved
in a natural and endogenous way through consumption. In order to capture this
feature, I extend the model to include a prior consumption stage in which (expected)
consumption can affect menu preferences. To begin my analysis, I consider a sim-
ple extension of the fPAEU framework to incorporate an explicit prior consumption
phase. I relegate a full behavioral characterization of this to Appendix A.1, but I will
note that the associated representation theorem is a slight adaptation of the results
of Hyogo (2007) to the subjective state space setting.
Definition 1.2: A baseline representation of % is a tuple ({Uc, µc}c∈C, δ) such
that % is represented by a function with the following form:
W (p,A) = Ep [V (c) + δVc(A)] (1.4)
where for some c∗, c∗ ∈ C and for all c, c′, c′′ ∈ C:
(i) δ > 0,
(ii) Vc({c′′}) = Vc′({c′′}) ≡ V (c′′),
(iii) Vc(A) =
∑
u∈Uc
max
a∈A
u(a)µc(u), such that (Uc, µc) is an
fPAEU representation of %c,
(iv) µc is a probability measure with support Uc, and
(v) u(c∗) = 1, u(c∗) = 0, and u(c′) ∈ [0, 1] ∀u ∈ Uc.
The above model is a natural generalization of the fPAEU model to include infor-
mative first period consumption. Equation (1.4) is a fairly standard looking ex-ante
expected utility model in which the pair (p,A) is valued according to the (expected)
weighted sum of first period consumption utility and the anticipated utility of the
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follow-on menu. Notice that the value of the follow-on menu depends on first pe-
riod consumption (the realization of the lottery p). I impose five restrictions on this
general form.
The first two restrictions require that the agent: (i) values second period consump-
tion, and (ii) ranks follow-on singleton menus the same way as he ranks the analogous
first period consumption, regardless of his prior consumption decision. This second
restriction rules out changing tastes as well as non-informational, intertemporal com-
plementarities. For instance, models of habit formation or a preference for variety
would not fit into this framework. Recall that the follow-on menu is selected con-
currently with first period consumption. When the menu is singleton, consumption
information cannot affect the ex-ante valuation of that menu.
Next, (iii) assumes that any degenerate first period consumption induces a menu
preference, %c, which has an fPAEU representation. This allows me to carry the
subjective state space framework into this extended domain. Then (iv) imposes that
µc is a probability measure rather than the general positive measure allowed in the
fPAEU representation.
Finally, (v) restricts attention to settings which feature a best and worst alterna-
tive which are common across all subjective states. This assumption greatly simplifies
exposition, however it can be relaxed substantially.3 One benefit of such settings is
that it suggests a natural restriction on the state space:
Definition 1.3: Say a pair, (Uc, µc) is regular if µc is a probability measure with
support Uc and
Uc ⊆ {u : ∆C → [0, 1] | u({βc∗ + (1− β)c∗}) = β}.
By restricting attention to cases where u(c∗) = 1 and u(c∗) = 0 for all u ∈ Uc,
3All results hold as long as the agent strictly prefers c∗ to c∗ with certainty. See Remark 1 in the
appendix for a behavioral statement of this condition.
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the fPAEU representation is uniquely identified. In DLR, Uc and µc are only jointly
identified. Under this restriction, a meaningful probability measure can be obtained.
Additionally, under this restriction, each menu is indifferent to some singleton
menu containing only a lottery between c∗ and c∗. That is to say, for each pair (c, A),
there exists some β ∈ [0, 1] such that
A ∼c {βc∗ + (1− β)c∗} ≡ {βˆ}
Notice β is a real number between 0 and 1, while βˆ is a lottery which places probability
β on the best outcome and (1− β) on the worst outcome. It may be useful to think
of these βˆ’s as money values. Under this interpretation, c∗ (c∗), can be seen as an
amount of money greater (less) than all possible valuations of anything else in C.
1.4 (Only) Direct Consumption Learning
In the baseline model, the value of the follow-on menu is dependent on first period
consumption. Therefore, it permits learning through consumption. However, the
baseline model does not rule out other learning processes. For instance, if Vc = Vc′
for every c, c′ ∈ C then it is as if the agent receives the same information regardless
of his consumption choice. Such a situation should not be interpreted as learning
through consumption, but rather as an exogenous information process. Furthermore,
the baseline model imposes very little discipline on the relationship across the induced
preferences. Thus, no specific learning process is implied.
In this subsection, I place a simple restriction on the learning process that pins
down a particularly simple endogenous information process as well as a Bayesian up-
dating rule.
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No Indirect Learning (NIL): For any β ∈ [0, 1] and c, c′ ∈ C:
c 6= c′ =⇒ {c′, βˆ} ∼c {c′} or {c′, βˆ} ∼c {βˆ}.
Notice that if consuming c provides taste information about c′, the agent may wish
to delay choice between c′ and βˆ until after consumption of c. This would generate a
preference for flexibility, the agent strictly preferring {c′, βˆ} to either of its singleton
subsets. The NIL axiom rules out this behavior. An agent satisfying NIL will only
demand flexibility if c′ will be tried prior to choosing from the menu. If this condition
holds for all c′, then the agent can be thought of as only learning through direct
experience. In particular, for each c the induced preference, %c, will only exhibit a
demand for flexibility over menus which contain c or a lottery with c in its support.
Suppose an agent had uncertainty about his tastes for Uber. NIL implies this
uncertainty can only be resolved by using Uber. Consumption of other goods or
services (for instance, Lyft) would not help him to make a better determination of
his valuation of Uber rides. In the introduction, three motivating behaviors were
discussed. Consumption dependent flexibility, (1.1), and experimentation, (1.3), are
compatible with NIL. However, indirect consumption dependent flexibility, (1.2), is
ruled out by NIL.
Adding this assumption to the baseline model pins down a particularly simple
learning process and yields an easily interpretable model. Before showing this, I first
define a few terms:
Definition 1.4: A Preference Discovery (PD) representation of % is a tuple
(U , µ, δ) where (U , µ) is a regular pair in which U is a finite set of expected utility
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functions, and δ is a positive constant such that % is represented by:
W (p,A) = Ep
∑
u∈U
u(c) + δ max
q∈A
∑
u′∈Pc(u)
u′(q)µ(u′|Pc(u))
µ(u)
where Pc(u) = {u′ ∈ U : u′(c) = u(c)}
The PD representation is the main model of interest in this paper. While the base-
line representation allowed for nearly arbitrary learning processes, the PD model
focuses on the a specific model of learning in which consumption of c informs the
agent of u(c).4 This information is then used to Bayesian update the agent’s beliefs
about his tastes. This model reduces the parameter space of the baseline model from
({Uc, µc}c∈C, δ) to (U , µ, δ), thus offering a more parsimonious view of the agent.
Definition 1.5: A PD representation, (U , µ, δ), has a product structure if for all
u ∈ U :
µ(u) =
∏
c∈C
µ(Pc(u))
where Pc(u) = {u′ ∈ U : u′(c) = u(c)}.
Imposing this product structure on the PD representation rules out any correlation
across alternatives in the agent’s prior belief about his tastes. Therefore, consumption
is only able to provide direct information about the consumed alternative. Theorem
1.1 demonstrates that this structure is equivalent to the behavioral condition, NIL.
Theorem 1.1:
(Existence): % has a baseline representation and satisfies NIL if and only if it has a
PD representation with a product structure.
(Uniqueness): % has at most one PD representation with a product structure.
4The requirement that (U , µ) is regular is what allows the cardinal utility of c to be interpreted
as a meaningful quantity.
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This theorem shows that the NIL condition characterizes a specific learning process
for the agent.5 Specifically, in the PD representation, (U , µ, δ), µ can be viewed as
the agent’s prior belief about his tastes. This prior belief, µ, has support U . This
prior is consistent with the fPAEU representation, (Uc, µc), of each induced menu
preference, %c, in the sense that:
µc(Pc(u)) = µ(Pc(u)) for every c ∈ C and u ∈ U .
So in the PD model, the agent can be interpreted as expecting to learn the utility
value of his first period consumption, c, prior to choosing from the follow-on menu.
The product structure rules out any other learning. Specifically,
µ(Pc′(u)) = µ(Pc′(u)|Pc(u)) for every c, c′ ∈ C and u ∈ U .
That is, given the product structure, learning the value of c cannot affect the agent’s
beliefs about the value of c′.
1.5 c-Potential Values
The next step in exploring the PD model is to look for a weakening of NIL which
provides the PD structure while allowing the possibility of indirect learning. In service
of this goal, this section calls attention to some features of the representation which
can be mapped directly into behavior. Specifically, I investigate the structure of the
set of utility functions, U . Given some U , it will be useful to consider the following
set:
Kc,c = {u(c) ∈ [0, 1] : u ∈ U }
5The example in section 1.7.4 explores the limitations of the uniqueness result in Theorem 1.1.
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Kc,c is the set of potential values of alternative c.
6 This is the set of the agent’s
subjectively possible utility realizations of c. Given this definition, I can state the
following simple result:
Proposition 1.1: If (U , µ, δ) is a PD representation, then
U ⊆
∏
c∈C
Kc,c.
Moreover, if (U , µ, δ) has a product structure, then U =
∏
c∈C
Kc,c.
This proposition highlights the essential role played by potential values in the con-
struction of the PD representation. Notably, these potential values can be identified
behaviorally. This is shown below:
Proposition 1.2: Suppose % has a PD representation, (U , µ, δ), then for any
c ∈ C
β ∈ Kc,c ⇐⇒ {βˆ, c} ∪ {12c+ 12 βˆ′} c {βˆ, c} for every β′ ∈ (β, 1].
To understand this proposition, first notice that the agent’s only taste uncertainty
in the menus on the right is about c. Moreover, the agent expects to consume c (and
learn its true value) prior to choice from the menu. Therefore if β = β′ the agent
would always be indifferent between the two menus, i.e.
{βˆ, c} ∪ {1
2
c+ 1
2
βˆ} ∼c {βˆ, c}.
This follows because if consumption of c reveals u(c) > β the agent will choose c and
otherwise choose βˆ. The agent never strictly prefers the lottery. Now suppose that
for every u ∈ U , u(c) 6= β. Then, for any sufficiently small  the above indifference
6The reason for the double subscript will become clear shortly.
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will continue to hold even if the lottery 1
2
c+ 1
2
βˆ is slightly improved to 1
2
c+ 1
2
(β̂ + ).
So the only time the right hand side of the proposition can be true for all β′ > β is
when the agent believes he may learn that u(c) = β. Thus the set of potential values
of c is exactly characterized by this behavior. This potential value concept focuses
on what the agent believes he may learn about u(c) given the consumption of c.
Next, I introduce a generalization of this concept. This will be used extensively
in the next section to explore the case of indirect learning.
Definition 1.6: Fix c ∈ C, p ∈ ∆C, and β ∈ [0, 1]. β is a c-potential value of p if:
{βˆ, p} ∪ {1
2
p+ 1
2
βˆ′} c {βˆ, p} whenever β < β′ ≤ 1.
While potential values only talk about how consumption teaches the agent about
the thing which was consumed, the c-potential value concept extends the logic of the
potential value to handle cases in which consuming c can inform the agent about
his tastes for an arbitrary lottery p. The set of c-potential values of p (denoted Kc,p)
should be thought of as the set of updated expected values of p that the agent believes
he may face conditional on observing the realized value of c. The next section shows
how c-potential values can be used to relax NIL and characterize a version of the PD
model in which indirect learning is permitted.
1.6 Indirect Consumption Learning
In section 1.4, I characterized a special case of the PD model which rules out indirect
consumption learning. However, there are many cases in which this is not desirable.
For instance, an agent may believe his tastes for products within the same category
are correlated. Thus consuming one product may affect the agent’s beliefs about
his tastes for related products. Prior to exploring such examples in section 1.6.3,
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I characterize another special case of the PD model in which indirect learning is
allowed. The characterization will be based on two axioms that jointly weaken NIL
and a structural condition which ensures uniqueness of the representation. This
last condition is incompatible with NIL, therefore I am unable to provide a unique
representation result for the general PD model. This is because the two period setting
examined here is not sufficient to pin down the agent’s conditional beliefs. That is to
say, in terms of the PD model, that for a given realization of the u(c) all we can infer
about c′ is Eµ(u′(c′)|Pc(u)) and not some finer information structure. This is more
thoroughly discussed in section 1.7.4.
1.6.1 Weakening NIL
A1 (Weak Indirect Learning): For any c ∈ C and p ∈ ∆C, |Kc,p| ≤ |Kc,c|.
Loosely, this axiom says that consumption of c tells the agent more about c than
about things that are not c. More formally, A1 ensures that two subjective states
which agree on the value of c cannot be distinguished through the consumption of c.
This restriction is what delivers the key feature of the PD representation, that
the agent only learns by discovering u(c) upon consumption of c. Since this learning
process is so specialized, A1 is ruling out quite a few other potential avenues of
learning. For instance, a first period consumption of known constant value cannot be
informative about the follow-on menu.
Additionally, A1 is potentially incompatible with separately learning about the
constituent parts of a consumption object. Suppose c is a meal consisting of two
ingredients which both have an uncertain value. The agent is certain that he dislikes
one ingredient and likes the other, but is unsure which is which. If in both possible
states, the complete meal has the same aggregate utility then A1 requires the agent
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not learn anything. Specifically, anticipated consumption of the two-ingredient meal
cannot induce a demand for flexibility in follow-on menus containing one or both of
these ingredients.
Furthermore, A1 rules out a wide class of exogenous information processes which
could in principle provide information regardless of the agent’s consumption choices.
One notable process which is ruled out by this axiom is learning through introspection.
Suppose, that between choosing (c, A) and picking an element from the menu A, the
agent plans to spend time thinking about his preferences for things in A. Then even
if c is of known consumption value (having a unique potential value), we should
expect the agent to have multiple c-potential values for the options he spends time
introspecting about. This would violate A1. Adding introspection to a model of
preference discovery is an interesting direction for future work. Of particular interest
is endogenous introspection which can vary with (c, A).
Weak indirect learning is implied by NIL. To see this, suppose NIL holds. If
c 6= c′, then the unique c-potential value of c′ would be the ex-ante expected value
of c′. It is straightforward to show there is always at least one c-potential value of
c, therefore A1 is satisfied. It is also worth noticing that, since the βˆ lotteries are of
certain expected value, every lottery p will have a unique βˆ-potential value. So under
A1, information can only be revealed if the value of the first period consumption is
uncertain.
A1 places restrictions on what each induced preference may look like. However,
it places no restriction across different induced preferences. The following axiom im-
poses this type of consistency condition, ensuring that the various induced preferences
can be viewed as Bayesian posteriors of the same prior.
A2 (Choice Relevant Value): Take any c ∈ C, β ∈ [0, 1], and any sequence
of lotteries, {pn}, in which pn → c. Define βˆ′pn such that {βˆ′pn} ∼c {pn, βˆ}. Then for
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any c′ ∈ C
{pn, βˆ} c′ {βˆ′pn} ∀n =⇒ β is a c-potential value of c.
Let’s understand this axiom in parts. First, βˆ′pn is defined to be the ex-ante expected
value of the menu {pn, βˆ} conditional on the information process generated by con-
suming c. This means {pn, βˆ} c′ {βˆ′pn} can only be true if c′ provides more choice
relevant information than c, in the sense that consumption of c′ instead of c improves
the expected choice from the menu.
Next, observe that if % has a baseline representation, then A2 implies that con-
suming c provides as much information about c as does consuming any c′. Formally,
A2 implies7 that for any β, β′ ∈ [0, 1]:
{βˆ′} ∼c {c, βˆ} =⇒ {βˆ′} %c′ {c, βˆ} ∀c′ ∈ C.
Given this observation, if {pn, βˆ} c′ {βˆ′pn} is true for all n, then under continuity
(implicit in the baseline representation) we find:
{c, βˆ} ∼c′ {βˆ′} ∼c {c, βˆ}.
It is easy to verify that this implies that the set of c′-potential values of c (denoted
Kc′,c) exactly coincides with Kc,c. Intuitively, this means that A2 ensures that there
is no better way to learn about c than to try it (loosely, for every c′, |Kc′,c| ≤ |Kc,c|).
This is subtly different from A1 which restricts the degree of indirect learning. That is,
A1 limits what the consumption of c can teach the agent about c′ (i.e. |Kc,c′| ≤ |Kc,c|).
In other words, A1 places an upper bound on indirect learning and A2 places a lower
bound on direct learning.
Now notice as pn approaches c each c
′-potential value of pn approaches some
7This implication is proven in Proposition 1.5 in the appendix.
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particular c′-potential value of c. Thus, if β 6∈ Kc′,c there will be some sufficiently
large n such that the realized c′-potential value of pn is greater than β if and only if
the realized c′-potential value of c is greater than β. Since Kc′,c = Kc,c, this implies
that consumption of c′ instead of c can only affect the agent’s (state contingent) choice
from the menu if β ∈ Kc,c.
When % has a baseline representation and NIL holds, A2 has no additional con-
tent. This result follows since A2 only has content if Kc′,c = Kc,c. But under NIL,
this can only happen if there is no taste uncertainty about c (i.e Kc,c is singleton).
But in that case, A2 only imposes that {c} has the same βˆ equivalent under each
induced preference. This is a form of stationarity which is implied by the baseline
model (see axiom B5 in the appendix).
So given a baseline representation, A1 and A2 are jointly weaker than NIL. Un-
fortunately, these axioms do not provide quite enough structure to yield a unique
representation theorem. In order to provide a result for the case of indirect learning,
I will restrict attention to settings in which there is a maximally informative alter-
native (MIA). Consumption of the MIA provides at least as much information about
tastes as can be gleaned from any other consumption alternative. Notice, the exis-
tence of an MIA is incompatible with NIL. This means the resulting representation
theorem will not be a generalization of theorem 1.1, but rather characterize a distinct
special case of the general PD model. Behaviorally, settings with an MIA satisfy the
following condition:
A3 (Maximally Informative Alternative): There exists some c¯ ∈ C such
that for every c ∈ C and A ∈ K :
A ∼c {βˆ} =⇒ A %c¯ {βˆ}.
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For each c, every menu has some β-equivalent which can be interpreted as the ex-
pected value of that menu given the anticipated information revealed by consumption
of c. If c is replaced by a more informative alternative we should expect the valuation
of all menus to increase. This axiom assumes there is some c¯ ∈ C which provides a
superset of the information of all other consumption possibilities. At first glance this
assumption seems very strong. However, this axiom only imposes an assumption on
the information value of c, not its consumption value. Because of this, often times a
suitable transformation of the domain will yield such a c¯.
For instance, suppose C = {steak, chicken, lobster}. Here consuming chicken may
provide different information than the other meals. This situation would fail to satisfy
A3. However, augmenting the set of outcomes to include a sampler platter with all
three meals intuitively solves this issue.8 Though consuming this sampler platter will
likely provide more information than any of the individual meals, it may be very
costly. But that’s fine, the maximally informative alternative may be nearly as bad
as the worst alternative.
Ultimately, this axiom provides a measuring stick with which to compare all other
induced preferences. In particular, the proof of the representation theorem will rely
on the sequences in A2 to ensure that more informative consumption choices induce
fPAEU preferences which are consistent with all less informative choices.9 However,
in general information is partially ordered. This axiom ensures there is a maximum
of this ordering on C. In turn, this allows the PD representation to be uniquely
identified using only ex-ante preference data over two periods. A3 could be relaxed if
8Note, there is some tension between this sampler platter idea and the multi-ingredient meal
issue pointed out in the discussion of A1. However, as long as each subjective state is associated
with a distinguishable consumption value for the sampler platter, this tension disappears.
9Here the information ranking can be thought of in terms of the Blackwell ordering. Formally,
this can be shown by adapting Theorem 2 from Dillenberger et al. (2014) to the subjective state
space setting.
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more periods of choice data are observed. In essence, if the agent has enough periods
to try all the alternatives in C before selecting from the menu it is as if he tried the
maximally informative alternative. In this sense, A3 provides a sufficient condition
for the unique identification of the PD representation without having to consider a
much larger domain. Piermont et al. (2016) study an infinite horizon problem, this
alleviates the need for an analogous assumption in their setting.
With these three axioms in hand, I can now turn to the main result of this paper.
But first I need one definition:
Definition 1.7: A PD representation, (U , µ, δ), is separating if there is some
c ∈ C such that when u 6= u′
u, u′ ∈ U =⇒ u(c) 6= u′(c).
This defines a restriction on the PD model such that alternative c separates the states
in U in the sense that u(c) takes a distinct value for each u ∈ U . In this paper, the
maximally informative alternative, c¯, will play this role. We can think of u(c¯) as a
sufficient statistic with respect to the agent’s subjective state space. So learning the
value of the maximally informative alternative resolves all the uncertainty which is
possible to resolve through a single instance of consumption.
Now the main representation theorem:
Theorem 1.2: % has a baseline representation and satisfies A1, A2, and A3 if and
only if it has a unique separating PD representation.
Theorem 2 shows that relaxing NIL to A1 and A2 removes the product structure
restriction from the representation. Because of this, there can now be correlation
across alternatives in the agent’s beliefs about his taste uncertainty. This allows the
possibility of indirect learning. However, in order to get a unique representation,
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I assume the existence of a maximally informative alternative. Since an MIA is
incompatible with NIL, Theorem 2 is not a generalization of Theorem 1. Instead it
characterizes a distinct special case of the PD representation.
1.6.2 Proof Sketch of Theorem 1.2
A full proof is provided in the appendix, but I discuss the proof of sufficiency of
the axioms in broad strokes here. The starting point of the proof is the baseline
representation. By assumption, we know % has a baseline representation. This means
that there exists a tuple ({Uc, µc}c∈C, δ) such that % is represented by
W (p,A) = Ep [V (c) + δVc(A)]
where for all c, c′, c′′ ∈ C, Vc(A) =
∑
Uc
max
a∈A
u(a)µc(u), (Uc, µc) is a regular fPAEU of
the induced preference %c, and Vc({c′′}) = Vc′({c′′}) ≡ V ({c′′}).
This already has a flavor of learning through consumption. Specifically, the valu-
ation of A, Vc(A), is indexed by c. Thus c is valuable not only for its consumption
utility, V (c), but also for its effect on the value of the menu A. However, the na-
ture of the learning process in this representation is arbitrary. In order to develop
a full model of consumption learning it is desirable to have an explicit model of the
relationship between the various pairs (Uc, µc).
The key task of this proof is showing that axioms A1-A3 imply this relationship
is Bayesian. A3 postulates the existence of a maximally informative alternative, c¯.
With A1, I show the fPAEU representation of the menu preference induced by this
maximally informative alternative, %c¯, has the separating form. The remainder of
the proof shows that all other induced preference are ‘consistent’ with this one in
the sense that their fPAEU representations can be viewed as coarser partitions of
26
(Uc¯, µc¯).
The main insight is that comparisons of the form {p, βˆ} ∼c {βˆ′} tell us about
the agent’s conditional expected utility for p. As will be discussed in section 1.7.2
(Theorem 1.3), this can be used to construct the agent’s induced state space for
each c. The contrapositive of A2 implies that for a sequence of lotteries pn which
approaches c there is some sufficiently large n for which the following is true:
For β 6∈ Kc,c {pn, βˆ} ∼c {βˆ′} =⇒ {pn, βˆ} ∼c′ {βˆ′} ∀c′ ∈ C.
This condition allows me to relate the conditional expected value of pn,
Eµc
[
u(pn)|u(pn) > β
]
across the menu preferences induced by different consumptions. The meat of the
proof argues that this is sufficient to provide the desired consistency. Having shown
this, it becomes clear that (Uc¯, µc¯, δ) is a separating PD representation which is
numerically identical to the baseline representation. Since (Uc¯, µc¯) is a regular fPAEU
representation, uniqueness follows from the DLR result.
1.6.3 Examples of Taste Uncertainty
In order to explore some possible applications of the PD model, I consider two special
cases in which additional structure is placed on the domain of consumption objects,
C. This highlights two particular types of taste uncertainty which fit into the PD
framework. Each is substantiated by a real world example.
Related Experience Goods
The most straightforward interpretation of the PD model is that of an agent learning
the match specific utility of some experience good through consumption. When an
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agent believes his tastes to be correlated across related experience goods, he can learn
through indirect consumption. That is consuming one product can help the agent
learn about his tastes for related products.
For instance, anti-depressants are a well known example of experience goods.10
Treatment success for this class of drugs tends to have idiosyncratic variation across
patients. Therefore, a patient’s utility for a particular prescription is unknown until
he has spent time taking the drug. Moreover, there are several families of drugs which
are known to affect similar patients in similar ways. Thus if one drug is unsuccessful
the patient (or more probably his doctor) not only learns that his utility for that drug
is low, but also updates his beliefs about the value of taking other anti-depressants
from the same family.
This sort of learning only within (exogenous) product categories is equivalent to
the following variant of the No Indirect Learning axiom:
Category Learning (CL): Suppose C is partitioned into categories. If c and c′ are
in distinct categories, then for each β ∈ [0, 1] either {c′, βˆ} ∼c {c′} or {c′, βˆ} ∼c {βˆ}.
Definition 1.8: A PD representation, (U , µ, δ) has a product structure across
categories if for any c and c′ in distinct categories and u ∈ U :
µ(Pc(u)) = µ(Pc(u)|Pc′(u)).
The proof of theorem 1.1 can be easily adapted to show that any PD representation
of a preference satisfying CL must have a product structure across categories. Alter-
natively, CL can be viewed as a test for whether an agent’s behavior is consistent
with a particular (partitional) categorization scheme.
10This example is adapted from Dickstein (2014). See his article for a thorough description of
the market and a structural model which permits indirect consumption learning within product
categories.
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Trade-offs across Product Attributes11
Now consider the case where C ⊂ RN . In this setting, consumption objects can be
viewed as multi-attribute products. An agent may well be certain of his tastes within
each particular attribute. Even so, he may be uncertain of his ranking of all objects
in C. Specifically, he may be unsure of the trade-off across attributes.
For instance, when searching for apartments a renter tends to consider many
attributes. Among other features, the renter might value apartment size, age, and
price. He may even know he strictly prefers larger, newer, and cheaper apartments.
However, he might have difficulty ranking a smaller, cheaper apartment against a
larger, more expensive one. To be concrete, consider the following (equally new)
apartments:
1. Apartment A: 900 sq. ft, $900/month rent
2. Apartment B: 500 sq. ft, $900/month rent
3. Apartment C: 900 sq. ft, $2500/month rent
The renter may well be certain that A is better than B or C, yet be uncertain of
his relative preference for apartments B and C. For instance, he may be uncertain
whether he values the apartments according to u1 =
size
rent
or u2 =
size
30
√
rent
. This
approximately corresponds to:
u1 u2
A 1 1
B .56 .56
C .36 .6
If the renter views u1 and u2 as equally likely and apartment A is unavailable
we might expect him to lease apartment B. Notice, under the PD framework this
11Thanks to Ran Spiegler for bringing this type of taste uncertainty to my attention.
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would not help him to resolve his taste uncertainty. While apartment C has a lower
expected consumption value, it also has the benefit of helping the renter to resolve his
taste uncertainty. Therefore, the renter may well find it optimal to take a short term
lease on apartment C and leave open the option of moving to the smaller, cheaper
apartment B once he figures out his preferences. In terms of the PD model this
could occur if δ is sufficiently large. Intuitively, this happens if the agent will rent
for sufficiently many periods to make the information gain outweigh the expected
present consumption loss. This would be an example of experimentation. This idea
is explored more formally in the next section.
1.7 Identifying Taste Uncertainty
1.7.1 Partial Identification through Experimentation
The motivating idea behind this paper is the observation that (unobservable) taste
uncertainty generates an incentive to experiment and that this (observable) experi-
mentation can in turn reveal an agent’s taste uncertainty. In this subsection, I explore
the question of what exactly experimentation can reveal. In service of this question,
I begin by formally defining what I mean by experimentation.
Definition 1.9: Given %, 〈a, b, A〉 is an experimentation tuple iff for every c ∈ C
(a, {c})  (b, {c}) and (b, A)  (a,A).
The idea behind this definition is that we can say the agent is experimenting if and
only if he is willing to forego current consumption utility in order to gain (taste)
information relevant to his future choice problem, A. When the follow-on menu
is singleton, there is no instrumental role for information. Therefore, the ranking of
current consumption alternatives should reveal the agent’s true preference ordering. If
the agent’s ranking of current consumption choices changes when the follow-on menu
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is non-singleton, then we may infer that he is engaging in costly experimentation.12
That is, he is willing to sacrifice current consumption utility in order to obtain new
information.
This behavioral definition of experimentation allows the analyst to observe exper-
imentation without needing any knowledge of the payoffs associated with individual
consumption objects. Moreover, this doesn’t assume any particular learning rule for
the agent. I believe this is the first non-parametric definition of experimentation in
the literature. The existing literature on experimentation relies on knowledge of the
agent’s beliefs, updating rule, and/or payoffs to identify when an agent is experiment-
ing.
With this definition in hand, I move on to the question of what we can learn
from observed experimentation. This exercise is motivated by the observation that
menu choice data (that is, choice between menus) may be difficult to observe in many
empirical settings. In such settings, the standard approach of eliciting subjective
states by observing the demand for flexibility cannot be applied.
For instance, doctors do not choose the menu of drugs from which they can write
prescriptions, this is set by the marketplace. However, we do observe their choices
of what drugs to prescribe. Suppose there are two depressed patients with identical
symptoms who go visit a benevolent doctor. The doctor expects the first patient
to visit regularly, but believes the second patient is unlikely to return for a future
visit. In the first case the doctor will be able to adjust the medication in the future,
essentially facing a repeated choice problem over drugs. For the other, the prescription
is a commitment to only use a single course of treatment. Anti-depressants typically
12Requiring definition 1.9 to hold for every c is unnecessary in the context of the PD model since
this consistency is imposed by the baseline representation. However, defining experimentation in
this way allows definition 1.9 to be viewed as a general definition of experimentation, independent
from the assumptions underlying the PD model. Imposing this consistency requirement rules out
alternate causes of the preference reversal, such as preference for variety or habit formation.
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have idiosyncratic efficacy across patients and experimentation can be useful in order
to determine the best drug-patient match. If the doctor prescribes different anti-
depressants to these two patients we might infer that he is ‘experimenting’ on the first
patient. That is he assigns a drug that has a lower immediate expected payoff, but
may be more informative about future treatment options.13 Notice in this example,
the doctor’s preference for flexibility is not observed. Whether or not the follow-on
menu was singleton was simply a characteristic of the patient he was treating and not
his own choice. Nonetheless, we could observe his experimentation. Thus, when the
data do not permit the demand for flexibility to be observed, it may still be possible
to detect experimentation.
The following two propositions demonstrate what this experimentation can teach
us about taste uncertainty. Both of these focus on a simple type of binary experi-
mentation, which I call the experimentation pair.
Definition 1.10: Given %, 〈a, b〉 is an experimentation pair iff for every c ∈ C
(a, {c})  (b, {c}) and (b, {a, b})  (a, {a, b}).
First, I observe that experimentation pairs occur in the PD model when b is inferior
to a in terms of expected consumption value, but promises to provide (sufficiently)
more taste information. This can only happen when there is uncertainty with respect
to the relative ranking of a and b. This very intuitive property can be formalized as
follows:
Proposition 1.3: Fix a PD representation, (U , µ, δ). If 〈a, b〉 is an experimenta-
tion pair, then there are u and u′ in U such that u(a) > u(b) and u′(a) < u′(b).
Proposition 3 shows that observed experimentation is a sufficient (but not neces-
sary) condition to infer relative taste uncertainty. Specifically, an agent may believe
13Perhaps one class of drugs is unlikely to completely control the depression, but produces a range
of minor side effects which are differentially informative about what other anti-depressants might
work.
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that there is some subjective state in which u(b) > u(a) and still not be willing to ex-
periment in the first period if the immediate loss in expected utility is too large. Thus
proposition 1.3 can be interpreted as showing that relative taste uncertainty can be re-
vealed by experimentation, but only sometimes. However, the next proposition shows
that the absolute presence of taste uncertainty is always revealed by experimentation.
Proposition 1.4: Fix a PD representation, (U , µ, δ), and some c ∈ C. Then the
following are true:
(i) There are u, u′ ∈ U such that u(c) 6= u′(c) if and only if there exists β ∈ [0, 1]
such that
〈
βˆ, c
〉
is an experimentation pair.
(ii) If
〈
βˆ, c
〉
is an experimentation pair for some β, then
V (c) ≡ Eµ[u(c)] = inf
{
β ∈ [0, 1]|
〈
βˆ, c
〉
is an experimentation pair
}
.
This proposition shows that (i) taste uncertainty always manifests itself in experi-
mentation and that (ii) when an agent is uncertain about his tastes for c, the expected
utility of c can be identified as the lower bound of the set of β’s for which
〈
βˆ, c
〉
is an
experimentation pair. So while experimentation behavior alone cannot fully identify
the parameters of the PD representation, it nonetheless is useful in diagnosing the
presence of taste uncertainty and provides a way of eliciting expected utilities.
1.7.2 Identification with Option Menus
In section 1.5, it was demonstrated that c-potential values play a crucial role in
the construction of the PD representation. A behavioral description of this concept
was already developed, however a graphical representation reveals another impor-
tant insight. This subsection uses this graphical representation to fully identify the
parameters of a regular fPAEU representation with limited choice data.
Recall that every induced menu preference, %c, has a regular fPAEU represen-
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tation. In this section, I describe a novel approach to eliciting the representation’s
parameters, (Uc, µc). The literature (see DLR) typically relies on studying instances
where flexibility is demanded to elicit the subjective state space, Uc. When there ex-
ists a known best and worst alternative, I observe that this elicitation can be achieved
with substantially less choice data. This is motivated by viewing the β’s as money
values. Under this interpretation, menus of the form {p, βˆ} can be seen as an analog
to financial options:
Definition: A menu, A ∈ K , is an option if A = {p, βˆ} where p ∈ ∆C and
β ∈ [0, 1].
Consider the option, {p, βˆ}. To make the analogy to financial options clear, I refer
to the lottery p as the underlying and to β as the strike price. There is (potentially)
subjective uncertainty about the value of the underlying lottery p. On the other hand,
the strike price yields a state-independent expected payoff. Here p is analogous to a
share of stock and β a fixed money value. I refer to the β-equivalent of an option as
its price. Formally, for some particular initial consumption c,
Definition: β′ ∈ [0, 1] is the price of the option {p, βˆ} if {p, βˆ} ∼c {βˆ′}.
It will be helpful to think of an option’s price, β′, as a function of its strike price,
β. Such functions are useful for identifying the parameters of the PD representation.
The following figures illustrate the essential features of this function under two simple
cases.
First, I consider a standard EU maximizing agent who is subjectively certain that
the degenerate lottery c has an expected value of 0.5 utils. Behaviorally, this implies
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Figure 1·1: No Taste Uncertainty
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whenever β ≤ 0.5 the agent is ex-ante certain that he will choose c from the menu
{c, βˆ}.
Thus, we should expect {c, βˆ} ∼c {c} ∼c {.ˆ5} whenever β ≤ 0.5 and, by similar
reasoning, {c, βˆ} ∼c {βˆ} whenever β > 0.5. This is illustrated in Figure 1·1.
Figure 1·2 illustrates the case of an agent with subjective uncertainty about the
value of c. In particular he believes that, with equal probability, c is worth either 0.3
or 0.7 utils and that this uncertainty will resolve prior to choosing from the menu.
Notice that c is still worth 0.5 utils in expectation. As before, we should expect the
price of the option to be 0.5 for low strike prices and equal to the strike price for high
strike prices. In particular,{c, βˆ} ∼c {.ˆ5} if β ≤ 0.3 and that {c, βˆ} ∼c {βˆ} whenever
β ≥ 0.7. In these cases the agent is certain of what he will choose from the option
menu even before the value of c is realized. The interesting question is what price
the option should take for intermediate values of β. When β ∈ (0.3, 0.7), the agent
conditions his choice from the menu on the realized value of c.
After this realization, he determines whether it is better to choose βˆ or c. Ex-ante,
the agent believes each utility level of c is equally likely (probability = 1
2
). Therefore,
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Figure 1·2: Two Subjective States
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he is (ex-ante) indifferent between the option, {c, βˆ}, and the singleton {1
2
(.ˆ7) + 1
2
βˆ}.
That is, he believes that with probability .5 the state in which the value of c is .7 will
occur and he will choose c from the menu. The rest of time he anticipates choosing
βˆ. Since we know,
{c, βˆ} ∼c {12(.ˆ7) + 12 βˆ},
we can apply the PD representation to fill in the middle part of the function in Figure
1·2. Specifically, for intermediate values of the strike price (i.e. β ∈ (.3, .7))
W (c, {c, βˆ}) = W (c, {1
2
(.ˆ7) + 1
2
βˆ})
V (c) + δVc({c, βˆ}) = V (c) + δVc({12(.ˆ7) + 12 βˆ})
Vc({c, βˆ})︸ ︷︷ ︸
Option Price
= .35 + .5︸︷︷︸
µ{u|u(c)<β}
∗ β︸︷︷︸
Strike Price
In Figures 1·1 and1·2, notice that the x-axis position of each kink corresponds directly
to a c-potential value of c. If instead we considered the option price induced by initial
consumption of c′ (rather than c), then these kinks would be the c′-potential values of
c. If we change the underlying from c to p, then the kinks are the c-potential values
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of p. A function with more kinks corresponds to more potential values and therefore
more states which the agent expects to become distinguishable prior to choice from
the menu.
I’ve shown that the kinks of the option price curve associated with {c, βˆ} can be
interpreted as the c-potential values of the c. Interestingly, we can also interpret the
slope of this curve as the agent’s subjective cumulative distribution function (CDF)
over these c-potential values of c. Specifically, at a strike price of β, the slope of
the option curve equals µc(u ∈ Uc|u(c) ≤ β). Since the option curve can be derived
from behavior, this gives us a way of eliciting the u(c)-marginals of µc. Moreover, the
option curves for non-degenerate underlying lotteries allow the full identification of
(Uc, µc). This idea is formalized in Theorem 1.3.14
Theorem 1.3: Consider two induced preferences, %a and %b, which both have
fPAEU representations and share common best and worst alternatives.15 If for every
option menu, {p, βˆ},
{p, βˆ} ∼a {βˆ′} ⇐⇒ {p, βˆ} ∼b {βˆ′}, then %a=%b .
Theorem 1.3 shows that if two preferences share a common state-independent best
and worst alternative and have distinct fPAEU representations, then they must price
some option menu differently. In other words, if the consumption of a and b each
induce the same preference over option menus, then they must induce the same pref-
erence over all menus. If we restrict attention to a preference known to have a regular
fPAEU representation, this theorem implies that preference data on options is suffi-
14Lu (2016) proves a result with a similar flavor in the context of an objective state space. He also
finds that binary menus are enough to identify his model, however his technique does not readily
generalize in the absence of objective states. Thus the method of proof for Theorem 1.3 is novel to
this paper.
15An fPAEU representation, (Uc, µc), has a known best and worst alternative if there exists c∗
and c∗ such that for every u ∈ Uc, u(c∗) = 1, u(c∗) = 0, and for all c′ ∈ C u(c) ∈ [0, 1]. A behavioral
characterization of this condition is provided in the appendix. Moreover, best/worst can be relaxed
to u(c∗) < u(c∗) for all u ∈ Uc. This relaxation is further discussed in a remark at the end of
appendix A.1.
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cient to identify its parameters.
The proof of this theorem is constructive and therefore could be useful in appli-
cations. Moreover, it demonstrates how the c-potential value concept aids in model
identification. For instance, models which characterize the optimal pricing of experi-
ence goods take the distribution of possible utilities as an input. The proof suggests
that observing an agent’s willingness to pay for option menus would allow a firm
to learn this distribution. Of particular interest is the case of related experience
goods. There, the construction of the state space reveals the agent’s beliefs about the
correlation of his utility across goods.
1.7.3 Proof of Theorem 1.3
The βˆ lotteries over the common best and worst alternatives provide a numeraire with
which to ‘price’ the option menus using each preference. By assumption, %a and %b
agree on this price for all option menus. Then, by lemma 1 in the appendix, both will
have unique regular fPAEU representations, respectively (Ua, µa) and (Ub, µb). The
body of this proof constructs a regular pair (U , µ) and argues this must be equal to
both (Ua, µa) and (Ub, µb).
Use the common ‘price’ data on options to construct the option price curves for any
underlying lottery p. Recall that the kinks in the option price functions correspond
to c-potential values of p. Since we are only dealing with the induced portion of the
preference, the information process (or equivalently the prior consumption, c) can
thought of as given. Therefore I will drop the c and refer to the set of these potential
values (for some p) as Kp. Now define the potential state space as
Û =
∏
c∈C
Kc.
Because %a and %b have fPAEU representations we know #Û < ∞. For either
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preference, the agent’s regular subjective state space will be a subset of Û . If the
agent believed that all his taste uncertainty was uncorrelated across consumption
alternatives we would find that the subjective state space would be this entire set. So
the objective is to figure out what correlations the agent believes to be impossible. In
other words, which potential states are given a subjective probability of 0? Choose
a lottery q such that there is some u, u′ ∈ Û where u(q) 6= u′(q). If no such q exists
then Û is singleton and the proof is complete.
Now think of q as partitioning Û such that each cell agrees on the utility of q. If q
fully separates Û , in the sense that all cells are singleton, then we can use the option
price curve for q to read off the probabilities of each cell and the proof is once again
complete. So the only interesting case is when some cell contains multiple distinct
states. Choose two distinct states (u1 and u2) in such a cell. Since these states are
distinct they must disagree on the utility of some outcome c. Fix some small  > 0,
and define q′ = (1− )q + c. So by construction u1(q′) 6= u2(q′). Moreover, because
there are finitely many states each cell can be uniformly separated from one another
in the sense that for some δ > 0 if u and u′ are in different cells |u(q) − u′(q)| > δ.
Therefore, for sufficiently small , q′ will generate a strictly finer partition of Û than
q did. Once again taking advantage of finiteness, this process can be iterated (a
finite number of times) until every cell of the partition consists of only one state. In
particular, note there is some lottery q¯ which induces the complete partition of U ∗.
As before, it is straightforward to use the slope of the option price function for q¯ to
read off the subjective probability of each cell. Let U be the subset of Û that takes
positive probability and µ be the probability measure on U constructed as described.
Finally, suppose (Ua, µa) 6= (Ub, µb). We already know Ua,Ub ⊆ U ∗. So we can
simply extend the strictly positive probability measures to the larger set by adding
zeros where necessary. However, if the measures differ anywhere then they generate
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different option value curves for q¯ which violates the assumption that options are
priced the same in both preference orderings. Moreover, it is easy to verify that
(U , µ) must be the fPAEU representation of both preferences. This completes the
proof.
1.7.4 Eliciting the Parameters of the PD model
A PD model has three main components, (U , µ, δ). The last of these is straightfor-
ward to identify from preference data. For instance, when δ ≤ 1 it will be exactly
equal to the β ∈ (0, 1] such that (c∗, {c∗}) ∼ (βˆ, {c∗}). The two remaining components
have a more subtle connection to the observables. Recall that Proposition 1 shows
U ⊂∏c∈CKc,c ≡ U ∗ and that each Kc,c is shown to be observable in Proposition 2.
This places an upper bound on the set of utility functions which the agent believes
may represent his preferences. Later, section 1.7.2 introduced the option value curves.
These curves are in principle observable and can be used to infer some of the structure
of µ. Specifically, the slope of the option value curve (induced by consumption of c)
for {c, βˆ} corresponds to the agent’s subjective CDF over c-potential values of c. This
is sufficient to identify µ(Pc(u)) for every u ∈ U ∗. When attention is restricted to
PD representations with the product structure, these marginal beliefs are sufficient
to identify the model. Moreover, when there is an MIA, c¯, Pc¯(u) is singleton for every
u ∈ U ∗. So once again this is sufficient to identify the model.
However, in the general case there are additional degrees of freedom related to the
beliefs of the agent conditional on learning some u(c). Given the domain considered
here, there is only enough preference data to infer µ{u ∈ U ∗ : u(c) = γ∧u(c′) = γ′}.16
I cannot, for instance, identify µ{u ∈ U ∗ : u(c) = γ ∧ u(c′) = γ′ ∧ u(c′′) = γ′′}.
16Intuitively, this can be determined by looking at how the c-potential values of (1− )c+ c′ are
affected by moving from  = 0 to some small positive . Details of this can be found in the proof of
Theorem 1.2.
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For this reason, Theorem 1 only has a uniqueness result within the product structure
class of PD representations. This issue is illustrated in the following example.
Define:
C = {a, b, c∗, c∗}
Ka,a = {0, 0.5}
Kb,b = {0, 0.5, 1}
U = Ka,a ×Kb,b × {1} × {0}
µ(u) = 1
6
∀u ∈ U
Ka,a is the set of a-potential values of a. U can be viewed as a set of utility functions
on C. Let ui,j denote the utility function in which u(a) = i and u(b) = j. Also we can
treat µ as a probability measure on U . Notice that Ka, Kb are observable through
behavior. Moreover for any c ∈ C and u ∈ U , µ(Pc(u)) is also observable (this can
be determined by the option value curves as seen in the proof of theorem 1.3). Now
observe that, for any δ > 0, (U , µ, δ) is a regular PD representation with a product
structure.
Now consider µ′ such that
µ′(u0,0) = 112 , µ
′(u0,0.5) = 412 , µ
′(u0,1) = 112 ,
µ′(u0.5,0) = 312 , µ
′(u0.5,0.5) = 0, and µ′(u1,1) = 312 .
The PD representation, (U , µ′, δ), does not have a product structure. However, it is
observably equivalent to (U , µ, δ) on the considered domain (ie the two represent the
same preference %).
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1.8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have axiomatized a model of taste uncertainty in which an agent learns
the cardinal utility of an object upon its consumption. This endogenously generated
information produces an experimentation incentive. Using a novel, non-parametric
definition of experimentation I show how the agent’s taste uncertainty can be inferred
from his observed experimentation behavior. This departs from the literature which
typically identifies subjective states through an agent’s demand for flexibility. In
many empirical settings, menu choice data is often unavailable. In such situations,
experimentation offers a useful alternative method of eliciting taste uncertainty.
Additionally, my model permits indirect learning. Thus consumption of one object
can provide taste information about untried alternatives. This indirect learning is a
result of correlations in an agent’s subjective belief about his tastes. These subjective
correlations can be elicited from choice data. To the extent which agents believe
their tastes for ‘similar’ products to be correlated, this suggests a method of eliciting
a subjective similarity relation. This observation may provide an interesting avenue
for future work.
The main interpretation of the preference discovery model is one of complete learn-
ing after a single instance of consumption. Adding more periods of choice data would
likely allow this to be relaxed so that repeated consumption of a single good can pro-
vide increasingly precise taste information. I conjecture that a suitable generalization
of the c-potential value concept would prove useful in characterizing this type of par-
tial learning model. Specifically, treating c as a consumption stream would allow a
generalized c-potential value to be used to elicit the agent’s conditional beliefs.
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Chapter 2
Network of thrones: kinship and conflict
in Europe, 1495-19181
2.1 Introduction
Bella gerant alii; tu, felix Austria, nube. Nam que Mars Aliis, dat tibi regna Venus2
Unofficial Habsburg Motto
“Although marriages may secure peace, they certainly cannot make it perpetual; for as
soon as one of the pair dies, the bond of accord is broken...”
Desiderius Erasmus, Education of a Christian Prince (1516)
War has high costs - military budgets, injuries, disease, lives lost, and disruptive
effects on long run economic growth. Fortunately, the frequency of war has greatly
declined over the past several centuries (Levy, 1983; Pinker, 2011; Gat, 2013). One
popular explanation for this trend is increased connectivity between states. These
connections can take a variety of forms. They include economic interdependence,
membership in international organizations, increased cultural exchange, and personal
relationships. We focus on this last type of connection and establish a causal rela-
tionship to conflict in the context of Europe between 1495 and 1918.
1This chapter is based on joint work with Seth G. Benzell.
2“Let others wage war; you, happy Austria, marry. For what Mars awards to others, Venus
gives to thee.” Traditionally attributed to 14th or 15th century statesmen, the motto was only
popularized much later.
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Early Modern Europe was characterized by hereditary, increasingly centralized
monarchies. This form of government places the personal relationships of monarchs
and their families at the center of politics. As the heads of royal families, monarchs
were expected to arrange the careers and marriages of close family members. Dynastic
marriages were negotiated strategically, in order to benefit the royal family and the
state. The explicit purpose of many of these marriages was to end a conflict or
reduce the likelihood of future conflict. The Habsburgs are a well-known (and well-
studied) example of a dynasty that took marriage negotiations extremely seriously.
The empires they forged owed much more to the Habsburgs’ marital cunning than
their martial prowess.
Dynastic marriages ultimately knit together rulers across the continent. It is our
hypothesis that these kinship bonds were effective in decreasing the prevalence of
war. In particular, we study whether, ceteris paribus, rulers who were more closely
connected by living ties in the European network of great families were less likely to
fight wars.
Theoretically, this is not obvious. That a fellow prince has become a cousin-in-
law is, to the hard-headed realpolitiker, no reason to make peace with him. Kinship
networks can affect international relations through a variety of channels, some of
which run counter to our hypothesis. For example, 16th century humanist scholar
Desiderius Erasmus argued that they led to foreign entanglements which increased
the likelihood of conflict. Ultimately, the net effect of kinship networks on war is an
empirical question.
To address this question, we construct a unique dataset which combines genealog-
ical records on European royalty with contemporaneous conflict data. Our dataset
links three main components. First, we generate a list of sovereign Christian monar-
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chies. For each monarchy, we document its history of rulers. Second, we build a
dynamic kinship network between the royals of Europe based on Tompsett (2014)’s
genealogical data. Finally, we combine and expand existing data sets on European
conflicts and their covariates during this period.
This dataset allows us to apply the tools of social network theory to test our
hypothesis. Our paper distinguishes between two types of kinship networks. The first
consists of living family connections which change as individuals are born, marry,
divorce, and die. The second is based on blood relationships, which we measure
by a pair’s distance to their closest common ancestor. For the blood related, our
evidence is suggestive. It points towards rulers with a common grandparent (and
to a lesser extent, a common ancestry in general) being more likely to fight wars.
This is consistent with a historical record of succession crises over who is to inherit a
country’s leadership.
Our main results are on living kinship ties. Simple OLS regressions do not indi-
cate any consistently significant relationship between living kinship ties and conflict
incidence. However, there is good reason to believe that such an estimate is biased.
Specifically, as mentioned above, the formation of kinship ties is often strategic. In
particular, diplomatic marriages were seen as a way to prevent or end conflicts. Thus
marriages may have been disproportionately formed between dynasties with a high
propensity for war. This would introduce a positive bias in the OLS estimate. We
provide a simple framework which captures this idea and helps to guide our analysis.
To correct for this bias, our main results exploit downward variation in kinship ties
caused by the deaths of individuals important to the kinship network. Our reduced
form approach avoids making structural assumptions about the network formation
process. This is beneficial since structural models of network formation not only
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require strong assumptions, but also are typically computationally demanding and
plagued by multiple equilibria.
We motivate our key findings with an event study. This shows disruptions to the
kinship network caused by these deaths decrease a dyad’s connectedness for about a
decade and raises its war propensity for a similar duration. These effects are only
present when a death breaks network ties. The death of a monarch’s close relative
who is not important to the network does not lead to an increased chance of war.
Using exogenous deaths of network important individuals (i.e. dropping those with
plausibly political causes of death, such as assassination), we instrument for kinship
distance to remove bias due to endogenous network formation. This instrumental
variable approach finds that decreased connectedness between a pair of rulers leads to
a substantial increase in war frequency and duration. The estimated coefficients imply
that a pair of monarchs whose only family connection is a pair of married children
would see an 8 percentage point increase in their war probability if this marriage tie
were dissolved. These findings are robust to different measures of kinship distance.
In line with previous literature, we observe a nearly 50% decline in the prevalence
of war after 1800. We also document a new fact: kinship ties between European
monarchs grew substantially over time. Thus our main result, that kinship networks
promote peace, suggests that these growing kinship networks can explain 68% of the
much discussed decline in European war frequency.
To our knowledge, no previous paper has quantitatively explored the connection
between royal family networks and war. However, there are a number of related papers
which we briefly review in section 2.2. In section 2.3, we provide historical context
for our study. In section 2.4, we provide a conceptual framework motivating our
analysis. Sections 2.5 and 2.6 discuss our data and provide OLS estimates. Section 2.7
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presents our main results. Section 2.8 performs a robustness analysis on our findings
and rules out spurious relationships that could be driving our results. In section 2.9,
we conclude. An online appendix documents our data construction, trends in royal
family connection, more fully explains the network measures employed, and provides
additional robustness checks.
2.2 Related Literature
The study of social networks in economics has expanded dramatically in recent years.
This provides a theoretical framework for our study. Network techniques have been
used to help understand trade flows (Cheney, 2014), microfinance (Banerjee et. al.,
2013), and the spread of gossip (Banerjee et. al., 2016). Jackson’s textbook (2008)
provides an overview of the methods and measures used in this literature. Jackson
(2014), in a review of the literature, forcefully argues for the importance of network
connections in understanding economic outcomes.
The seminal paper applying network methods to historical political outcomes is
Padgett and Ansell (1993). They use network centrality to explain how the Medici, a
noble family of no particular note in 1400, rose to the pinnacle of Florentine politics in
1434. Their thesis is that Cosimo de’Medici forged a series of marriages and business
ties that placed his family ‘between’ the other great families of Florence. This allowed
the Medici the opportunity to be involved in nearly all decisions of consequence.
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016) find that a measure of genetic proximity between
nations is strongly correlated with international conflict. More genetically related
populations are more likely to fight wars. They suggest this is a consequence of
populations of similar cultures being more desirable for conquest. Our study provides
complementary results. We find suggestive evidence that blood related rulers do in
fact engage in more frequent conflict. Our paper distinguishes these from living
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kinship ties which reduce conflict.
Maoz et al. (2007) and Maoz (2010) show that bilateral trade relations and
mutual membership in international organizations are negatively correlated with bi-
lateral conflict (though find mixed results when using alternative measures of network
connectivity). Jackson and Nei (2015) advance an argument that alliance networks
without a ‘peace surplus’ from trade are inherently unstable. They attribute the post
18th century decline in war frequency to a rise in international trade.
Our main results rely on deaths which change the structure of kinship ties. Similar
identification strategies have been employed elsewhere. For instance, Azoulay et. al
(2010) show that the death of a superstar researcher reduces the productivity of
their coauthors and others in the topic area. Jones and Olken (2005) use unexpected
leader deaths to show that leader quality matters for economic growth in autocracies.
Fisman (2001) uses a related idea to study the value of political connections. He
investigates the effect of rumors of Indonesian President Suharto’s death on stock
market returns for politically connected firms.
Three recent papers use data similar to our own. Iyigun (2008) uses Brecke’s ‘Con-
flict Catalogue’ and finds strong evidence that Ottoman invasions aided the spread
of Protestantism in Europe in the 16th century. Iyigun, Nunn, and Qian (2016) use
Brecke and other conflict data to study the effect of climate change on European war.
Dube and Harish (2016) study the effect of ruler gender on conflict. Like us, they
construct a data set matching Wright’s (1942) war data to Tompsett’s genealogical
data. Dube and Harish use the genealogical data to identify the gender of rulers’
close relatives. They use this information to make a compelling case that female
rulers were more likely to engage in wars than men. They suggest this results from
female rulers being more likely to delegate domestic responsibilities to their spouses.
We discuss the advantages of our dataset versus these similar ones in the appendix.
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2.3 Historical Context
We restrict our analysis to the monarchies of Christian Europe from 1495-1918.3
Giving a complete account of this rich and fascinating period is far beyond the scope
of this paper. However, this section briefly describes some of the institutions relevant
to our analysis.4
During the period from the end of the 15th century to the middle of the 18th
century - typically referred to as ‘early modern’ - monarchy was an ubiquitous form
of government. While many monarchs aspired to absolute power, most early modern
European dynastic governments were mixed systems with varying degrees of royal,
aristocratic, and parliamentary power.5 In the 17th and 18th centuries the trend was
towards centralization of power in the hands of the monarch. Towards the end of our
sample constitutional constraints increasingly limited the power of monarchs in many
countries.6 Despite these limitations, the monarch was typically one of the most, if
not the most, important leader in any polity during our period. This was especially
true when it came to matters of interstate conflict. For example, in Britain, even
during periods when the Parliament and Cabinet decided whether to declare war, the
King was in charge of the war’s conduct (Hoffman, 2012).
In most monarchies rule was hereditary, although countries differed in the details
of succession (especially regarding the possibility of women to inherit the throne). A
3Geographically, this roughly corresponds to continental Europe, the British Isles, the Mediter-
ranean Islands, and Russia. The Ottoman Empire is also excluded. For a more detailed explanation
of inclusion criteria, see appendix A.
4For a one volume history focused on international conflict, consider “Europe: The Struggle for
Supremacy, from 1453 to the Present” (Simms, 2014)
5Absolute monarchy was an ideal articulated by Jean Bodin and others. For more details on
early modern government, See Bonney (1991), especially ch. 6 The Rise of European Absolutism
6Marshall and Jaggers (2015) provide an index of the constraints on the authority of monarchs
covering the last century of our sample. In 1816, they score 16 monarchies in our data and find in
11 the monarch has ‘unlimited authority.’ By 1900, only 2 monarchies maintain this status. On a
scale of 1-7, the average constraint score increases from 1.875 in 1816 to 5.36 in 1900.
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common norm was that in order to be eligible to inherit a throne, both parents of an
heir must be royal. In some regions with stronger aristocracies (such as Poland), the
monarch would be elected for life by a council of nobles. Importantly, even in these
regions new leaders were typically selected from a single great family.
Monarchs were not only political leaders but also patriarchs and matriarchs of their
families. Close family members of the ruler were often selected to be ambassadors,
advisors, and military leaders. Marriages of members of the royal family were typically
arranged or approved by the monarch.7
These institutions made dynastic marriage a common way to build relatively stable
political connections between polities. Fleming (1973) provides evidence that such
marriage arrangements were greatly influenced by international and domestic political
concerns. Studying the descendants of English King George I, she finds that relative
to the lower nobility royals were more likely to marry foreigners, other royals, and
close relatives. They were also less likely to marry commoners. In the data section of
this paper, we comprehensively document the ubiquity of inter-dynastic ties.
The Habsburg Holy Roman Emperor and Austrian Archduke Maximilian I (r.1486-
1519) was especially adept at marriage arrangements. Marrying Mary of Burgandy
in 1477, he gained control of her principalities in the Low Countries. To secure an
ally in the interminable Valois-Habsburg struggle with France in Italy, he married his
son Philip ‘the Handsome’ to Joanna ‘the Mad’ of Castile in 1498. To reduce border
tensions with East European neighbors, granddaughters and grandsons were married
to Hungarian and Bohemian rulers. This series of marriages set the groundwork for
one of the most successful dynasties in history. Habsburgs would go on to rule lands
7Sometimes this principle was legally codified. For example, King George III, upset at the
nonstrategic marriage of his brother, passed the Royal Marriages Act (1772) through parliament,
which required members of the English royal family to have their marriages approved by the reigning
monarch. This law was only repealed in 2015.
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from the Philippines to Budapest.
Fichtner (1976) uses the marriage negotiation letters of 16th Century Habsburgs
to craft a broader anthropological theory of European royal marriage. She finds that
royal marriages entailed marathon negotiations over dowries, inheritance rights, and
international political obligations. The size of dowries involved (usually bi-directional)
could rival the yearly maintenance of standing armies. These marriages allowed the
Habsburgs to install spies and influencers foreign courts and place Habsburgs in lines
of succession.8 These connections also created lines of communication that could
become activated even when serious disruptions took place.
The Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) provides an illuminating example of the re-
lationship of kinship networks to conflict. In the preceding century, Lutheranism
and Calvinism had spread across the Holy Roman Empire. A series of wars of re-
ligion rocked the continent. With religion so politically charged, inter-confessional
royal marriages became very rare. An important tool for the deescalation of dynastic
conflict was eliminated.
Protestant Bohemian nobles, concerned about the erosion of Protestant rights,
brought the lingering conflict to a head. They did so by throwing the Habsburg’s
representatives out a window in 1618 (in the Second Defenestration of Prague), and
calling for the election of a protestant prince. The ruler they chose in 1619 was
Frederick V, elector of The Palatinate (r.1610-1623). This outcome was unacceptable
to the Habsburgs (Bohemia being a pivotal voter in the electoral college which selected
the Holy Roman Emperor), and a steadily escalating conflict ensued.
Figure 2·1 shows the family and ancestral relationships between the states of
8“In an age when accurate information from abroad was at a premium, a child at a foreign
court could keep one apprised of events there. Ferdinand’s daughter Catherine reported to her father
regularly about dealings between her husband, King Sigismund Augustus of Poland, and Muscovy...”.
Fichtner (1976)
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Europe in 1618. From this figure alone, one can predict the two primary blocs during
the Thirty Years’ War. On the left, note three main clusters of connections: the
Catholics of France, Spain and Southern Italy; a second cluster of Catholic States
in Austria, Bohemia, and Poland; and a Protestant cluster, containing England, the
Netherlands, Denmark and the Protestant electorates of the empire (Prussia, Saxony,
and the Palatinate). The division between these camps is clearly centered in modern
Germany and the Netherlands, which was to be the battlefield for the conflict. The
second map emphasizes the strength of Habsburg ties between the family’s Austrian
and Spanish branches.
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Figure 2·1: In the lead up to the Thirty Years’ War, kinship con-
nections displayed a clear Catholic/Protestant division. In the above
maps, black dots represent capitals. In the left figure, lines represent
living kinship connections between rulers (i.e. a line connects the capi-
tals if their rulers share a living family tie), while in the right figure lines
represent blood connections within 3 generations (i.e. the two rulers
share a great grandparent). Modern political boundaries are included
for reference.
Arguably, it was Frederick V’s centrality in the international system that led
‘The Bohemian Revolt’ to escalate into a century-defining war. The lands controlled
directly by Frederick V were relatively weak, but he was at the center of protestant
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Figure 2·2: Hollow circles report the share of dyads with a living kin-
ship tie, left axis. Solid circles report share of dyads at war, right axis.
Second order polynomials are fitted to each data series. Important po-
litical events indicated. Overall war frequency and kinship connection,
averaged by decade, are negatively correlated, ρ = −.197.
politics. Frederick V was the son of the founder of the Protestant Union, which
contained many other protestant-leaning principalities of the Holy Roman Empire. He
was closely connected by blood and marriage to the most important protestant states
in Europe. King James I of England (r.1567-1625) was his father-in-law, William
the Silent of Orange (r.1544-1584) (first Stadtholder of the independent Netherlands)
was his grandfather, the elector George William of Brandenburg (r.1619-1640) was
his brother-in-law, and Christian IV of Denmark (r.1588-1648) was his uncle-in-law.
All of these states would eventually be drawn in to the war. The Habsburgs too drew
in familial allies. Phillip III (r.1598-1621) of the Spanish Habsburgs begrudgingly
rallied to his cousins’ cause.
Figure 2·2 displays the time trends in war and connectedness. It suggests an in-
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verse relationship, driven by a decrease in conflict and increase in connections in the
19th century. The years between the Napoleonic Wars and World War I, sometimes
known as ‘The Concert of Europe’ were atypically peaceful. A ‘Holy Alliance’ of the
major monarchs of Europe was declared, dedicated to defending royal prerogatives
and conservative values against the new ideas sweeping Europe. This alliance, ex-
plicitly a fraternity, may have only been possible because of their increasing sense of
kinship.9
In World War I, this system of personal relationships between the rulers failed.
King George V of the United Kingdom (r.1910-1936), Tsar Nicholas II of Russia
(r.1894-1917), and Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany (r.1888-1918) were all first cousins,
and grandchildren of Queen Victoria of England (r.1819-1901).10 While democracy
in the United Kingdom had developed to the point that King George V had limited
influence, Kaiser Wilhelm II and Tsar Nicholas remained important decision makers.
On the eve of the war, the German and Russian rulers exchanged a series of personal
telegrams signed ‘Willy’ and ‘Nicky’, desperately trying to deescalate the conflict.
However, since their grandmother’s death, the two had grown into mutual distrust
and suspicion.11 This last gesture towards brotherhood proved too little too late, and
with the war came the end of a Europe dominated by kings and tsars.12
9From the text we have “...the three contracting Monarchs will remain united by the bonds of a
true and indissoluble fraternity, and, considering each other as fellow-countrymen, they will, on all
occasions and in all places, lend each other aid and assistance ; and, regarding themselves towards
their subjects and armies as fathers of families, they will lead them, in the same spirit of fraternity
with which they are animated, to protect Religion, Peace, and justice.”
10George V and Wilhelm II were her biological grandchildren. Nicholas II was a grandson-in-law,
having married Victoria’s granddaughter Alix of Hesse in 1894.
11While signing the mobilization order, Kaiser Wilhelm II remarked “To think George and Nicky
should have played me false! If my grandmother had been alive, she would never have allowed it.”
12Although at least one Polish royal did not believe this at the time. Princess Radziwill’s fasci-
nating handbook to the royal marriage market discusses the politics and culture of royal marriages
leading up to the war, and predicts the consequences of the war for future marriages. In 1914 she
writes “It is probable however, that, after the present war has come to an end, Royal alliances will
become once more subjects of general interest, and of greater importance than has been the case dur-
ing the last twenty years or so. This fact has led me to include in my book a review of the personages
54
2.4 Connecting Kinship and Conflict
Our paper is motivated by a clear historical record of European monarchs and their
advisers treating dynastic marriage negotiations, papal annulments, lines of succes-
sion, and the bonds of kinship between rulers as central to foreign policy. Uniting
these considerations are their origins in family networks. Changes in these familial
network connections are therefore likely to be associated with political outcomes.
There are several mechanisms by which a change in family connections might
influence diplomatic outcomes. One set of theories is that rulers who are closer family
are more likely to resolve disputes amicably. This could be because the rulers are
more disposed to trust connected rulers as allies (as in Levi-Strauss’s (1949) theories
of marriage alliance among primitive tribes). Alternatively, perhaps close family ties
facilitate dispute resolution by promoting the spread of information. This information
spread may be overt (as connected rulers spend more time interacting with each other,
for example during family events and holidays) or covert (as a daughter married
abroad might serve as a spy at a foreign court, as in Fichtner (1976)). Any of these
effects might lower effective negotiation costs and allow for more efficient resolution
of conflicts.
Close family ties could also prevent conflict by raising the expected cost of war
or the surplus from peace. For instance, a shared interest in a mutual relative might
prompt cooperation between rulers. The possibility that a mutual relative would serve
as a hostage, and therefore provide insurance against aggression, is a more cynical
version of that idea. The fact that a pair of closely connected rulers (or their heirs)
have a chance of inheriting each others’ domains may also give them a further interest
in promoting bilateral prosperity.
eligible to become one day the consorts of European rulers.”
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On the other hand, it may simply be that familiarity breeds contempt. Relatedly,
closely connected rulers may find themselves in more frequent succession disputes.
These mechanisms would tend to raise the expected spoils (and frequency) of war. It
is our hypothesis that these mechanisms are quantitatively much less important than
the ones which lead to peace.
While this list is not exhaustive, it illuminates the diversity of mechanisms by
which family ties can influence the chance of conflict. They also suggest a basic con-
ceptual framework to guide our empirical analysis. This framework draws attention
to the endogenous characteristics of the kinship network. This endogeneity motivates
the need for exogenous variation to recover the true causal effect.
Our unit of analysis is the dyad (a country-pair). Suppose a given dyad experiences
a potential conflict with exogenous probability, p. Think of this as their idiosyncratic
latent war propensity. Potential conflicts can either resolve peacefully or escalate
into war. We assume that the dyad is able to resolve the potential conflict with
probability q(1
d
), an increasing function of inverse kinship network distance. The idea
is that tighter kinship bonds either increase the incentive to resolve disputes or lower
the costs of doing so.
Notice that this framework suggests that an exogenous increase in kinship network
distance, d, lowers q and thus leads to more frequent wars. Suppose war is socially
inefficient and that the dyad can reduce war frequency by exerting costly effort to
lower d. In this setting, dyads with a large p have a correspondingly large (Coasian)
incentive to form tighter kinship bonds (e.g. through strategic marriage). Therefore,
we are likely to observe pairs with the highest latent war propensity forming the
tightest kinship ties. This means a simple regression of war frequency on 1
d
will
produce a coefficient with positive bias.
Our study requires a source of exogenous variation in network structure to recover
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the causal effect of kinship networks on war frequency. The ideal experiment would
take two ex-ante identical country pairs and randomly vary one of the pair’s level of
connection. Any subsequent difference in conflict behavior would be attributed to the
changed kinship network. To approximate this, we use variation in a dyad’s kinship
network distance following the deaths of nobles important to the network.
2.5 Data Description
Our analysis is based on a newly constructed dataset on royal kinship networks and
wars. The final dataset takes the form of an unbalanced panel of country dyads. Our
analysis is restricted to sovereign Christian European monarchies from 1495-1918.
This limitation aids in collecting a comprehensive data set, while focusing on the
types of states for whom dynastic connections might be particularly important. For
a complete description of the data and its construction, as well as variables collected
but not used in this analysis, see appendix A.
2.5.1 Summary Statistics
Our raw data consist of 90,653 country-pair (dyad) years. Monarchs are matched to
these countries primarily using Spuler (1977). Of these dyads, 3,864 dyad-years are
in personal union, where the same ruler controlled two crowns simultaneously. By
construction, personal unions are never at war, so these pairs are not included in the
analysis.
There are 858 country pairs in our sample. In table 2.1, we report summary
statistics for our data. The first group of variables measure conflict activity. These
variables are primarily based on Wright (1942), but we expand and reconcile this
data with other sources. War is a dummy variable which indicates whether a pair of
countries are at war in a given year. War Start (Continue) is a dummy for whether
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
count mean sd min max
War 86789 .035 .18 0 1
War Start 83816 .007 .085 0 1
War Continue 2973 .814 .389 0 1
Neither Landlocked 86789 .632 .482 0 1
Adjacent 86789 .137 .343 0 1
ln(Distance) 86789 6.94 .668 4.0 9.3
Same Religion 86789 .458 .498 0 1
# Immediate Relatives 86789 10.27 5.24 0 34
Shortest Path Length 33871 7.24 4.68 1 30
Resistance Distance 33871 2.77 2.00 .20 15.8
Blood Distance 53067 4.62 1.68 1 7
a pair begins (continues) a war, conditional on being at peace (war) in the previous
year.
Wars start in approximately 0.7% of previously peaceful dyads. Conditional on
being at war in a given year, 81.4% of dyads continue into the next year. Together,
this implies a war frequency of 3.5% of dyad-years. Dyads are very heterogeneous
in their bellicosity. Some never fight wars, while others are long time rivals. For
example, Austria and France, which have 346 years of overlapping presence in the
data, are at war in 24.7% of years.
The second class of variables are pairwise covariates. Primarily, these are geo-
graphic variables that are derived from Reed (2016). Reed provides maps of Europe
for our entire time period at very high frequency. The variables Neither Landlocked
and Adjacent are self-explanatory dummy variables which vary over time with bor-
der changes. We also record the natural log of the distance between two countries’
capitals in kilometers. Additionally, we construct a dummy for whether the pair of
rulers are members of the same religious group (Catholic, Protestant, or Orthodox).
The final class of variables are based on Tompsett’s (2014) genealogical data. The
genealogy has 872 individuals alive in the median year, but this amount increases
strongly in later years. Figure B·2 in the appendix plots the number of living nobles in
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our data by year. The average pair of rulers have 10.27 immediate family connections
(i.e. parents, spouses, siblings or children) between them. Rulers sometimes share
immediate family members, so this corresponds to somewhat more than 5.6 immediate
family members per ruler.
We reconstruct these data as a dynamic kinship network in which living individuals
are linked with their immediate family members. Immediate family relations are
parent/child, sibling, and spousal. Each year the set of individuals is updated based
on births and deaths. Links are added for births and marriages and removed after
deaths and divorces. Using this network, we calculate measures of kinship distance.
Shortest Path and Resistance Distance are our measures of kinship distance be-
tween rulers. The shortest path between two rulers is simply the minimum number
of network links that must be traversed to get from one ruler to the other. While
shortest path distance only looks at one path between rulers, resistance distance is
an all-path measure inspired by electrical resistance. This measure is decreasing in
the number of paths between two rulers and increasing in the length of each of these
paths. If no path exists, both of these measures are defined to be infinity. Only finite
values are summarized in the above table. Appendix C provides a detailed description
of the network construction and corresponding measures.
Blood Distance is a different type of bilateral kinship measure. Instead of relying
on the dynamic network of living kinship relations, this measure is calculated from a
static directed network in which links run only from children to parents. Using this
network of ‘blood’ connections, we report the maximum number of steps from two
rulers to their most recent common ancestor. We search the genealogical data up to
7 generations. Like our living measures, this is measure is defined as infinity if no
common ancestor exists.
Approximately a third of dyad-years are connected by living kinship ties. The
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share of states connected in this way trends upwards over time, after a slight dip
in the decades after Luther’s Theses. In the 1580’s only eleven percent of states are
connected, the lowest share on record. In the 1910’s, the last decade in our data (albeit
a partial one) over 95 percent are. A positive trend is still observed when looking
only at close connections of less than 8 steps. A larger share of monarchs share a
common ancestor. There is no long term trend in the share of dyads with a close
blood connection. For more information on our genealogical data and demographic
trends, see appendix B.
2.6 OLS Analysis
2.6.1 Living Kinship Ties and War
We are interested in the relationship between network distance and war. We begin
by estimating a baseline specification, eq. (2.1). This equation models the probability
of war as a linear function of inverse kinship network distance, (1/d). The measure
d is either shortest path length or resistance distance. For shortest path length,
using inverse distance has the attractive property of being bounded between zero and
one. In addition, this inverse measure captures the intuition that a unit increase in
network distance will be more important for more closely connected rulers. Taking
the inverse of our distance measures allows us to deal with unconnected pairs (d =∞)
in a natural way. This inverse distance measure takes a value of 0 when the pair is
unconnected.
War(i,j),y = α + β ·
(
1
d
)
(i,j),y
+ δ ·X(i,j),y + θ(i,j) + θy + (i,j),y (2.1)
The outcome variable, War(i,j),y, is a dummy for whether countries i and j are at
war in year y. We regress this on inverse network distance (1/d). Tables refer to this
60
variable as (Path)−1 or (Resistance)−1 as appropriate. We also include a vector of
dyad-year controls X(i,j),y (including log of capital distance as well as dummies for
close blood connection, adjacency, same religion, and neither landlocked), and fixed
effects for dyad (θ(i,j)) and year (θy). In columns (5) and (6) of table 2.2, we estimate
this model using shortest path length and resistance distance respectively. Columns
(1)-(4) estimate the regression with different combinations of controls and fixed effects.
The final two columns report estimates where the outcome variable is replaced with
a dummy for the dyad beginning (continuing) a war in year y conditional on being
at peace (war) in year y − 1.
Throughout the paper, we report standard errors clustered two-way by country.
This method is standard in the country-level network literature, employed in papers
such as Jackson and Nei (2015). This form of clustering helps to account for corre-
lation among observations which share a country, both contemporaneously and over
time.
Two-way clustering allows for, for example, France’s fighting a war with Austria
to be correlated with it fighting a war with Hungary. This is important both because
of the presence of stable alliance blocks, and because our causal results will rely on
identifying variation based on events that are correlated between dyads that share
a country. Cameron and Miller (2015) show that this clustering procedure can miss
some relevant correlations, thus potentially under reporting standard errors. To show
our results are not driven by incorrect standard errors, we conduct placebo simulations
in our robustness section.
Table 2.2 finds no effect of either inverse shortest path length or inverse resistance
distance on the likelihood of war overall, or on the rate of war start or continuance.
This estimated null effect survives various combinations of covariates and fixed effects.
Despite this, the regressions still reveal some interesting relationships. Countries are
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marginally more likely to start wars when they share a border, even controlling for
dyad fixed effects, but are also quicker to end them. Note that countries that share
a religion group are significantly less likely to start wars and spend less of their time
fighting wars. This strong negative relationship disappears in our subsequent section,
where we instrument for connectedness. This suggests that a shared religion primarily
lowers war probability by making it easier to form marriage ties.13
Table 2.2: OLS War Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
War War War War War War War Start War Continue
(Path)−1 0.00 0.00 -0.01 .001 -0.05
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.003) (0.06)
(Resistance)−1 -0.01 -0.001 -0.001
(0.01) (0.003) (0.003)
3 Gen. Blood 0.01 0.01 0.001 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.002) (0.02)
Same Religion -0.021∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.0066∗∗∗ -0.03
(0.005) (0.006) (0.0017) (0.03
Adjacent 0.029+ 0.029+ 0.008+ -0.03∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.004) (0.01)
Neither Landlocked 0.004 0.004 0.00 0.03
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.03)
ln(Distance) 0.00 0.00 -0.002 0.078∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.002) (0.009)
Pair FE X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X
N 86789 86789 86746 86746 86746 86746 82154 2946
+p < .10,∗ p < .05,∗∗ p < .01,∗∗∗ p < .001,
Standard errors are robust to two-way country clustering.
2.6.2 Blood Ties and War
Table 2.3 details the association of conflict with blood distance. It regresses war
against blood connection of various degree, dyad and year fixed effects, and selected
covariates. Brothers have a blood distance of 1, first cousins have a blood distance of
2, and so on. The sample size in this table is lower than in the above section, because
we drop dyad-years where one of the rulers has changed.
13Adjacency and distance have little variation within dyad. Therefore they are not estimated
precisely when dyad fixed effects are included.
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Table 2.3: Blood Distance and War
(1) (2) (3) (4)
War War War War
Blood Distance 1 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Blood Distance 2 0.027∗ 0.026∗ 0.028∗ 0.029∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
Blood Distance 3 0.003 0.003 0.024+ 0.026+
(0.01) (0.01) (0.015) (0.015)
Blood Distance 3 0.003 0.003 0.024+ 0.026+
(0.01) (0.01) (0.015) (0.015)
Blood Distance 4 -0.01 -0.01 0.013+ 0.014+
(0.01) (0.01) (0.008) (0.008)
Blood Distance 5 0.005 0.01 0.021∗ 0.022∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.009) (0.0085)
Blood Distance 6 0.01 0.01 0.018+ 0.017+
(0.01) (0.01) (0.009) (0.009)
Blood Distance 7 -0.004 -0.002 0.01+ 0.01+
(0.007) (0.01) (0.006) (0.006)
Same Religion -0.002 -0.0194∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.005)
Adjacent 0.050∗∗ 0.03
(0.016) (0.02)
Neither Landlocked 0.009+ 0.005+
(0.005) (0.003)
ln(distance) 0.007 0.002
(0.01) (0.01)
Pair FE X X
Year FE X X
N 78613 78613 78610 78610
+p < .10,∗ p < .05,∗∗ p < .01,∗∗∗ p < .001,
Standard errors are robust to two-way country clustering.
Omitted category is dyads without a common ancestor.
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In all specifications, with or without fixed effects and covariates, having a blood
distance of 2 is significantly correlated with a higher chance of war. An example
would be a pair of monarchs whose closest common ancestor is a grandparent. The
size of this relationship, 2.9 percentage points in the most complete specification,
is large. No relationship is found between war and brotherhood. However, in the
most complete specification we see a relationship between war and all other degrees
of shared ancestry at the 10 percent significance level. Thus, compared to unrelated
rulers, blood relatives fought more wars.
We do not have an instrument for the blood relationship of rulers. However, this
form of connection is plausibly exogenous to the international political situation in the
short run.14 Any endogeneity of blood distance to long term political relationships
are partly accounted for by pair fixed effects. Therefore, these regressions provide
suggestive evidence that war is more likely for the closely related, especially those
who share a grandparent.
Erasmus (1516) was aware of the role of dynastic inheritance in creating conflict.
In fact, it is his main reason for opposing royal marriages. He writes,
Why, then, is there most fighting among those who are most closely re-
lated? Why? From [dynastic inheritants] come the greatest changes of
kingdoms, for the right to rule is passed from one to another: something
is taken from one place and added to another. From these circumstances
can come only the most serious and violent consequences; the result then,
is not an absence of wars, but rather the cause of making wars more fre-
quent and more atrocious...
14A rare exception being when a loyal closely related ruler is installed by a victorious invader.
Such exceptions would tend to bias our estimates of the effect of blood connection on war to be
more negative.
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In principle, increases in peace from the creation of living kinship ties might, in the
long term, be offset by decreases due to the creation of shared ancestries. However,
the share of monarchies with rulers sharing a great grandparent is relatively constant
over time (see appendix B).
2.7 Main Results
To motivate our instrumental variable analysis, we first describe the deaths we are
interested in and demonstrate their relationship to connectivity and conflict. Then we
construct an instrument for inverse network distance using these deaths and discuss its
validity. Finally, we use this instrument to directly address the endogeneity problem
from the previous section.
2.7.1 Shortest Path Deaths
A BC
Figure 2·3: In this simple network, the shortest path from A to B is
2. The resistance distance is (1
2
+ 1
5
)−1 = 10
7
. Following C’s death, both
distance measures increase to 5.
Our primary kinship network measure is inverse shortest path distance. Figure
2·3 illustrates a hypothetical kinship network between monarchs A and B. In this
figure, the shortest path from A to B is length 2 and passes through individual C. If
C were to die, the shortest path length would increase to 5. Note that deaths along
the shortest path mechanically (weakly) increase the network distance between A and
B whether measured by shortest path or resistance. These sorts of “on-path” deaths
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Figure 2·4: Effect of on-path deaths on inverse shortest path length
act as our source of variation with which to identify the effect of the kinship network.
Of 86,789 dyad-years in the final data, 33,871 are observed to be connected by
living kinship ties. These connected dyads are the only ones which can be affected
by on-path deaths. We observe 4,304 dyad-years with an on-path death.
Figure 2·4 reports, for the 10 years before and after an on-path death, the yearly
empirical mean of inverse path length across the affected dyads. Formally,
Eˆ
[(
1
d
)
(i,j),y+t
∣∣∣∣∣Death(i,j),y = 1
]
for t ∈ [−10, 10].
Figure 2·4 shows that these on-path deaths produce a substantial and sustained
decrease in inverse shortest path length, our primary measure of connectivity. The
level of connection grows more quickly in the years following these deaths, consistent
with our hypothesis that dyads have a target level of connection they seek to achieve.
These events result from the deaths of 263 distinct individuals, who are on - on
average - the shortest paths of 16 dyads at the time of their deaths. Interestingly, but
unsurprisingly, these 263 key individuals played a disproportionate role in connecting
the rulers of Europe.
We document the cause of death for 74% of the 263 shortest path deaths in our
sample. Overwhelmingly their causes of death are peaceful and non-violent. The
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leading causes of death are old age (13%) and childbirth (10%), followed by a variety
of illnesses. Of the 194 individuals with identified causes of death, only ten died
for reasons that could be plausibly tied to the inter-state political situation. Six
were assassinated, three were executed, and one was hit by a cannonball.15 This fits
with Hoffman’s (2012) evidence that early modern rulers, even those who lost wars,
faced little to no personal risk from international conflicts. Cummins (2017) provides
complementary evidence that the proportion of violent deaths among European elites
substantially declined (to about 5%) after 1500.
While our main results are very similar with and without these 10 potentially po-
litically motivated deaths, our subsequent analysis will be based on the remaining 253
apolitical on-path deaths leading to treatments in 4201 dyad-years. Our robustness
section demonstrates that our results are not affected by dropping deaths of unknown
cause (Table 2.7, column (5)).
2.7.2 Event Study
On-path deaths weaken kinship ties and thus potentially influence conflict frequency.
To examine this relationship, we perform an event study analysis of war in years
before and after an on-path death. To avoid double counting of dyads, we restrict
attention to the subsample in which exactly one on-path death occurs in a 25 year
window. Thus, the solid dots in figure 2·5 report:
Eˆ
[
War(i,j),y+t
∣∣∣∣∣Death(i,j),y = 1,
15∑
i=−10
Death(i,j),y+i = 1
]
for t ∈ [−10, 15]
While on-path deaths may influence the chance of war between a pair of monarchs
by lowering their level of connection, they conceivably have a direct effect as well.
To explore this possibility, we also report war frequencies before and after the deaths
15A detailed account of causes of death is provided in the appendix and associated data files.
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of any immediate relative (child, parent, sibling or spouse) of either monarch. These
‘close’ deaths are more frequent than on-path deaths, and thus a smaller 16-year
window is reported so that the requirement of only one such death in the window is
not overly demanding. The hollow dots in figure 2·5 represent:
Eˆ
[
War(i,j),y+t
∣∣∣∣∣DeathClose(i,j),y = 1,
8∑
i=−8
DeathClose(i,j),y+i = 1
]
for t ∈ [−8, 8]
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Figure 2·5: This figure plots the mean war frequency of dyads in the
years before and after they experience the death of a relative. Solid
dots indicate war frequency before and after an on-path death. Hollow
dots are conditioned on close family deaths which are not necessarily
on-path. The dashed line indicates overall average war frequency. This
sample is restricted to dyads which experience only one death within the
time horizon. 95% confidence intervals (based on binomial statistics)
are indicated by error bars.
In the years following the on-path death there is a significant increase in war
frequency. This elevated conflict propensity seems to persist for about 8 years. Figure
2·4 indicates that this is the amount of time it takes to mostly return to long-run
levels of connectivity.
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This elevation in war is not driven by a small subset of deaths. We observe 3081
dyad-years of war. Of these, 655 occur in the 5 years following an on-path death.
These 655 observations correspond to the deaths of 117 individuals. Similarly, we
observe 657 war onsets. Of these, 165 occur in the 5 years following an on-path
death. These correspond to 99 individuals.
It is important to note there is an elevated war frequency in the two years imme-
diately preceding on-path deaths. This raises the question of reverse causality, the
concern that wars are causing deaths rather than vice versa. We rule out the most
direct version of this possibility since we exclude assassinations, executions and battle
deaths. However, it remains possible that a bellicose international environment may
increase royal death rates. For instance, individuals may be exposed to more stress
and lower resource levels during wartime, thus increasing their mortality rates.
If it were indeed the case that royal deaths are more likely during periods of
elevated conflict, an increased war frequency should be present in the years before
both on-path and close deaths. We do not observe an elevated pre-death chance of
war when looking at the close death event study (hollow dots). Therefore, it would
need to be that war conditions increase ‘on-path’ mortality, but do not affect the
mortality rate of a monarch’s close relatives. Since individuals with on-path deaths
are also royal, such a differential impact is implausible.
Instead, this anticipatory effect can be readily accounted for without appealing to
reverse causality. For instance, suppose the illnesses causing deaths sometimes render
their victims incapable of performing their network functions in the year or two prior
to the actual date of death. This would account for the observed effect.
Another explanation is that small skirmishes are more likely to escalate into wars
following a death. In the absence of an on-path death, the skirmish would not have
been recorded. However, the weakened network lowers the ability of dyads to deesca-
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late conflicts. When Wright (1942) records the start date of the war it may be dated
to these initial skirmishes, making it seem deaths caused wars that preceded them.
2.7.3 Instrument definition and Identification
To estimate the causal effect of living kinship ties on conflict, we return to our OLS
regression specification from section 5. However, we modify the model by instru-
menting for inverse kinship distance with lagged on-path deaths. Our instrument,
Z(i,j),y, is a dummy for whether an on-path death occurred in the previous 5 years.
Specifically, Z(i,j),y is
Z(i,j),y = max
t∈[1,5]
Death(i,j),y−t (2.2)
where Death(i,j),y is a dummy for whether a non-political death occurred along
the shortest network path between rulers i and j in year y (ignoring contemporaneous
deaths).16
This is a somewhat coarse instrument, given that some on-path deaths change
connectivity more than others. This coarseness is necessary in order to satisfy the
stringent conditions for instrument validity. The reason we require an instrument in
the first place is that the level of living kinship connection is endogenously determined.
Any instrument constructed using information about connectivity prior to the on-path
death will also be endogenous and therefore invalid.
More generally, for the instrument to be valid it must be strongly correlated with
1
d
and satisfy the exclusion restriction. The necessary strong correlation is directly
verified in first-stage regressions and can be seen in figure 2·4. In this setting, the
16Results are robust to alternate specifications of the instrument. The pooled dummy produces
similar results including up to 8 lags of death. Similar results can also be obtained using separate
dummies for each lag of death. We prefer the pooled specification because it eliminates worries of
over-fitting.
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exclusion restriction can be written as:
War(i,j),y ⊥ Z(i,j),y|{(1/d)(i,j),y, X(i,j),y, θy, θ(i,j)} (ER)
The exclusion restriction cannot be directly tested and faces an array of potential
concerns. (ER) requires that the on-path deaths we use to construct our instrument
are independent of war probability conditional on observables. In other words, our
identifying assumption is that recent on-path deaths relate to war only through their
impact on network distance.
Violations of (ER) can be thought of in three classes: reverse causality, effects
through non-network channels, and omitted variables.
The most obvious threat to (ER) is reverse causality. This concern is partially
dealt with by only using lagged deaths to construct our instrument. We also exclude
politically motivated on-path deaths from our analysis. Indirect channels such as
war increasing the likelihood of death by cutting supply lines or otherwise affecting
environmental factors are implausible since there is no elevated chance of war in the
years preceding close relative deaths.
A second concern is that deaths directly affect war frequency through non-network
channels. For instance, these deaths could potentially generate political instability
independently of any effect on the kinship network (e.g. by altering lines of succession,
installing inexperienced individuals in senior leadership positions, or simply through
a psychological effect on the ruler). In the event study section, we established that
the deaths of close relatives ‘off-path’ are not correlated with increased war frequency.
Therefore, the effect we see from on-path deaths points toward there being something
important about their on-pathness. It is highly implausible that only on-path deaths
matter, but the kinship ties themselves do not.
Admittedly, the deaths of close relatives are not a perfect placebo. For example,
71
close relatives may be more or less likely to be in positions of responsibility than
on-path royals. As a further test of robustness to the instability channel, we can
restrict attention to on-path deaths which do not vacate thrones (Table 2.7, column
(6)). Restricting our analysis to this subset of on-path deaths does not eliminate our
estimated effect.
Third, we might face an omitted variable problem. Some unobserved factor could
lead to both increased war frequency and an increased frequency of on-path deaths.
For instance, a major epidemic or famine might cause both noble deaths and political
turmoil. However, none of our nobles with identified causes of death died of starvation
and only a single one died of plague. Further, while epidemics did occur during our
time period, these were localized to a single city or region. The two major continent
wide epidemics, the Black Death (peaking c.1346-1353) and the Spanish Flu (1918) lie
outside our analysis period. Other omitted variable issues are partially addressed by
including fixed effects. Dyad fixed effects difference out any persistent dyad-specific
unobservable, while year fixed effects remove temporary widespread shocks.
A related concern arises from the fact that nations drop out of our data when they
lose sovereignty. This conceivably biases our results since polities enter and leave our
data as a result of their conflict behavior. The robustness section presents results
where the sample is limited to a more balanced panel consisting only of polities in
existence for at least 85% of observed years (Table 2.7, column (4)). This is shown
to strengthen our results. Thus, if present, this sort of selection bias would appear to
attenuate our estimates.
Supposing the instrument is valid, it is important to think carefully about what
this source of variation allows us to identify. On-path deaths can only occur along
existing network paths and the variation is always in the direction of reducing connec-
tivity. Our estimates are of the marginal impact of increases in network distance on
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conflict activity within dyads which share kinship ties. Thus, the correct interpreta-
tion of results based on this instrument is as a local average treatment effect (LATE).
In principle, changes in living kinship ties may be directionally asymmetric. Thus
our analysis does not provide direct evidence on how an unconnected dyad would re-
spond to the formation of a new kinship tie.17 In future work, this could potentially
be addressed through a structural model of the mechanism by which kinship networks
reduce conflict.
2.7.4 Main IV Estimates
With our instrument in hand, we use two-stage least squares (2SLS) to estimate the
following model:
War(i,j),y = α + β ·
(̂
1
d
)
(i,j),y
+ δ ·X(i,j),y + θ(i,j) + θy + (i,j),y (2.3)(
1
d
)
(i,j),y
= c+ φZ(i,j),y + γ ·X(i,j),y + ω(i,j) + ωy + ξ(i,j),y (2.4)
This follows our OLS specification, except it treats inverse network distance as an
endogenous variable and instruments for it using a dummy for recent on-path deaths.
First stage estimates (of equation (4)) are reported in Table 2.4 and causal estimates
for the impact of inverse kinship distance on war incidence are reported in Table
2.5. Columns (3) and (6) correspond to equation (3) above where kinship distance is
measured by shortest path length and resistance distance respectively. Other columns
exclude controls and/or fixed effects.
17Earlier versions of this paper explored potential instruments for increases in connectivity. How-
ever, these tend to suffer from a lack of power. For instance, we attempted to leverage the occurrence
of opposite gender firstborn children of rulers to instrument for the probability of royal marriage.
While point estimates are consistent with a symmetric effect, there are too few prince-princess
marriages to yield statistical significance.
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Table 2.4: First Stage Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(Path)−1 (Path)−1 (Path)−1 (Resistance)−1 (Resistance)−1 (Resistance)−1 (Path)−1 (Path)−1
Recent On-Path -0.0176 -0.0576∗∗∗ -0.0602∗∗∗ -0.00331 -0.163∗∗∗ -0.169∗∗∗ -0.0589∗∗∗ -0.0777∗∗∗
Death (0.0137) (0.00953) (0.00951) (0.0347) (0.0263) (0.0260) (0.00943) (0.00990)
3 Gen. Blood 0.0838∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.0849∗∗∗ 0.0113
(0.0184) (0.0393) (0.0188) (0.0274)
Same Religion 0.0468∗ 0.114∗ 0.0468∗ 0.0522
(0.0182) (0.0581) (0.0184) (0.0442)
Adjacent -0.00646 0.00349 -0.00804 -0.00175
(0.0144) (0.0563) (0.0154) (0.0231)
Neither 0.0137 0.0123 0.0138 0.00967
Landlocked (0.0107) (0.0213) (0.0108) (0.0290)
ln(distance) -0.0327∗∗∗ -0.0665+ -0.0321∗∗∗ -0.00653
(0.00851) (0.0397) (0.00834) (0.0527)
Pair FE X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X
N 85653 85648 85648 85653 85648 85648 82155 2946
F-Stat 1.641 36.52 40.12 0.00914 38.47 42.48 38.99 61.53
+p < .10,∗ p < .05,∗∗ p < .01,∗∗∗ p < .001,
Standard errors are robust to 2-way country clustering.
When dyad and year fixed effects are included, as in columns (3) and (6), we find
that our instrument (recent deaths) displays a strong negative correlation with both
measures of inverse kinship distance. The strength of the instrument is evidenced
by large (> 10) Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics. Pair fixed effects control for the fact
that dyads with different average connectedness potentially have different frequencies
of on-path death. With these included our identification is based on the short-term
deviation from a country pairs’ average level of connectedness generated by on-path
deaths. Our estimates are not sensitive to the inclusion of other dyad-level covariates.
Columns (1)-(6) of table 2.5 estimate the effect of kinship ties on war incidence.
When dyad fixed effects are included, we estimate a large and significant negative
relationship between inverse network distance, no matter how measured, and war.
Column (3) reports our preferred specification.
Given that the estimate is a local average treatment effect (LATE), care is neces-
sary when interpreting the coefficients. A naive reading of our results would suggest
that a change from being immediately connected ((Path)−1 = 1) to unconnected
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Table 2.5: 2SLS Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
War War War War War War War Start War Cont.
(Path)−1 0.139 -0.273∗∗ -0.260∗∗ -0.0601∗∗∗ -0.550∗
(0.268) (0.0908) (0.0810) (0.0144) (0.277)
(Resistance)−1 0.736 -0.0964∗∗ -0.0927∗∗
(7.968) (0.0338) (0.0307)
3 Gen. Blood 0.0351∗ 0.0321∗ 0.00622∗∗ 0.0185
(0.0145) (0.0143) (0.00220) (0.0125)
Same Religion -0.00950 -0.0111 -0.00375+ 0.000952
(0.00940) (0.00953) (0.00217) (0.0222)
Adjacent 0.0261 0.0281 0.00782+ -0.0340
(0.0176) (0.0193) (0.00449) (0.0247)
Neither Landlocked 0.00697 0.00455 0.000689 0.0320
(0.00440) (0.00333) (0.00133) (0.0334)
ln(distance) -0.00639 -0.00404 -0.00376+ 0.0720∗
(0.00815) (0.00839) (0.00217) (0.0306)
Pair FE X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X
N 85653 85648 85648 85653 85648 85648 82155 2946
+p < .10,∗ p < .05,∗∗ p < .01,∗∗∗ p < .001,
Standard errors are robust to 2-way country clustering.
((Path)−1 = 0) causes a 26 percentage point increase in war incidence. However,
variation of that magnitude is never observed because pairs with a shortest path of
one cannot have an individual between them die.
Rather, the coefficient measures a marginal effect and should be understood with
respect to the typical identifying variation. From the first stage regressions, we see
that a recent on-path death produces an average change in inverse shortest path
length of −0.06. That reduction is roughly the difference between a shortest path
length of four and five. The results indicate that this variation causes (with 95%
confidence) a 1.6 ± .8 percentage point increase in war incidence. That is a 46 ± 23
percent increase over an overall dyadic war frequency of approximately 3.5%. While
not the typical variation observed, to understand the size of the effect, consider a pair
of monarchs that move from having their children married to being disconnected.
This would correspond to a decrease in inverse shortest path length of 1
3
, and an 8.66
percentage point increase in war frequency.
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These estimates suggest the role of living kinship ties in reducing conflict is sub-
stantial. Similarly large effects are estimated when we use resistance as our measure
of kinship distance. These effect sizes help justify the huge amount of energy exerted
over dynastic marriage negotiations. It also helps explain the central role of marriages
in peace negotiations to end wars.
The estimated reduction in war incidence could either be from fewer wars starting,
or from the wars that do occur lasting fewer years. To differentiate between these
channels we change our outcome variable. We consider the effect of inverse network
distance on whether a dyad starts (continues) a war, conditional on previously being
at peace (war).
Estimates of these regressions are reported in columns (7) and (8) of Table 2.5.
We find that both channels are active. That is, increases in inverse network distance
cause decreases in both the rate at which conflicts start and the duration of conflicts
that do start. We again interpret the estimated coefficients with respect to the typical
variation in path length induced by observed on-path deaths. From columns (7) and
(8) of table 2.4, we see this variation is -0.06 when a dyad was at peace in the
previous year and -0.08 following a year of war. So, a typical on-path death increases
the probability of war onset by 0.36 percentage points. This is roughly a 50% increase
over a base war onset frequency of 0.7%. Similarly, the probability of a war continuing
from the previous year increases by 4.4 percentage points following a typical on-path
death. This is a proportionally smaller effect, since wars continue at a rate of 81.4%.
2.8 Robustness
In this section, we present several alternate specifications of the instrumental variable
analysis to address potential threats to identification. Another concern is that our
estimator is biased or that the standard errors on our estimates are not sufficiently
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conservative. To investigate this issue, we conduct Monte-Carlo simulations on a
comparable set of placebo deaths.18
2.8.1 IV Robustness
While column (3) of table 2.5 reports our preferred specification, several concerns lead
us to investigate how our estimates vary in subsets of the data and with alternate
definitions of the instrument. Tables 2.6 and 2.7 report these robustness checks.
The first four columns of table 2.7 perform our analysis in subsamples of the data.
Columns (1) and (2) demonstrate that the effect of kinship on conflict is time varying
with a more substantial effect in the earlier part of our sample. This is unsurprising
since the centralization of power in the hands of monarchs decreased during the 19th
century. Column (3) shows that the estimated effect is somewhat attenuated when
dyads including Hapsburg rulers are dropped. This is consistent with the historical
record which testifies to the particular importance of kinship ties to Habsburg power.
To create a more balanced panel, in column (4) we restrict attention to polities which
are in our sample in at least 85% of observed years.19 The estimated coefficient is
similar to our main specification. This should assuage concerns that our estimates
are biased due to endogenous entrance and exit from our sample as the result of war
outcomes, or due to our country inclusion criteria.
The final two columns explore restricted death samples to address potential con-
cerns about the instrument. Column (5) shows that our results are not substantially
changed when we construct our instrument using only deaths that are positively iden-
18In appendix D, we present semi-parametric estimates of the effects of on-path and close deaths on
war. Those results weight observations by the inverse probability of a death based on characteristics
of the shortest path (such as average age of individuals on the shortest path, its length, and its
gender mix) and the pair’s number of close relatives. These estimates are also consistent with our
main results.
1990% or 95% thresholds produce qualitatively similar results. 85% is the lowest natural threshold
which excludes France, a country which became a republic (and thus exited our sample) several times,
the last of which as a result of the Prussians defeating Napoleon III in war.
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tified as apolitical (i.e. also dropping deaths of unknown cause). Column (6) uses an
instrument based only on the deaths of on-path non-rulers. This subsample elimi-
nates the possibility of on-path deaths causing wars through the creation of political
instability caused by the vacation of thrones rather than through their effect on net-
work distance. After dropping those deaths, the estimated coefficient is still large and
negative.
Table 2.6: First Stage Estimates: Alternate Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Path)−1 (Path)−1 (Path)−1 (Path)−1 (Path)−1 (Path)−1
Recent On-Path -0.081∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗
Death (0.019) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
3 Gen. Blood 0.087∗∗∗ 0.041∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.017) (0.009) (0.025) (0.019) (0.019)
Same Religion 0.044∗ 0.024 0.014 0.068∗ 0.047∗ 0.047∗∗
(0.019) (0.018) (0.015) (0.029) (0.018) (0.018)
Adjacent 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Neither Landlocked 0.01 0.02∗ 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
ln(distance) -0.04∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.036∗∗ -0.05 -0.033∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008)
Pair FE X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X
N 57127 28371 51762 24843 85648 85648
F-Stat 18 37 53 53 35 35
Notes Pre-1800 Post-1800 Drop Long Lived No Unknown No Ruler
Habsburgs Polities Death Causes Deaths
+p < .10,∗ p < .05,∗∗ p < .01,∗∗∗ p < .001,
Standard errors are robust to 2-way country clustering.
2.8.2 Placebo Simulation
A final potential issue issue for our estimates is the correlation structure of the death
shocks. An important feature of our data is that a single death typically leads to many
shortest path disruptions. These disruptions change a single ruler’s connection with
many other states. Because our instrument is based on these disruptions, correlation
of this type would cause standard errors to be too small. Two-way clustered standard
errors are meant to be robust to these correlations. With those standard errors, our
main results are highly significant - some at the .1 percent level. However, Cameron
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Table 2.7: 2SLS Estimates: Alternate Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
war war war war war war
(Path)−1 -0.261∗ -0.180∗∗ -0.200+ -0.317∗∗ -0.274∗∗ -0.183∗
(0.115) (0.060) (0.104) (0.12) (0.093) (0.080)
3 Gen. Blood 0.039+ 0.01 0.035∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.036∗ 0.029+
(0.020) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.015) (0.015)
Same Religion -0.02 0.012+ -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Adjacent 0.054∗ 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Neither Landlocked 0.00 0.013+ 0.016∗ 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.007) (0.01) (0.01) (0.004) (0.004)
ln(distance) -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Pair FE X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X
N 57127 28371 51762 24843 85648 85648
Notes Pre-1800 Post-1800 Drop Long Lived No Unknown No Ruler
Habsburgs Polities Death Causes Deaths
+p < .10,∗ p < .05,∗∗ p < .01,∗∗∗ p < .001,
Standard errors are robust to 2-way country clustering.
and Miller (2015) show this clustering procedure fails to account for some possible
types of correlation.
To confirm that our analytic standard errors are not overconfident, we perform
a Monte-Carlo analysis. We randomly generate a series of placebo instruments and
re-estimate our main IV specification.
To make our placebo simulations comparable to the true instrument, we use the
following procedure. We begin by randomly assigning ‘base’ treatment events to
specific ruler-years. We use Bernoulli draws with a parameter calibrated to generate
an expected 253 base events (the number of non-political deaths in the data). This
mimics the individual deaths underlying our instrument. We then flip a coin to decide
which of the two rulers the placebo ‘death’ was closer to. We assign placebo on-path
death events to every dyad that ruler is connected to in that year. This procedure
makes the simulated instrument even more correlated across specific ruler-years than
the true instrument. Therefore this approach produces a conservative upper bound
on the magnitude of the estimates an instrument like ours would produce by chance.
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Figure 2·6: Distribution of simulated estimates
This procedure is performed 1000 times. For each iteration, we replicate the
instrumental variable analysis from Table 2.5 column (3). The parameter of interest
is the 2SLS estimated coefficient on inverse path length generated by instrumenting
with these placebo treatments. Summary statistics and the histogram of estimated
values are presented in Figure 2·6.
The mean estimate in these simulations is .053. This alleviates concerns that our
main estimator is negatively biased. The variance of the simulated estimates, .045, is
lower than our analytical standard error (.081). The coefficient estimated on the real
data, -.260 is much larger in magnitude than any of the 1000 simulated estimates. It
is highly unlikely the main estimate was produced by chance.
2.9 Conclusion
We construct a dataset which links a genealogy of European royals to lists of sovereign
monarchies, interstate wars, and several covariates. The data provides a rich environ-
ment to study the influence of interpersonal relationships on long-run macroeconomic,
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political, and institutional outcomes. In this paper, we focused on the relationship
between kinship and conflict. However, the same data and network tools might well
be applied to more traditional economic questions. We think future work investigat-
ing the long-run implications of leaders’ kinship networks for trade, growth, cultural
diffusion and development will be fruitful.
This data reveals a dramatic increase in kinship connections between European
monarchs over time. Viewing the genealogy as a kinship network, we use exoge-
nous variation in network structure to provide evidence that close living kinship ties
substantially reduced the frequency and duration of war.
Consistent with existing literature, we document a decline in conflict in Europe
after 1800. Specifically, we observe 2.46% of dyad-years at war from 1495-1600 com-
pared to only 1.25% from 1800-1918. Given these findings, it is natural to ask how
much of this decline can be attributed to increased kinship ties. While it is difficult
to say definitively, our results allow us to make a rough approximation.
Suppose we replaced the 19th century’s kinship network with its 16th century
counterpart. This would result in average inverse shortest path length falling from
.118 to .072. In the post-1800 subsample, we estimate a reduction in connectivity
of this magnitude would cause war incidence to increase by 0.82 percentage points.
Thus our results suggest that roughly 68% of the decline in war can be attributed to
growing kinship ties between rulers. While we acknowledge this sort of extrapolation
is imperfect, it suggests that royal family networks played a significant role in keeping
the peace.
One broad takeaway from this project is that international relations models that
eschew the role of individuals in favor of the collective state are likely ignoring impor-
tant variables. Rather than being solely driven by abstract geo-strategic imperatives,
we show that international political outcomes are greatly influenced by a leader’s per-
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sonal identity and interpersonal relationships. This is in line with the public choice
tradition, which emphasizes the role of the individual in politics. It is also consistent
with Jones and Olken (2005) who find that the identity of autocratic world leaders
has been an important determinant of economic growth in the modern age.
While our study is focused on a bygone era, its key message is timeless. Close
lines of communication and tight personal relationships between leaders are vital to
preserving peace. In the past, these ties took the form of royal family relationships.
Today, professional diplomats play much the same role. Interruptions of these linkages
can have devastating consequences, and thus redundancy in these systems is highly
desirable.
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Chapter 3
Association-based expected utility
3.1 Introduction
Consider a restaurant that you’ve been visiting for years. You enjoy their food and
have every intention of continuing to eat there. You like this restaurant so much that
you take your significant other there with the intent to propose marriage. However,
to your great surprise, your proposal is refused. Following this rejection, you never
return to the restaurant. You even refuse to go there when friends suggest it. In your
mind, the restaurant is forever associated with that awful experience.
Alternatively, for very happy experiences we go out of our way to purchase or
create mementos. At weddings we vigorously snap photographs, on vacations we buy
souvenirs, and at theme parks we purchase large quantities of branded merchandise.
All of these behaviors can be viewed as attempts to extend this positive experience
by establishing an association with a durable token. These tokens are meant to help
carry some of that positive experience forward with us.
People who engage in these behaviors seem to be revealing that the consumption
value of a product can be influenced by the context in which that product was used in
the past. This sort of history dependence obviously influences our decision making.
However, the economics literature has paid very little attention to the mechanisms
by which our past experiences shape our current preferences.1 This paper provides
1One major exception is the literature on habit formation.
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foundations for a simple model in which our current utility is partially determined by
the psychological associations we hold. These associations can be created by external
forces or through one’s own conscious effort.
The importance of psychological associations in determining our behavior has
a long history in psychology. The experimental psychology literature on evaluative
conditioning focuses specifically on how associations shape our evaluation of particular
goods. This literature was initiated by the luncheon experiment in Razran (1954).
This classic study found that subjects who experienced a particular item (artwork,
music, or a quote) together with a free lunch were later more positively disposed to
the item than before the lunch. Opposites results are obtained when the free lunch is
replaced by a foul odor. De Houwer, Thomas, and Baeyens (2001) provide an excellent
survey of the vast literature following Razran. The weight of evidence demonstrates
these association effects to be a robust and long-lasting phenomenon.
Building on the psychological evidence, the marketing literature suggests that
brand value can be created by curating the associations that people hold with a par-
ticular brand [Keller (1993), Dimofte and Yalch (2011)]. Thus, one role of marketing
professionals is to use advertisements and brand imagery to reshape consumers’ psy-
chological associations. This view of advertising is quite distinct from the canonical
economic views of advertising as either a signal (money-burning) or a source of ob-
jective information. Behavioral economic theories of advertising typically focus on
making a product salient to attention constrained consumers, this is also conceptu-
ally distinct from this association-based view.
Very little work has attempted to incorporate psychological association into formal
theoretical models. One reason for this is that previous work tends to conceptualize
associations via a spreading activation network model of memory [Walther (2002), Di-
mofte and Yalch (2011)]. Formalizations of such models are not particularly amenable
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to applications. Thus the primary contribution of this paper is to provide foundations
for a tractable association-based expected utility (ABEU) model.
I start by taking the key insights from the evaluative conditioning literature as
behavioral axioms. Together with standard expected utility assumptions, this char-
acterizes the ABEU model. Decision makers obeying my axioms can be viewed as if
they mix the utility of associated objects. Specifically, an ABEU agent’s preferences
can be represented by:
VA(c) =

u(c) c 6∈ A
(1− α)u(c) + α∑a∈A u(a)|A| c ∈ A (3.1)
Intuitively, this agent has some underlying utility function, u, which is modified
when certain goods, within the set A, become associated. Goods in the association set
are evaluated according to a convex combination of their initial utility and the average
utility of associated objects. The strength of association is measured by α ∈ (0, 1).
The ABEU model extends the standard expected utility framework to allow for
psychological associations. The primary motivation for this extension is to provide
economists with a tractable way of incorporating the behavioral evidence into appli-
cations. To this end, I study an application in which strategic marketing can be used
to manipulate psychological associations.
Specifically, I study a two product monopolist making a strategic branding deci-
sion. This firm must decide whether to market their two products under the same
brand umbrella or to use separate labels. When facing ABEU consumers, this deci-
sion is akin to deciding whether to mix the demand curves of the two products. I
show how the distribution of consumer valuations can impact the optimal branding
strategy. This is far from the only application. The next section provides additional
examples of settings where the ABEU model can be applied.
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3.2 Examples
Example 1: Advertising and Association
ABEU makes a potent theory of advertising. The ubiquity of sexual imagery in
advertising is an excellent example of firms responding to ABEU. Sexual arousal is
pleasurable (and prefered to most products), therefore ABEU predicts that ads gen-
erating an association between a product and arousing imagery should be effective.
Standard economic theories of advertising (money-burning, information, considera-
tion set) have trouble explaining the fairly uniform content of many advertisments
(attractive women, popular celebrities, tranquil scenery, and low-information)
Example 2: Smear Campaigns
Voters with ABEU will be susceptible to negative campaigning in ways that stan-
dard voters would not. This framework suggests that an effective campaign strategy
would be to simply run advertisements that alternate images of the opposition candi-
date with unpleasant stimuli. This would be expected to generate a negative associ-
ation between your opponent and the unpleasant stimuli, lowering their likelihood of
receiving votes. Such a campaign strategy would not have this effect in the standard
model since no information is conveyed.
Example 3: Attribution Bias as Association
Sihmonson (2009) shows that bad weather during a propective student’s university
visit is associated with lower matriculation rates. Haggag and Pope (2017) find that
amusement park visitors have a higher stated willingness to return if their recent
visit coincided with pleasant weather. If pleasant and unpleasant weather are viewed
as their own consumption goods, this evidence can easily be explained by ABEU.
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Haggag and Pope provide a model of “attribution bias” in the agent evaluates a state-
dependent consumption object as a mixture of the utility in the current state and the
utility in previous states in which the object was consumed. This can be viewed as a
special case of the current model. To see this let c be yesterday’s consumption, ω be
yesterday’s state, and ω′ be today’s state. Then Haggag and Pope’s two period model
is simply the ABEU model in which the set of outcomes is C×Ω and A = (c, ω), (c, ω′).
Thus the ABEU model generalizes the attribution bias model to allow misattribution
or association among distinct goods.
3.3 Foundations for Association
3.3.1 Choice environment
Let C be a (at most countable) set of consumption goods and ∆(C) be the set of
simple lotteries over C.2 I consider an agent’s preference over ∆(C), conditional on
having been previously primed by a finite set of goods A ⊂ C. Denote this conditional
preference %A. A will be interpreted as an exogenous association set. Let %∅ denote
the agent’s preference in the absence of any prior priming. When a %∅-maximal
(minimal) object exists, denote it by c¯ (c). I assume that %A is observable for every
finite set A ⊂ C/{c¯, c}.3 In a slight abuse of notation, I denote a uniform lottery over
the alternatives in A by A|A| .
This choice environment is intended to mimic a typical experimental set-up from
the evaluative conditioning literature. Here associations are generated in participants
by concurrent priming of multiple items and then the effect of this association is
elicited through choice over a wider set of both primed and unprimed items. In
settings where willingness to pay is elicited, the set of unprimed items can be viewed as
2Simple lotteries are lotteries with finite support.
3The requirement that the maximal elements not be in the association set is purely technical. If
there are multiple maximal elements, only one needs to be left out of the association sets.
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including money. In one application of interest, the association set can be interpreted
as an advertising campaign or branding strategy that generates an association between
two or more products.
3.3.2 Behavioral Assumptions
To model association-based preferences, I impose several assumptions on behavior
which are meant to capture some intuitive aspects of association. In order to focus
our attention on the implications of association, I rule out other non-standard behav-
ior by imposing the familiar expected utility conditions (weak order, continuity, and
independence).
C0: For every association set, A, %A has an expected utility representation.
It will be useful to think of %∅ as the agent’s initial preference when no associa-
tions are induced. The next axiom limits how much the process of association can
impact this initial preference.
C1: If a, b 6∈ A or a, b ∈ A, then a %A b⇐⇒ a %∅ b.
This axiom requires that if neither a nor b is primed, then the agent’s preference
between them should not change. It also requires that if both a and b are in the
association set, then the agent’s ranking does not reverse. Intuitively, this says if a
and b become associated with one another (or some common third object) that this
should not overwhelm the agent’s initial preference. Notice this assumption implies
that the only revealed preference implications of association occur when the agent is
comparing objects across the boundary of the association set. Therefore if a ∈ A and
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b 6∈ A, we cannot be sure whether their post association preference will conform to
their initial preference.
The next axiom captures the essential character of evaluative conditioning, that
association of a good with relatively worse (better) objects lowers (raises) its value.
C2: For a∗, a∗ ∈ A where a∗ %∅ a and a %∅ a∗ ∀a ∈ A, the following hold for every
p ∈ ∆(C):
1. p %∅ a∗ =⇒ p %A a∗
2. a∗ %∅ p =⇒ a∗ %A p
This condition simply states that the best object in A, as determined by the initial
preference order, becomes less valuable after association with the other (worse) objects
in A and that the opposite holds for the worst object in A.
With only these basic conditions, we can obtain a representation result with a
significant amount of structure. This is shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1: The collection of preferences {%A} satisfies C0-C2 if and only if there
exists a tuple (u, {αA, pA}) such that u : ∆(C)→ R is linear in probability, αA ∈ [0, 1]
and pA ∈ ∆(A) for every A, and that each %A is represented by
VA(p) = Ep

u(c) c 6∈ A
(1− αA)u(c) + αAu(pA) c ∈ A
Lemma 3.1 derives a very flexible utility representation which captures the main
intuition of association. In this model, the agent is viewed as evaluating alternatives
using a mixture of their direct utilities with the utility of associated objects. However,
the weak assumptions mean that very little structure is placed on the association
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process. In order to provide a more tractable model, it will be useful to further
specialize the type of association we have in mind.
One plausible assumption is that the association process simply causes the agent
to mis-attribute value within the association set. In other words, association neither
systematically increases nor decreases the value of objects, but simply redistributes
value among the set of alternatives. This idea is captured by the following condition.
C3: If p ∈ ∆(C/A), then A|A| ∼∅ p⇐⇒ A|A| ∼A p.
This condition supposes that a decision maker’s evaluation of a uniform lottery over
the set A is unaffected if all elements of A are primed prior to choice. Adding this to
the above assumptions allows us to specialize the representation from Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.2: The collection of preferences {%A} satisfies C0-C3 if and only if there
exists a tuple (u, {αA, pA}) such that u : ∆(C)→ R is linear in probability, αA ∈ [0, 1]
for every A, and that each %A is represented by
VA(p) = Ep

u(c) c 6∈ A
(1− αA)u(c) + αA 1|A|
∑
a∈A u(a) c ∈ A
This added assumption allows us to view the agent as evaluating alternatives in
the association set as a mixture between their direct utility and the average of all
associated alternatives. This representation also allows the strength of association
to depend on what is included in the set. There are many situations where this is
desirable. For instance, evaluative conditioning is often thought of as a subconscious
process. If a particular combination of objects is very unusual or attention grabbing
we might expect a decision maker to consciously resist psychological association be-
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tween the contents resulting in a lower α. However, this allows the possibility of some
non-intuitive behavior. Specifically, consider two association sets, A and B, which
share a common object c and can be ranked in the following sense:
Definition 3.1: A (strictly) improves B if A|A| %∅ (∅) B|B| .
Allowing α to be an arbitrary function of the association set means that we could
observe:
c ∼∅ c′, c′ A c, and c B c′.
Thus without further behavioral restrictions, improving the quality of items which
are associated with c could actually lower an agent’s ex post evaluation of c. This
behavior is at odds with the basic intuition underlying psychological association. In
order to study the basic implications of association in economic settings it will useful
to abstract away from this concern. Formally,
C4: If c ∈ A ∩B and A (strictly) improves B, then a %B p =⇒ a %A (A) p.
Combined with a suitable richness condition on the consumption space, A0-A4 pin
down an extremely tractable model of association. This is shown in proposition 3.1.
The uniqueness properties of the model are established in proposition 3.2.
Definition 3.2: An association-based expected utility (ABEU) representation of
{%A} is a pair (u, α) such that u : ∆(C) → R is linear in probability, α ∈ [0, 1],
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and that each %A is represented by
uA(p) = Ep

u(c) c 6∈ A
(1− α)u(c) + α 1|A|
∑
a∈A u(a) c ∈ A
Definition 3.3: The consumption space, C, is rich if for every c, c′ ∈ C such that
c ∅ c′ the following hold:
1. (Order-Denseness) There exists some c′′ ∈ C such that c ∅ c′′ ∅ c′.
2. (Unboundedness) For every  > 0, there exists a c¯ and c such that (1−)c′+c¯ ∅
c and c′ ∅ (1− )c+ c.
Theorem 3.1: When C is rich, a decision maker’s preferences, {%A}, satisfy C0-C4 if
and only if there exists an association-based expected utility (ABEU) representation
of {%A}.
Theorem 3.2: If (u, α) and (u′, α′) are both ABEU representations of {%A}, then
α = α′ and u′ is a positive affine transformation of u.
The last result of this section establishes that the parameter α does in fact cap-
ture psychological association. In the ABEU model, the association process can lead
to preference reversals. Thus we expect an agent with stronger psychological asso-
ciation to experience more reversals (in the sense of set inclusion). I formalize this
intuition in definition 3.4. Then proposition 3.1 establishes that the parameter, α,
captures the strength of psychological association in the ABEU model.
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Definition 3.4: Agent 1 exhibits stronger association than agent 2 if for every asso-
ciation set A,
1. %1∅=%2∅,
2. If p %2∅ q and q 2A p, then q 1A p
Proposition 3.1: Suppose agents 1 and 2 hold preferences which admit ABEU rep-
resentations, (u1, α1) and (u2, α2). Agent 1 exhibits stronger association than agent
2 if and only if u is a positive affine transformation of u′ and α1 ≥ α2.
3.4 Application: Brand Extension
One advantage of the ABEU model is that it is sufficiently tractable to be applied in
standard economic settings. The decision theoretic underpinnings of the ABEU model
take the association set to be exogenous. However, this is from the point of view of
the consumer. When firms are selling products to consumers with ABEU preferences,
it may be possible for the firm to endogenously affect the contents of the association
set. The marketing literature has suggested that psychological associations can be an
important factor in the success of brand extension.
Brand extension is a marketing strategy in which a firm sells several distinct
products under the same brand umbrella. Typically, this involves a firm introducing
a new product using the brand name from an existing product line. These brand
extension represent a large share of all new consumer products, Aaker and Keller
(1990) finds 40% of new products in US supermarkets are brand extensions.
The economics literature has mainly viewed brand extensions as the result of a
signaling equilibrium. The idea is that firms who have developed a reputation of
being a high quality producer of one product can carry this advantage into new
markets by only extending their brand to other high quality products. However, this
93
explanation runs into several difficulties. Moorthy (2012) criticizes this explanation
on technical grounds, demonstrating that the signaling equilibrium is not robust and
fails to exist when firms face arbitrarily small amounts of uncertainty about the
quality of new products. Additionally, signaling explanations cannot explain brand
extension when the quality of new products is readily observable. In other cases,
the signaling explanation has trouble explaining situations when firms choose not to
brand extend despite having a reputation for quality.
I show how the ABEU model can be used to understand brand extension in situa-
tions where the signaling model may not be appropriate. Specifically, the possibility
of psychological association can motivate firms to either extend their brand (or not)
even when consumers have no uncertainty about product quality. To study this set-
ting, I adapt the environment familiar from the literature on bundling (see McAfee,
McMillan, and Whinston (1989)).
Specifically, I consider a monopolist selling two products, x and y. In addition to
choosing the price of each good, this monopolist may choose whether to market the
products under a single brand. The monopolist operates in a market populated by a
unit measure of consumers whose willingness to pay (their reserve price) for products
exhibits an association effect of strength, α. Specifically, when the two products are
branded separately, let Pi(x) and Pi(y) denote the willingness to pay of consumer
i ∈ [0, 1] for products x and y, respectively. However, if the monopolists chooses to
extend a single brand to both products, then consumers will associate the products.
In that case, the willingness to pay for x becomes
Pαi (x) = (1− α)Pi(x) + α
Pi(x) + Pi(y)
2
and symmetrically for y.
The following propositions show that a profit maximizing monopolist monopo-
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list must take into account his customer’s psychological association. Proposition 3.4
shows how a monopolist can use brand extension to extract more surplus from ABEU
consumers. Essentially, a monopolist is able to use association effects to convince
consumers to buy worthless branded merchandise. This allows the monopolist to sell
secondary products to customers who are unwilling to pay the monopoly price for
the primary product. Proposition 3.5 shows that indiscriminate brand extension can
reduce profits when products are sufficiently horizontally differentiated.
Proposition 3.4: If Pi(x) > Pi(y) = 0 ∀i, Pj(x) > c(x) for some j, and c(y) = 0,
then brand extension strictly increases profits.
Proposition 3.5: If Pi(x) > Pj(x)⇐⇒ Pj(y) > Pi(y), then brand extension strictly
decreases profits.
3.5 Related Literature
This project draws inspiration from the experimental psychological literature on eval-
uative conditioning. One of the earliest examples is the Razran (1954) luncheon
experiment. Razran asked participants to evaluate a variety of visual and auditory
stimuli (e.g. music, artwork, and quotations). Then some of these stimuli were paired
with either a free lunch or unpleasant odors. When participants were later asked to
re-evaluate the items, it was shown that items paired with the free lunch were eval-
uated more positively and items paired with the unpleasant odor more negatively.
Another important experiment was conducted by Levey and Martin (1974). They
elicited subjects’ rankings of a variety of images. When neutral images were paired
with highly liked (disliked) images, the evaluation of the neutral images improved
(declined). Levey and Martin (1974) spurred many similar studies that showed the
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phenomenon of evaluative conditioning to be extremely robust across sensory modes
and product categories. This literature is expertly surveyed by De Houwer, Thomas,
and Baeyens (2001).
Of particular interest to the present study, Kim, Allen, and Kardes (1996) show
that evaluative conditioning can be effective in a consumer goods setting. Specifically,
they conduct an experiment which shows that pairing a brand of facial tissues with
images of kittens substantially improves subjects’ evaluations of the brand. This is
just one example of a growing literature in academic marketing which recognizes the
importance of psychological association on consumer choice. Bargh (2002) reviews
the evidence on unconscious influences on behavior and calls for more attention on
this issue in consumer psychology. Answering this call, Dimofte and Yalch (2011)
propose that “mere association” can impact brand value. Their idea is that the value
of a product or brand is partially determined by the ideas and associations it evokes.
Like many papers in the advertising literature, Dimofte and Yalch suggest the use
of spreading activation networks to model associative memory. However, the use
of these network models (or any formal model) to study psychological association is
exceedingly rare.4 One reason for this is that these sorts of neural network models are
mathematically complicated and involve many parameters which make them difficult
to operationalize. A key goal of the present paper is to provide a tractable model
which can be used to bring these psychological insights to bear on economic questions
in a rigorous way.
While evaluative conditioning and psychological association have been popular
topics in psychology and marketing, the economics literature has been comparatively
silent on these issues. The behavioral economics literature on framing is the closest
4One notable exception is Bhatt (2012) who constructs a framework using spreading activation
networks to study advertising.
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antecedent to my model. Rubinstein (1993) presented an early framing model in which
monopolists could split the price of their product into two components. By making
this split a complex function of the state of the world, the monopolist can effectively
price discriminate against computationally constrained consumers. Masatlioglu and
Ok (2005) axiomatize a model of choice where an exogenous status quo frames deci-
sions by giving a utility bump to the object designated as the status quo. Rubinstein
and Salant (2006) study choice from lists where a statisficing agent’s choice is influ-
enced by the order of presentation. Ahn and Ergin (2010) axiomatize a model where
the way in which a contract is written can affect an actor’s evaluation by bringing
to mind more contingencies. Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010) find similar behavior in
a model of local thinking. All of these models study the impact of pay-off irrelevant
features of the environment on choice behavior. Rubinstein and Salant (2008) pro-
vided choice theoretic foundations for a general framework to capture these framing
effects. Spiegler (2014) explores the idea of advertisements as frames and shows how
competitive market forces can mitigate the consumer welfare losses from framing. In
a broad sense, evaluative conditioning generally and my ABEU model in particular
can be viewed as a specific type of framing.
However, this interpretation relies on a particular view of the underlying psycho-
logical process. Essentially, a framing interpretation requires that association affects
choice by “tricking” the agent and not directly impacting the hedonic value of an
experience. When the marketing literature discusses brand value as being derived
from associations (see some reference), it is implicit that these associations actually
affect consumer experience. The fact that a consumer has fond childhood memories
of Hershey bars and terrible past experiences with Jack Daniels can very well impact
actual consumption value today. If this sort of memory utility underlies the evidence
on psychological association, then it should be viewed as a distinct phenomenon from
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framing. My results are largely independent of which mechanism causes consumers
to exhibit association-based preferences.
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Appendix A
Appendices to Preference discovery and
experimentation
A.1 Behavioral foundations for the baseline model
The main text of this paper begins the analysis taking for granted that the observed
preference can be represented by a separable representation based on DLR menu rep-
resentation. This appendix describes the axiomatic foundations for such a model.
B1 (Continuous Weak Order): The relation % is complete, transitive, and for
any pair
(p,A) ∈ ∆C ×K the upper and lower contour sets,
{(p′, A′) ∈ ∆C ×K | (p′, A′) % (p,A)} and {(p′, A′) ∈ ∆C ×K | (p,A) % (p′, A′)},
are closed in the product topology.
Definition: A′ ⊆ conv(A) is critical for A if for all B with A′ ⊆ conv(B) ⊆
conv(A), we have (p,A) ∼ (p,B)∀p ∈ ∆C.
B2 (Ex-post fPAEU): For each c ∈ C the induced menu preference, %c, satis-
fies:
(a) (Monotonicity) B ⊂ A =⇒ A %c B
(b) (Independence) For any α ∈ [0, 1] and any A,A′, B ∈ K (Monotonicity)
A c A′ =⇒ αA+ (1− α)B c αA′ + (1− α)B
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(c) (Finiteness) Every menu, A, has a finite critical subset.
(d) (Weak Order) %c is complete and transitive.
(e) (Continuity) {A′|A′ %c A} and {A′|A %c A′} are closed in the Hausdorff topol-
ogy.
B2 is a set of standard axioms which together are necessary and sufficient for each
initial consumption choice, c ∈ C, to induce a preference over menus, %c, which has
an fPAEU representation. This is explored in DLR (2009). Obviously parts (e) and
(f) of B2 are implied by B1. B1 strengthens completeness,transitivity, and continuity
to the extended domain considered in this paper rather than only to the domain of
menus considered by DLR.
The main text of this paper also makes extensive use of the presence of a state
independent best and worst outcome. Behaviorally this is equivalent to the following
condition:
B3 (Best/Worst): There exists c∗, c∗ such that for all c ∈ C and for all menus
A ∈ K the following holds:
(a) (Non-degeneracy) {c∗} c {c∗}
(b) (Best always chosen) {c∗} ∼c A ∪ {c∗}
(c) (Worst never chosen) A ∼c A ∪ {c∗}
The next three axioms will impose some consistency conditions on the types of
interaction between the initial consumption consumption and the associated menu
preferences.
B4 (Rational Expectations): For α, β, β′ ∈ [0, 1] and p, q ∈ ∆C,
A ∼p {βˆ} and A ∼q {βˆ′} =⇒ A ∼αp+(1−α)q {αβˆ + (1− α)βˆ′}
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This axiom is best understood for the case of degenerate consumption lotteries.
Let p = c and q = c′. Suppose the DM expects the menu A to be worth β given
a first period consumption lottery c and β′ given c′. This axiom requires a first
period consumption lottery of αc + (1α)c′ to lead the DM’s expected value of A to
be αβ + (1α)β′. Since I am interested in modeling an agent that learns through the
act of consumption, only the (expected) outcome of the consumption lottery should
affect the ex-ante valuation of the menu.
This axiom rules out any correlation between the first period randomization de-
vice and either the agent’s taste uncertainty or second stage randomization devices.
For instance, if both current and future lotteries were decided by a single (publicly
observed) roll of a die then this axiom would not be satisfied. In this sense, this axiom
rules out certain types of information processes.
B5 (Weak Separability): For any a, b, c, c′ ∈ C
(a, {c}) % (a, {c′})⇐⇒ (c, {b}) % (c′, {b}).
B5 combines two assumptions. First, let a = b. Then the above reduces to (b, {c}) %
(b, {c′}) ⇐⇒ (c, {b}) % (c′, {b}). This is a stationarity assumption. It requires if c is
expected to be preferred to c′ tomorrow, then it must also be preferred today.
Secondly, combining the axiom with its implication stationarity (stated above)
shows that B5 also implies (a, {c}) % (a, {c′}) =⇒ (b, {c}) % (b, {c′}). That is to say
I assume that the induced relations %a and %b agree on singleton menus. Notice, it
is likely that the consumption of different objects will provide different information
that could lead the agent’s ranking of menus to be different. However, the induced
menu preferences are determined ex-ante. The singleton menu is chosen prior any
consumption activity and thus all anticipated information is irrelevant since there is
no active choice following the information revelation. Singleton menus will be valued
at their ex-ante expected value, regardless of the expected information process. A
similar axiom is discussed by Hyogo (2007).
B6 (Additivity):
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(a) For every c, c′, c′′ ∈ C and p, p′, p′′ ∈ ∆C
(c, {p′}) ∼ (c′, {p}) and (c, {p′′}) ∼ (c′′, {p}) =⇒ (c′, {p′′}) ∼ (c′′, {p′}).
(b) For α ∈ [0, 1] and p, p′, q, q′, r, r′ ∈ ∆C
(p, {p′}) % (q, {q′})⇐⇒
(αp+ (1− α)r, {αp′ + (1− α)r′}) % (αq + (1− α)r, {αq′ + (1− α)r′}).
Part (a) is the well-known hexagon condition from Debreu (1960). To understand
the hexagon condition, suppose c is better than c′ which is better than c′′ and similarly
for the ps. Now suppose the gain from consuming c instead of c′ is exactly offset by
switching from p to p′ tomorrow and similarly that consuming c instead to c′′ is
exactly offset by switching from p to p′′. Then the hexagon condition requires the
gain from consuming c′ instead of c′′ is exactly offset by the loss of switching from
p′ to p′′ tomorrow. Part (b) is a weakening of independence such that it only holds
when the follow-on menu is restricted to singletons. This weakening (relative to full
independence) allows for the possibility that first period consumption can have inter-
temporal complementarities with non-trivial menus. This is essential if learning is
to be valuable to the DM. Additionally, this implies an analogue to the ‘uniform
utility differences’ condition introduced in Karni (2004). This analogue is used more
explicitly in Hyogo (2007). If I were to expand the domain to ∆(∆C ×K ), then part
(a) would be unnecessary and an Anscombe-Aumann like argument could be used to
derive additivity instead.
Together these conditions (B1-B6) provide the behavioral foundations for the base-
line representation. In order to formalize this result, I will first state a series of lem-
mas. The first shows one of the useful features of a domain with a best and worst is
to provide a unique regular fPAEU representation. Recall, an fPAEU representation,
(Uc, µc), is regular if Uc ⊆ {u : ∆C → [0, 1] | u({βc∗ + (1 − β)c∗}) = β} and µc is a
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probability measure with support U .
Lemma 1.1: If % satisfies B2 and B3, then for each induced menu preference, %c,
there exists a unique regular fPAEU representation, (Uc, µc).
Proof: It follows from DLR (2009)’s Theorem 6 that B2 is sufficient to ensure each
induced preference has an fPAEU representation which I denote (U , µ). In this rep-
resentation, U is a set of expected utility functions and µ is a positive measure with
support U . B3 implies the existence of universal best and worst alternatives, c∗ and
c∗. The fPAEU representation , (U , µ), can be easily ‘regularized’ as follows:
Uc ≡
{
u− u(c∗)
u(c∗)
| u ∈ U
}
and µc(u) ≡ u(c
∗)µ(u)
µ(U )
It is easy to verify that (Uc, µc) is a regular fPAEU representation of %c. It remains
to show that it is the unique one. Notice that the DLR theorem guarantees that Uc
is ordinally unique. That means the set Uc is identified up to positive affine trans-
formations of its members. However, regularity removes these degrees of freedom by
requiring u(βˆ) = β. It only remains to show that no probability measure, other than
µc, will represent %c.
Suppose toward a contradiction that (Uc, µ′) also is a regular fPAEU representation
of %c. WLOG there is some u′ ∈ Uc such that µc(u′) > µ′(u′).
Adapting an argument from DLR, we know there are menus A and B such that
max
a∈A
u′(a) > max
b∈B
u′(b) and max
a∈A
u(a) = max
b∈B
u(b) if u 6= u′.
Let βˆA and βˆB be the β-equivalents of A and B respectively. Since we have βˆA ∼ A
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and βˆB ∼ B it must be that:
βA − βB =∑
u∈Uc
[
max
a∈A
u(a)µc(u)−max
b∈B
u(a)µc(u)
]
=
∑
u∈Uc
[
max
a∈A
u(a)µ′(u)−max
b∈B
u(a)µ′(u)
]
(
max
a∈A
u′(a)−max
b∈B
u′(b)
)
µc(u
′) =
(
max
a∈A
u′(a)−max
b∈B
u′(b)
)
µ′(u′)
µc(u
′) = µ′(u′)
This is a contradiction because we said that µc(u
′) > µ′(u′) 
The next lemma shows that singleton independence, my B6(b), implies part (b) of the
additivity condition used in Hyogo (2007). Moreover, it is straightforward to show
that adding B5 implies that if we interchange period consumptions [such that (a, b)
becomes (b, a)] this implication will continue to hold.
Lemma 1.2: Suppose % satisfies transitivity and B6(b). Then for every c, c′, c′′ ∈ C
and p, p′, q, q′ ∈ ∆C
(c, {p′}) ∼ (c′{p}) and (c, {1
2
p′ + 1
2
q}) ∼ (c, {1
2
p+ 1
2
q′}) =⇒ (c, {q′}) ∼ (c′{q}).
Proof: By assumption we have
(c, {p′}) ∼ (c′, {p}) and (c, {1
2
p′ + 1
2
q}) ∼ (c, {1
2
p+ 1
2
q′}) .
Applying singleton independence (B6(b)) we can mix each side of the first indifference
with 1
2
(c, q) to find (
c, {1
2
p′ + 1
2
q}) ∼ (1
2
c′ + 1
2
c, {1
2
p+ 1
2
q}) .
Then by the second indifference and transitivity we find(
1
2
c′ + 1
2
c, {1
2
p+ 1
2
q′}) ∼ (1
2
c′ + 1
2
c, {1
2
p+ 1
2
q}) .
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Another application of B6(b) lets us “unmix” a 1
2
(c, p) from each side yielding
(c, {q′}) ∼ (c′, {q}) 
Using these lemmas, I now state the formal characterization of the baseline repre-
sentation.
Theorem 1.0: % satisfies B1-B6 if and only if it has a baseline representation,
({Uc, µc}c∈C, δ). Moreover, a baseline representation is unique.
Proof: Necessity is trivial. To show sufficiency I adapt Lemma 4 from Hyogo (2007)
to the case of a subjective state space. I begin by restricting attention to the restricted
domain ∆C ×∆C. Notice this space is isomorphic to [0, 1]|C| × [0, 1]|C| and therefore
is connected and separable.
So by Debreu (1960), B1 (order and continuity), B3(a) (non-degeneracy), B5(weak
separability), and B6(a) (hexagon condition) imply that there exist continuous and
non-constant functions v : ∆C → R and w : ∆C → R such that % is represented by
Ŵ (p, {q}) = v(p) + w(q).
For each induced preference %c, Lemma 1 pins down a unique pair (Uc, µc) such that
%c is represented by
Vc(A) =
∑
u∈Uc
max
a∈A
u(a)µ′(u) for A ∈ K .
By B4, when a lottery p ∈ ∆C over prior consumption is chosen the induced preference
%p can be represented by
Vp(A) = Ep
∑
u∈Uc
max
a∈A
u(a)µ′(u) for A ∈ K .
When we restrict the domain of Vp to singleton menus, we know that it must be a
positive monotonic transformation of w. Moreover, weak separability (B5) implies
that the representations of all induced preferences must agree on singletons. That
is Vc({c′′}) = Vc({c′′}) for all c, c′, c′′ ∈ C. So when restricted to singleton menus
the representations are independent of c, thus we can drop the c and just call this
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function V . Further, the stationarity component of B5 implies that V must also be a
positive monotonic transformation of v. Let φ and φ′ be these transformations. Now
we can express the representation as follows: constant functions v : ∆C → R and
w : ∆C → R such that % is represented by
Ŵ (p, {q}) = φ(V (p)) + φ′(V (q)).
Now I wish to show that φ′ is affine. Towards that end, lemma 1.2 shows that a con-
dition analogous to Karni (2004)’s “uniform utility differences” is implied by B6(b).
Following Hyogo (2007), this is sufficient to show that the restricted preference can
be represented by
Ŵ (p, {q}) = φ(V (p)) + V (q).
In fact (by an analogue to Lemma 2), B5 and B6(b) together imply a symmetric
condition which guarantees φ is also affine. Thus there is a δ > 0 such that
Ŵ (p, {q}) = V (p) + δV (q).
Further, the uniqueness portion of Debreu’s theorem implies δ is unique. Best/Worst
and Continuous weak order guarantee all menu have a singleton β-equivalent. Thus
there is a natural extension of Ŵ to ∆C ×K . Denote this by
W (p,A) = V (p) + δVp(A) = Ep[v(c) + δVc(A)].
This is the baseline representation that we were seeking. Uniqueness follows from
Lemma 1.1 and Debreu. 
Remark 1: The results of this paper utilize a state independent best and worst
outcome. In many settings this is an odious assumption. However, it is not neces-
sary. In fact, B3 can be relaxed to the existence of a pair of alternatives which are
strictly ranked (the same way) in every subjective state. All of my results can be
suitably modified to hold in this setting. This condition can be formalized in terms
of the preference relation as follows:
B3* (Better/Worse): There exists c∗, c∗ such that for all c ∈ C and A ∈ K
there is a sufficiently small  > 0 such that:
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(a) {c∗} c {c∗},
(b) {c∗} ∼c {c∗} ∪ {(1− )c∗ + A}, and
(c) {(1− )c∗ + A} ∼c {(1− )c∗ + A} ∪ {c∗}
A.2 Independence of axioms
In this appendix, I explore the logical independence of the main learning axioms, A1
and A2. To this end, I give examples of learning processes which satisfy one but not
the other.
In terms of the PD representation, A1 requires that the signal generated by con-
sumption of c is measurable with respect to Pc, the partition of U generated by u(c).
One implication of A2 is that consuming c should be the best way to learn about u(c).
Consider a model in which consumption produces a signal coarser than Pc. Clearly
such a model would satisfy A1. In particular, fix some  > 0 and consider the partition
P c in which cells are defined by
P c (u) = {u′ ∈ U | ≥ |u(c)− u′(c)|}.
If we modify the PD representation such that P c (u) replaces Pc(u), there will be sets
of utility functions, U , such that trying c is no longer the best way to learn u(c).
Specifically consider a separating PD representation (with the above modification)
with a maximally informative alternative, c¯. That is to say u, u′ ∈ U implies |u(c¯)−
u′(c¯)| > . If there are u and u′ such that |u(c)− u′(c)| ≤ , then trying c will not be
able to separate these states even though c¯ could. This sort of ‘bandwidth’ learning
would violate A2 while satisfying A1.
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For the opposite case, I apply similar logic and consider a learning process by which
consumption of c produces a more informative signal than Pc. Any such process will
violate A1. The question is whether A2 can continue to hold in this setting. To find
the answer, I need only consider the simplest possible case in which every consumption
choice produces the same signal (assumed to be a partition finer than Pc). Now A2
is vacuously true. To see this, notice A2 only has content if consuming some c′ 6= c
is sometimes more informative about a menu {pn, βˆ} than consuming c. However, if
c and c′ generate the same signal (and thus induce identical menu preferences) this
can never be relevant.
Finally notice that a preference with a PD representation without the separating
qualification necessarily satisfies A1 and A2, but will not have a maximally informa-
tive alternative and therefore fails to satisfy A3.
A.3 Proofs
This appendix collects the proofs omitted from the main body of the paper. I begin
by considering the case of a preference with a baseline representation which satisfies
No Indirect Learning. Recall from the first appendix that a baseline representation
specifies a unique set of fPAEU representations {Uc, µc}c∈C which represent the in-
duced preferences {%c}c∈C. To prove Theorem 1, the following definitions will be
helpful:
Û ≡ {u ∈ [0, 1]|C|| for each c, u(c) = u′(c) for some u′ ∈ Uc},
Pc(u) ≡ {u′ ∈ Û |u′(c) = u(c)},
and µˆ is a probability measure satisfying:
µˆ(u) =
∏
c∈C
µc{Pc(u)} for every u ∈ Uˆ
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Before proceeding to Theorem 1.1, I provide a lemma which helps illustrate the re-
striction No Indirect Learning (NIL) places on the baseline model.
Lemma 1.3: If % has a baseline representation and satisfies NIL, then the induced
preference, %c, can be represented by
Vc(A) =
∑
u∈Û
max
q∈A

∑
u′∈Pc(u)
u′(q)µˆ(u′|Pc(u)) if c ∈ supp(q)
V (q) else
 µˆ(u).
Proof: Notice, for every c′ 6= c ∈ C, NIL implies there is exactly one c-potential
value of c′. The proof of Theorem 1.3 demonstrated that the unique regular fPAEU
representation of %c, denoted (Uc, µc), will satisfy Uc ⊆
∏
Kc,c′. Here Kc,c′ refers
to the set of c-potential values of c′. Thus distinct subjective states in Uc can only
differ on the valuation of c. Immediately we can see that the agent cannot demand
flexibility in menus which do not contain c (or a lottery placing weight on c). Further
because we know that all induced preference agree on the ex-ante value of singletons
we can determine:
u′′ ∈ Uc =⇒ u′′(c′) = V (c′) ∀c′ 6= c
Noting that V is linear in probabilities, we find that:
Vc(A) =
∑
u′′∈Uc
max
q∈A
u′′(q)µc(u′′) =
∑
u′′∈Uc
max
q∈A
{
u′′(q) if c ∈ supp(q)
V (q) else
}
µ(u′′)
Now we can simply identify u′′ ∈ Uc with the cell Pc(u′′). Given this identification it
is straightforward to see the desired numerical equivalence:
Vc(A) =
∑
u∈Û
max
q∈A

∑
u′∈Pc(u)
u′(q)µˆ(u′|Pc(u)) if c ∈ supp(q)
V (q) else
 µˆ(u). 
With Lemma 1.3 in place, the proof Theorem 1.1 becomes fairly straightforward.
Theorem 1.1: % has a baseline representation and satisfies No Indirect Learning if
and only if it has a unique PD representation with a product structure.
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Proof: Necessity is obvious. To show sufficiency, first notice that the baseline rep-
resentation is numerically equivalent to:
W (p,A) = Ep
∑
u∈Û
[u(c) + δVc(A)] µˆ(u)
Now applying Lemma 1.3 this can be rewritten as:
W (p,A) = Ep
∑
u∈Û
u(c) + δmax
q∈A

∑
u′∈Pc(u)
u′(q)µˆ(u′|Pc(u)) if c ∈ supp(q)
V (q) else

 µˆ(u)
Taking advantage of the product structure of (Û , µˆ) , I observe that for every u ∈ Û
V (q) =
∑
u′∈Pc(u)
u′′(q)µˆ(u′′|Pc(u)) as long as c 6∈ supp(q).
This observation allows me to show that
W (p,A) = Ep
∑
u∈Û
u(c) + δmaxq∈A

∑
u′∈Pc(u)
u′(q)µˆ(u′|Pc(u)) if c ∈ supp(q)∑
u′′∈Pc(u)
u′′(q)µˆ(u′′|Pc(u)) else

 µˆ(u)
W (p,A) = Ep
∑
u∈Û
u(c) + δmax
q∈A
∑
u′∈Pc(u)
u′(q)µˆ(u′|Pc(u))
 µˆ(u)
Thus the tuple (Û , µˆ, δ) is a PD representation of %. Given the definitions of Û and µˆ it
is easy to verify that this tuple has the desired product structure.
To establish uniqueness, suppose there is a second PD representation with a product struc-
ture, (U ′, µ′, δ′), which also represents %. Together, propositions 1 and 2 below demon-
strates that Û = U ′. Suppose δ ≤ 1. Find β such that (βˆ, c∗) ∼ (c∗, c∗). Clearly,
δ = δ′ = β. For δ > 1, find β such that (c∗, βˆ ∼ (c∗, c∗). Here, δ = δ′ = 1/β. Finally,
suppose toward a contradiction that µˆ 6= µ′. Because of the product structure restriction,
this can only be true if there is some c ∈ C and u ∈ Uˆ for which µˆ(Pc(u)) 6= µ′(Pc(u)).
However, if this were true then the two representation would imply different subjective CDFs
over the c-potential values of c. This is not possible since this would imply different observ-
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able behavior which can be seen as changing the slope of the option value curve for (c, βˆ).
Hence there is a contradiction and (Û , µˆ, δ) must be the only PD representation of % which
satisfies the product structure restriction.
Proposition 1.1: Suppose (U , µ, δ) is a PD representation. Let Kc,c ≡ {u(c)|u ∈
U }. Then
U ⊆
∏
c∈C
Kc,c.
Moreover, if (U , µ, δ) has a product structure, then U =
∏
c∈C
Kc,c.
Proof: The first part of the proposition is trivially true by construction of Kc,c. The
second part of the proposition is more subtle. However, it follows as a consequence of
the construction used to prove theorem 1.1. If (U , µ, δ) has a product structure then
theorem 1.1 implies there is a corresponding baseline representation, ({Uc, µc}c∈C, δ).
As was shown in the proof of theorem 1, U can be expressed as:
U = {u ∈ [0, 1]|C|| for each c, u(c) = u′(c) for some u′ ∈ Uc} (∗)
Now suppose toward a contradiction that there exists some u ∈∏Kc,c \U . For every
c, we know by definition of Kc,c that there is a uc ∈ U such that u(c) = uc(c). How-
ever, this means that there was some u′c ∈ Uc such that u′c(c) = uc(c) = u(c). Since
this is true for every c ∈ C, (∗) implies that u ∈ U . This is a contradiction and thus
proves the result. 
Proposition 1.2: Suppose % has a PD representation, (U , µ, δ), then
β ∈ Kc,c ⇐⇒ {βˆ, c} ∪ {12c+ 12 βˆ′} c {βˆ, c} whenever β < β′ ≤ 1.
Proof: (⇐=) Let
Uc =
{
u′ | u′ =
∑
u∈U
u µ(u|u(c) = α) for some α ∈ [0, 1]
}
, and µc(u
′) = µ(Pc(u′)).
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It is straightforward to see that (Uc, µc) is a regular fPAEU representation of the
induced preference %c. Given we know that, for every β′ ∈ (β, 1],∑
u∈Uc
max
(
u(βˆ), u(c), u(1
2
βˆ′ + 1
2
c)
)
µ(u) >
∑
u∈Uc
max
(
u(βˆ), u(c)
)
µ(u)
This means for some state u′ ∈ Uc it must be the case that for all
1
2
β′ + 1
2
u′(c) = u′(1
2
β′ + 1
2
c) > max(β, u′(c)) ≥ 1
2
β + 1
2
u′(c)
This must hold for all β′ arbitrarily close to β. This can only be true if β = u′(c). And
by the construction of Uc this means that Pc(u′) ⊂ U is non-empty. Thus β ∈ Kc,c .
(=⇒) This direction is trivial and can be shown by following the above logic in reverse
order.
In the discussion of A2, I claim that the axiom (together with the baseline repre-
sentation) implies that “consuming c provides as much information about c’s value
as does consuming any c′.” This is shown below:
Proposition 1.5: If % has a baseline representation and satisfies A2, then for any
β, β′ ∈ [0, 1]
{βˆ′} ∼c {c, βˆ} =⇒ {βˆ′} %c′ {c, βˆ} ∀c′ ∈ C.
Proof: The supposition that % has a baseline representation ensures that all induced
preferences share a commonly agreed upon state-independent best and worst alterna-
tive. The contrapositive of A2 implies:
β 6∈ Kc,c =⇒ {βˆ′pn} %c′ {pn, βˆ} for some n.
In the above, pn is any sequence approaching c and c
′ is an arbitrary element of C.
Clearly the constant sequence pn = c for all n works, then for any β 6∈ Kc,c this gives
{c, βˆ} ∼c {βˆ′} =⇒ {βˆ′} %c′ {c, βˆ} ∀c′ ∈ C.
As long as Kc,c is finite, the continuity of %c′ gives the required result. These finite-
ness and continuity conditions are guaranteed by the fPAEU form. These conditions
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are formally stated in appendix A.1.
Propositions 1.3 & 1.4 demonstrate the implications which can be drawn from exper-
imentation behavior.
Proposition 1.3: Fix a PD representation, (U , µ, δ). If 〈a, b〉 is an experimenta-
tion pair, then there are u and u′ in U such that u(a) > u(b) and u′(a) < u′(b).
Proof: First notice that 〈a, b〉 is an experimentation pair if and only if
δ (Vb({a, b})− Va({a, b})) > V (a)− V (b) > 0.1
Clearly V (a) > V (b) implies that for some u ∈ U , u(a) > u(b). Suppose toward a
contradiction this is true for all u ∈ U . Then there is no need for taste information
since the agent will choose a out of the menu {a, b} in every contingency. Thus we
would find Vb({a, b}) = Va({a, b}), but this is a contradiction. 
Proposition 1.4: Fix a PD representation, (U , µ, δ), and some c ∈ C. Then the
following are true:
(i) There are u, u′ ∈ U such that u(c) 6= u′(c) if and only if there exists β ∈ [0, 1]
such that
〈
βˆ, c
〉
is an experimentation pair.
(ii) If
〈
βˆ, c
〉
is an experimentation pair for some β, then
V (c) ≡ Eµ[u(c)] = inf
{
β ∈ [0, 1]|
〈
βˆ, c
〉
is an experimentation pair
}
.
Proof: For part (i), if
〈
βˆ, c
〉
is an experimentation pair (EP) the existence of an ap-
propriate u and u′ follows from proposition 3. Conversely, if there are u, u′ ∈ U such
1Here Vc(A) is the expected utility of A conditional on consumption c and V (p) is the ex-ante
expected utility of p. Formally,
Vc(A) =
∑
u∈U
max
q∈A
∑
u′∈Pc(u)
u′(q)µ(u′|Pc(u))µ(u) and V (p) ≡ Vc({p}) = Vc′({p}) ∀c, c′ ∈ C
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that u(c) 6= u′(c) then WLOG I can assume u(c) > V (c) > u′(c). Let β = V (c) + .
Then
〈
βˆ, c
〉
is an EP iff δ·µ[u : u(c) > V (c)+]·(Eµ[u(c) : u(c) > V (c) + ]− V (c)− ) >
 > 0.
Notice that the finiteness of U implies that for sufficiently small  we will have both
µ¯ ≡ µ[u : u(c) > V (c) + ] = µ[u : u(c) > V (c)] > 0 and
V¯ ≡ Eµ[u(c) : u(c) > V (c) + ] = Eµ[u(c) : u(c) > V (c)] > V (c).
For small , µ¯ and V¯ are independent of . Now the sufficient condition for
〈
βˆ, c
〉
to be an EP can be rewritten as:
µ¯ · (V¯ − V (c)) > (1 + δ)
δ
> 0.
As long as a sufficiently small positive  is chosen this will be satisfied. This proves
part (i). The proof of part (ii) of also follows from this argument. By assumption
there is some
〈
βˆ, c
〉
which is an EP. Therefore we know there are WLOG u, u′ ∈ U
such that u(c) > V (c) > u′(c). Repeating the argument above we can rule out the case
that the infimum of
{
β ∈ [0, 1]|
〈
βˆ, c
〉
is an experimentation pair
}
is strictly greater
than V(c). The definition of an EP rules out the infimum being strictly less than
V(c), thus we are left to conclude that part (ii) must be true. 
Now I turn to proving the main representation result of the paper.
Theorem 1.2: A binary relation, % has a baseline representation and satisfies A1,
A2, and A3 if and only if it has a unique separating preference discovery representa-
tion.
Proof: (⇐=) Necessity of the axioms is straightforward. Though it is worth pointing
out that A3 is only necessary because of the separating qualification. This qualification
ensures there is some c¯ which separates the subjective state space, U . This will act
as the maximally informative alternative.
(=⇒) The existence of a baseline representation means that each induced preference,
%c, has an fPAEU representation denoted (Uc, µc). The strategy of this proof will
be to show that A1-A3 imply these various representations are ‘consistent’ with the
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representation of the maximally informative alternative (Uc¯, µc¯).
Step 1: For each c (including c¯), (Uc, µc) is regular and Uc has a separating form.
Specifically, for distinct elements u, u′ ∈ Uc it is the case that u(c) 6= u′(c).
Fix some c ∈ C. Regularity is a condition of the baseline representation. Now suppose
toward a contradiction that Uc is not separating. Then there exists u, u′ ∈ Uc, such
that u(c) = u′(c) and u(p) 6= u′(p) for some p ∈ ∆C. Notice that the set of c-potential
values of p can be expressed as
Kc,p = {u(p)|u ∈ Uc}.
Now fix some arbitrarily small  > 0 and perturb p toward c. Call this perturbed
lottery p′ = (1 − )p + c. Any u’s that differ on either the value of c or p will also
differ on this perturbed lottery. This implies #Kc,p′ > #Kc,c which is a violation of
A1.
It is now sufficient to show that for each fPAEU representation, (Uc, µc), the fol-
lowing is true:
Uc =
⋃
u∈Uc¯
 ∑
u′∈Pc(u)
u′(q)µ(u′|Pc(u))
 and
µc
 ∑
u′∈Pc(u)
u′(q)µ(u′|Pc(u))
 = µc¯(Pc(u))
where Pc(u) = {u′ ∈ Uc¯|u′(c) = u(c)}
Step 2: For c ∈ C, µc(v) = µc¯(Pc(v)) ∀v ∈ Uc where Pc(v) ≡ {u′ ∈ Uc¯|u′(c) = v(c)}.
To prove this step it will be useful to work with the (logically equivalent) contra-
positive of A2 rather than A2 itself:
A2* (Contrapositive of A2): If β 6∈ Kc,c and pn → c, then for sufficiently large
n, {βˆ′} ∼c {pn, βˆ} =⇒ {βˆ′} ∼c¯ {pn, βˆ}.
Recall c¯ denotes the maximally informative alternative assumed to exist by A3. The
baseline representation requires that both Uc¯ and Uc have only finitely many elements.
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Let γi and λi denote the i
th highest utility value of c on the sets Uc¯ and Uc respectively.
Now define:
µi = µc¯ (u ∈ Uc¯ : u(c) = γi)
ηi = µc (v ∈ Uc : v(c) = λi)
For example, (for i = 1) µ1 is the subjective probability (conditional on trying c¯) that
u(c) is the highest value which is (subjectively) possible. I proceed by induction over
the values of i.
For the base case, I will show that λ1 = γ1 and µ
1 = η1. Suppose toward a con-
tradiction that λ1 > γ1. By finiteness, there exists a β ∈ (γ1, λ1)\Kc,c. Then by A2*,
it must be that: ∑
v∈Uc
max{v(c), β}µc(v) =
∑
u∈Uc¯
max{u(c), β}µc¯(u)
λ1η
1 + β(1− η1) = β
=⇒ η1 = 0 (because λ1 > β)
But given the definition of η1 and the fact that Uc non-empty, this cannot be true.
The case where λ1 < γ1 is identical. Thus we must have γ1 = λ1.
Given this, choose β′ ∈ (max{γ2, λ2}, λ1) \Kc,c. Apply A2* again to find:
γ1µ
1 + β′(1− µ1) = λ1η1 + β′(1− η1)
λ1µ
1 + β′(1− µ1) = λ1η1 + β′(1− η1) (λ1 = γ1 from above)
β′(η1 − µ1) = λ1(η1 − µ1)
=⇒ η1 = µ1 (because β′ < λ1)
Now assume for i ≤ k − 1, that λi = γi and µi = ηi. Finally for the inductive step I
need to show this holds for i = k.
Suppose toward a contradiction that λk < γk. Choose β ∈ (max{λk, γk+1}, γk) \Kc,c.
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Once again apply A2*:∑
v∈Uc
max{v(c), β}µc(v) =
∑
u∈Uc¯
max{u(c), β}µc¯(v)
k−1∑
i=1
λiη
i + β
(
1−
k−1∑
i=1
ηi
)
=
k−1∑
i=1
γiµ
i + γkµ
k + β
(
1−
k−1∑
i=1
µi
)
− βµk
(γk − β)µk = 0 (by inductive assumption)
γk = β
contradiction
The case where λk > γk is identical. Thus we must have λk = γk.
WLOG suppose γk > λk+1 > min
u∈Uc¯
u(c). Otherwise the proof is trivial. Now choose
β′ ∈ (max{γk+1, λk+1}, γk). Another application of A2* yields:
k∑
i=1
λiη
i + β′
(
1−
k∑
i=1
ηi
)
=
k∑
i=1
γiµ
i + β′
(
1−
k∑
i=1
µi
)
(λk − β′)ηk = (γk − β′)µk
ηk = µk (since λk = γk)
This completes step 2. I have shown that if vi ∈ Uc assigns the ith highest utility
value to c on Uc, then
µi = µc¯{u ∈ Uc¯|u(c) = vi(c)} = µc¯{Pc(vi)} = ηi = µc{v ∈ Uc|v(c) = λi} = µc(vi)
The last equality follows since c separates Uc (by step 1).
Step 3: For every b, c ∈ C and v ∈ Uc, it must be that
v(b) =
∑
u∈Pc(v)
u(b)µc¯(u|Pc(v)) = Eµ[u(b)|u(c) = v(c)].
From step 1 we know that each v ∈ Uc takes a distinct value for v(c). Index these
v’s so that vi takes the i
th largest value of v(c). Let b′ = αc + (1 − α)b. Notice for
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α sufficiently close to 1, if the v’s were indexed by their valuation of b′ the ordering
would be the same.
For any β 6∈ Kc,c, A2* ensures that there is some α such that for α ∈ (α, 1] we have:∑
v∈Uc
max{v(b′), β}µc(v) =
∑
u∈Uc¯
max{u(b′), β}µc¯(u)
Picking a sufficiently large α ensures∑
{i|λi>β}
vi(b
′)ηi +
∑
{i|λi≤β}
βηi =
∑
{u∈Uc|u(c)>β}
u(b′)µc¯(u|u(c) > β) +
∑
{i|γi≤β}
βµi
Apply Step 2 to find∑
{i|γi>β}
vi(b
′)µi =
∑
{u∈Uc|u(c)>β}
u(b′)µc¯(u|u(c) > β)
Since v and u are EU functions, apply linearity to find:
∑
{i|γi>β}
[αvi(c) + (1− α)vi(b)]µi =
∑
{u∈Uc|u(c)>β}
[αu(c) + (1− α)u(b)]µc¯(u|u(c) > β)
One more application of Step 2 gives∑
{i|γi>β}
vi(b)µ
i =
∑
{u∈Uc|u(c)>β}
u(b)µc¯(u|u(c) > β)
Choose β1 ∈ (γ2, γ1) \Kc,c, then we have:
v1(b) =
∑
{u∈Uc|u(c)=γ1}
u(b)µc¯(u|u(c) = γ1) (by Step 2)
Or equivalently,
v1(b) = Eµ[u(b)|u(c) = v1(c)]
Now choose β2 ∈ (γ3, γ2) \Kc,c, we can use similar logic to find:
v1(b)µ
1 + v2(b)µ
2 = Eµ[u(b)|u(c) = γ1]µ1 + Eµ[u(b)|u(c) = γ2]µ2
v2(b) = Eµ[u(b)|u(c) = γ2]
Iterating this procedure completes the step. Together steps 2 and 3 show that all of
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the induced fPAEU representations take the desired form. Specifically, they can all be
viewed as coarsenings of the one induced by c¯.
Step 4: Within the class of separating PD representations, there is a unique tu-
ple which represents % .
Notice for any separating PD representation, (U , µ, δ), satisfying A3 it must be that
(U , µ) is the regular fPAEU representation of the menu preference induced by the
maximally informative alternative. Therefore uniqueness of the separating representa-
tion can be established by the uniqueness of the regular fPAEU representation (lemma
1.1) and the fact that δ can be uniquely elicited from time preference over βˆ’s. 
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Appendix B
Appendices to Network of thrones
B.1 Data Construction
The data set analyzed in the paper is complex, with many moving parts. This ap-
pendix describes the construction of each part, and how the whole is put together.
While elements of our data have been used elsewhere, such as Wright (1942) and
Tompsett (2014), both our empirical methodology and the breadth of our data dis-
tinguish this paper from the existing literature. We exert significant effort to expand,
reconcile, reorganize and improve upon these sources. For example, we re-construct
Tompsett’s genealogy as a dynamic kinship network and we bring in additional sources
to identify when countries exit wars. Our supplementations also make our dataset
much larger. While we have 86,746 observations in our main regressions, Dube and
Harish have 37,116 in their comparable dyad-year regressions.
B.1.1 Genealogical Data
Our genealogical data is taken from the 2014 update of Tompsett’s Royal Genealogy
collection. Tompsett’s data covers the “genealogy of almost every ruling house in
the western world”, merging many sources of genealogical records. A substantial
portion of Tompsett’s data comes from “The Complete Peerage or a History of the
House of Lords and all its Members from the Earliest Times” (Cokayne, 1953) and
“Europaische Stammtafeln” (Loringhoven, 1964) in their various series and editions.
A consultation with New England Historic Genealogical Society revealed these to be
well-regarded and reliable.
Adjustments to Tompsett’s data were few, mainly to add birth and death dates
for rulers where this information was missing. The total number of adjustments is
125. The full list of changes is included in the data.
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B.1.2 State List
We restrict our analysis to (i) sovereign (ii) hereditary or elective monarchies in (iii)
Christian Europe. Of these criteria, the most difficult to operationalize is sovereignty.
We used the following procedure in determining whether a state is independent. Any
polity we find reference to in Europe over our time period in any listing is given the
presumption of sovereignty; this includes the super-national organizations of the Holy
Roman Empire (HRE), German Confederation, and the short-lived North German
Confederation.
We judge polities to be lacking sovereignty for several reasons. A primary reason
for being excluded is via being a province, dependent, or vassal of another state. For
example, the Balkan states for most of our time period are vassals of the Ottoman
Empire and are thus excluded from the dataset.
De-facto sovereignty is often ambiguous for the members of the three super-
national organizations to which we attribute sovereignty. For states of the HRE,
we attribute sovereignty only to Electors and Austria.1 For members of the German
Confederation, we retain the 11 states with a vote in the Federal Assembly. For the
short-lived North German Confederation, we retain the two member Kingdoms and
five member Grand Duchies.
A related reason for exclusion is due to being a puppet state set up by a foreign
occupier. When a period of foreign occupation or domination lasts 5 or fewer years,
and the previous dynasty subsequently regains the throne, we have the two countries
in existence and at war throughout. An exception is that a foreign occupation of less
than 5 years will be coded as an interregnum if the incumbent ruler formally and
substantively abdicates (even if the dynasty eventually regains the throne).2 When
a period of foreign domination lasts for more than 5 years, but the previous dynasty
eventually regains the crown, we have the dominated state as not existing during the
1Some prefer the term ‘Habsburg Monarchy’ or ‘Austrian Monarchy’ to refer to the Habsburg
patriarchal lands in central Europe. However, this is an unofficial term, and our analysis relies on
precisely identifying rulers with titles. Therefore we code the ruler of Austria as the individual with
the title of Austrian Archduke, with other Habsburg ruled lands (such as Bohemia and Hungary)
potentially in the hands of other members of the Habsburg royal family. These countries only drop
out of our data following our rules regarding permanent personal union. After that time, what we
denote Austria in figure B·1 can be thought of as the Habsburg Monarchy, until the establishment
of a successor state (the Austrian Empire and later Austria-Hungary).
2For example, in the Great Northern War the Saxon King Augustus II abdicated his claim to
the Polish throne for a short period. This is coded as an interregnum. During these interregnums,
as with any period a ruler is not coded, the country drops out of the data.
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occupation. This means, for example, that much of the German and Italian speaking
world is not sovereign during the height of Napoleon’s power. For cases like Spain
during the Peninsular War (where a government attempted to organize resistance
from the besieged city of Cadiz) where there is at least partially organized resistance
with loyalty with the previous ruler, we err on the side of keeping the previous ruler
installed and at war throughout. When a foreign installation is permanent, we have
the installed leader running the country at the end of hostilities. For states where a
de jure country has two rulers simultaneously in different parts for a period of decades
(i.e. longer than a civil war), we consider it two separate countries.3
Finally, we list only the more powerful member of a pair of states under permanent
personal union. Personal unions were a common occurrence in our period in which
a single individual would rule two or more countries. When we see a pair of states
entering and leaving personal unions (such as due to divergent inheritance laws, as
in the case of Hanover and the United Kingdom) in our time period, we list them as
separate sovereign states throughout. However, if a personal union lasts continuously
until one of the states is abolished (or until the end of our sample period) then we
combine the two states into one sovereign entity. We consolidate the two states not
at the beginning of the personal union, but rather when the first person to inherit
both states simultaneously comes into power.
Of these criteria, the most imperfect is the decision to only list electors of the HRE.
Certainly, at least the electors had a degree of sovereignty. The ‘Golden Bull of 1356’,
which fixed the constitutional structure of the HRE, established electoral dignity
as non-transferable and conferring a degree of sovereignty higher than normal HRE
membership. There is also the fact that by being electors, they had influence over who
was elected Emperor, and therefore influence over wars fought by the Empire. The
list of electors is very stable over time. When in the course of the Thirty Years War
the Emperor transferred the treasonous Electoral Palatinate’s vote to Bavaria this led
to a major constitutional crisis. Eventually a vote for the Palatinate was restored,
but Bavaria retained the Palatinate’s electoral status. Along with the creation of the
Electorate of Hanover in 1692 (thereby creating an odd number of electors again),
these are the only changes in the course of our sample. So we feel comfortable
attributing sovereignty to all the electors.
3For Hungary, this means we record a Christian ruler during the century when the better part of
the country was ruled by an Ottoman puppet.
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However, there were a handful of states, mostly northern Italian, which were non-
Elector members of the HRE that acted with a degree of autonomy, especially in the
early part of our sample. These include Savoy, Switzerland, Milan, Modena, Parma,
and Florence. Bavaria before getting its electoral status also participated in wars
independently of the HRE. Many of these would be otherwise eliminated for much of
their histories for being republics. It would be impossible to include in our analysis
the literally hundreds of members of the HRE, each of which had different degrees of
sovereignty. This legalistic approach was determined to be the safest one.
In addition to Austria, the following are the member states of the Holy Roman
Empire, German Confederation, and North-German Confederation to which we at-
tribute sovereignty.
1495-1705: Kingdom of Bohemia4
1495-1871: Margraviate of Brandenburg (later, Kingdom of Prussia)
1495-1806: Duchy of Saxony
1495-1623: County Palatinate of the Rhine (later, Electoral Palatinate)5
1623-1806: Duchy of Bavaria
1648-1803: Electoral Palatinate
1692-1806: Electorate of Brunswick-Luneburg (later, Electorate of Hanover)
Napoleon disbands the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, and replaces it with a puppet
organization named the Confederation of the Rhine. During this period, many of the
above states lost sovereignty.
After the defeat of Napoleon, the German Confederation is founded. For members
of the German Confederation, we attribute sovereignty to the 11 states with a vote
in the inner session of the Federal Assembly.
1815-1866: Duchy of Holstein, Kingdom of Hanover, King of Bavaria, Kingdom of
Saxony, Kingdom of Wuttemberg, Electorate of Hesse, Grand Duchy of Baden, Grand
Duchy of Hesse
1815-1839: Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
1839-1866: Duchy of Limburg
After the dissolution of the German Confederation, several states are temporarily
independent, before being subsumed into the German Empire. Other states become
4We drop Bohemia as an independent state at this point due to our rules concerning permanent
personal unions
5The electoral dignity of The Palatinate is temporarily transferred to Bavaria during the Thirty
Years War. Bavaria comes to control an additional electoral vote.
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sovereign members of the North German Confederation.
1866-1871: Saxony, Hesse, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Olden-
burg, Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach
1866-1871: Kingdom of Bavaria, Kingdom of Wurttemburg, Baden
1866-1918: Principality of Lichtenstein
1839-1918: Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
In figure B·1, we list the full timeline of countries in our data. In order to be in
this list, the state must be attributed both sovereignty and a monarch matched to
the genealogical data. Hence, countries occasionally drop from the data for a year or
two due to interregnums between rulers. Polities change names over time, and here
countries are listed on the same row if they are considered successor states and share
a fixed effect. For space, shortened or informal names of the polities are used.
Figure B·1: Monarchies in the final dataset by year. For space, short-
ened or informal names are used. Monarchies sharing a fixed effect (i.e.
successor states) are listed in the same row.
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B.1.3 Data on Rulers
For every year of a sovereign state’s existence we attempt to match a ruler from our
genealogical data. Our ruler data is primarily derived from Spuler (1977). When
multiple dates of rule change are listed, such as the date of the death of a parent and
subsequent coronation of their child, the earliest date is used. In elective monarchies,
where the next ruler is clear but formal election is delayed this is used to prevent
interregnums. For the few occasions in which two simultaneous and cooperative
rulers are listed by this or another source, we choose the individual who seemed to
be the dominant decision maker. As all of these situations are marriages or involve
closely related individuals, this subjectivity does not matter to our results. For the
majority of state years where Spuler does not list a ruler, we use Tapsell (1984). A
handful of imputations from outside these sources are noted in the data.
In situations where Spuler is ambiguous (i.e. he lists both an incumbent ruler and
a claimant) we attempt to keep rulerless periods as brief as possible. During civil
wars and succession crises, we have the incumbent ruling throughout the war; if the
pretender wins we have him ruling subsequently. When incumbency is seriously in
doubt, we err on the side of having the eventual winner ruling throughout. States
completely lacking in executive leadership are listed without a ruler, dropping out of
our sample. This can sometimes occur as a result of a succession crisis. We attempt
to keep such interregnums to a minimum.
Finally, there is the special case of the Netherlands Stadtholder. While the Seven
United Netherlands might in some ways be described as a republic (or confederation of
republics), in times of foreign conflict, they were represented by a general Stadtholder.
Traditionally, this Stadtholder was the Duke of Orange. Foreign countries would
maintain royal missions with the Duke, with the understanding that he represented
the Netherlands internationally. Therefore, in the years before the Netherlands are
actually a monarchy, we record the Stadtholder or (failing the existence of a general
Stadtholder) the Duke of Orange as the Seven United Netherlands’ monarch.
B.1.4 Data on Wars
The most difficult portion of this data to assemble is the set of war dyads. A war
dyad is a pair of states which are at war in a given year. Our goal is to have a list of
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every conflict involving at least two states with sovereign Christian European rulers.
Prior to 1816, there is no standard list of interstate wars. This arises from ambiguity
about what a state is, what a war is, and when wars begin or end. Our list is based
on Wright (1942), which uses a primarily legalistic definition of war
As supplements, use was also made of Phillips and Axelrod (2005), Langer (1972),
Brecke (2012), Levy (1983), and Sarkees and Wayman (2010). For the Thirty Years
War, a supplementary source was Parker (1997). For the Schmalkaldic War a supple-
mentary source was “The Age of Reformation” (Smith, 1920).
Before 1816, the best comprehensive list of wars with a clear criteria for inclusion
is Wright’s.6 Wright attempts to document every war from 1480-1940. He defines war
as “all hostilities involving members of the family of nations, whether international,
civil, colonial, or imperial, which were recognized as states of war in the legal sense
or which involved over 50,000 troops. Some other incidents are included in which
hostilities of considerable but lesser magnitude, not recognized at the time as legal
states of war, led to important legal results...” (Wright, p. 636). Wright defines war
in the legal sense as “the legal condition which equally permits two or more hostile
groups to carry on a conflict by armed force” (Wright, p. 8).
B.1.5 Procedure for Generating War List
Because Wright was the best list of wars available when we began our data collection
which covers our entire period of interest, it forms the basis of our primary war dyad
data. However, a number of difficulties prevent us from relying solely on Wright’s
text.
First, there are errors to be corrected. For example, in his coding of The Second
Northern War (table 35), Hanover is not listed as a participant, despite a footnote
noting the year they signed a peace treaty ending their involvement; France is listed as
entering the 1st Opium war after the war’s conclusion (this entry seems to be correctly
attributed to the war a row below); and he fails to record Hungarian participation
in Ottoman War of 1537-1542, in which Hungary was the principle theater, and the
6In the post-1816 period, the gold standard in war records is the Correlates of War (CoW)
database. CoW defines interstate wars as “those in which a territorial state that qualifies as a
member of the interstate system is engaged in a war with another system member. An inter-state
war must have: sustained combat involving regular armed forces on both sides and 1,000 battle-
related fatalities among all of the system members involved. Any individual member state qualified
as a war participant through either of two alternative criteria: a minimum of 100 fatalities or a
minimum of 1,000 armed personnel engaged in active combat.”
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Austrian Archduke (listed at war with the Ottomans) was in personal union with the
Royal Hungarian Crown.
Second, Wright does not report information on war sides and war exit that is
important for our purposes. His text only states the time states entered the war,
and their primary allegiance to one of two war sides. Therefore, Wright does not
comprehensively record examples of parties switching sides during a war, exiting a
war early, or compound wars not well described by two completely opposed camps.
For example, in the Thirty Years War and French Rev and Napoleonic Wars there
are several shifts in the sides of the conflict and examples of states only at war with
some members of an alliance group.
Third, because we are primarily concerned with which leaders are fighting wars, we
need to understand whether our coded rulers correspond to Wright’s understanding
of state leadership. For example, Wright records a Polish Russian conflict in which
a Russian Tsar intervened to help a Polish King put down anti-Russian insurgents.
However, because the Polish King and Russian Tsar were aligned in this incident, it
does not make sense to call it an international war for our purposes.
Finally, our list of states does not perfectly match Wright’s (excepting non-
European states, theocracies, states in permanent personal unions, states facing in-
terregnums, republics, and a few non-Elector HRE members, our list is a superset of
Wright’s). Therefore, it is important for us to search for wars including states not in
his list.
For every war, Wright lists five pieces of information. These are: The year every
state in his list entered the war; the side each state primarily fought on; which of
these sides was the war’s aggressor; when the war ended; and the war’s type (civil,
imperial, or balance of power). Occasionally, he also lists the month of the war’s
inception or close, as well as the number of important battles fought.
To reconcile Wright’s schema with our own, we needed the following additional
pieces of information.
• Did any states which we code as sovereign but Wright does not participate in
any of Wright’s wars? Were there any wars between our states involving one or
fewer of Wright’s?
• In wars involving more than two states, did any state leave the conflict early?
• Did any war participants switch sides over the course of the conflict?
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• If the HRE (or German Confederation) is participating, to what extent was it
acting collectively?
• Did the conflict involve a succession crisis or civil war, which might lead us to
have a different understanding of war ‘sides’ than Wright?
• Check whether Wright made any unambiguous typos or errors
For every war listed in Wright (1942), we began by searching for a corresponding
account of the war in question in Phillips and Axelrod (2005) and Langer (1972).
Usually these are sufficient to answer the above questions, but additional sources
were consulted when these left the situation unclear. For the Thirty Years War, a
supplementary source was Parker (1997). For the Schmalkaldic War a supplementary
source was Smith (1920). Any deviation from a nave Wright coding was noted and
cited in our data.
For wars involving only one or fewer members of Wright’s system, we searched
Phillips and Axelrod (2005) and Brecke (2012). Interstate wars appearing in these
lists meeting both Wright’s legalistic war criteria and not including more than one
of Wright’s states (we assume that Wright’s list is comprehensive for wars including
two or more of the states he tracks) were added. Adding wars from scratch in this
manner is rare, leading us to add only 25 war-year dyads from five wars.
Levy (1983) and Sarkees and Wayman (2010) were used primarily as sanity checks
for clear Wright coding errors. In the data, we record whether our final coding conflicts
with Levy (1983). For all but the most complex compound wars, we also record how
our final dyadic codings correspond to a naive Wright coding which would ignore the
above issues.
A few notes follow on how we proceeded in ambiguous cases.
For states in personal unions (like Denmark with Norway and the various crowns
held simultaneously by the Spanish rulers), if we code one state at war we assume
the other is at war as well, unless we find evidence otherwise. For the Austrian
Habsburgs, we extend this principle to Bohemia and Hungary (when their titular
rulers are close relatives of the Austrian Archduke rather than the Archduke or Holy
Roman Emperor himself).7 By construction, we never have a ruler of two nations at
7For more information on the unusual unity of the Austrian Habsburgs, and its legal and norma-
tive foundations, see Tapi (1971), especially p. 38-39. For information on how Habsburg unity was
facilitated by an honest and informal communication style, see Fichtner (2016)
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war with himself.8
Only extremely rarely does this principle come into conflict with our deference to
Wright’s list of wars. This is because he rarely lists two countries in personal union
separately in his lists of states. The one significant exception is Hungary (a state for
which Wright has several coding anomalies, such as stating they do not participate
in several Habsburg-Ottoman wars taking place in Hungarian lands). In these cases,
we stick to the principle that states in personal unions are typically united in their
efforts, and look for evidence beyond Wright for coding them otherwise.
Wright lists some wars as being fought by the ‘German Empire’. For the bulk of
our period this is the HRE. Later in the sample, this is the North German Confed-
eration, German Confederation, or German Empire. When the HRE fights conflicts
we look at evidence from our sources on this conflict and other concurrent conflicts
whether the HRE acting at that moment in a united or divided manner. If there is
no evidence of disunion, it is assumed that the ‘German Empire’ fighting entails the
Habsburg crowns and all electors fighting alongside the Holy Roman Emperor. Oth-
erwise, we mark the HRE as being divided and cite individually which of its members
participated.
B.1.6 Data on Formal Alliances
Data on formal alliances is derived from Gibler (2008) and Levy and Thompson
(2005). This data is not used in this paper, but appears in the data files. Gibler
accumulates a comprehensive database of every formal alliance since 1648. Gibler’s
list of states follows the CoW criteria for system membership and also almost fully
encompasses our list. Levy and Thompson’s list, while going back to 1495 only
contains alliance behavior for the ‘great powers’.
Levy gives alliance targets explicitly, but Gibler’s targets were determined from
Gibler’s summary. If the target of an alliance involves a succession crisis we leave out
the target.
8However, we do have observations of Habsburgs at war (during the Habsburg Brother’s War
between Rudolf II and his cousin Matthias who became King of Hungary in 1608). There is even
arguably an observation of a Habsburg at war with himself – Franz Joseph as Emperor of Austria
declared war on himself as King of Hungary in putting down the revolution of 1848. For our purposes,
this is treated as a civil war, and is therefore not recorded.
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B.1.7 Data on Covariates
Covariates are assembled from a variety of publicly available sources. Religion cor-
responds to the religion a ruler publicly professed. When no explicit reference to a
ruler’s religion can be found, the state or dominant domestic religion is used. During
the early phases of the Protestant Reformation, it is often unclear when a ruler fully
converts to a protestant sect. For example, a ruler might be privately sympathetic to
a Lutheranism, and aid the spread of those ideas, but not publicly convert himself.
We always erred on the side of caution in such cases, and consider a ruler as con-
verting to Protestantism only we found evidence they publicly did so. Outside this
period, coding the religion of rulers was straightforward.
Coding capital locations was usually straightforward as well. In the rare cases
a state had multiple political centers of power, we selected the dominant one. The
one instance in which this selection was not straightforward was for the capital of
the Holy Roman Empire. This entity had multiple legislative, executive, and judicial
centers. Until 1532 we selected Frankfurt as the capital, due to its role as the tradi-
tional location for the selection and coronation of Emperors. After 1532 we selected
Regensburg, which held periodic Imperial Diets through 1663, and a permanent one
after that date. These locations have the added benefit of being near the HRE’s
center of mass.
Landlocked-ness and country adjacency were derived from Reed (2016). This map
series gives the political borders for Europe and the Middle East at five week periods
from the 11th century to the present. Generally, coding is straightforward. For
countries that are briefly occupied, the occupied and occupying country are considered
adjacent so long as the two countries were adjacent beforehand. Countries that gain
control of new regions according to Reed gain the adjacency of the regions they
subsume. However, in the case of a non-permanent personal union, the adjacencies of
the countries are considered separately. For example, during the Kalmar Union the
King of Denmark ruled Norway in a personal union. However, because for reasons
discussed above, Norway is listed as an independent state, Denmark is not coded as
adjacent to Russia. Conversely, because Croatia is in a permanent personal union
with Hungary throughout our sample, Croatia is not listed as an independent state,
and Hungary inherits Croatia’s adjacency.
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B.1.8 Generating The Final Dataset
The above data were all collected at the monthly level. However, spotty monthly
data makes a monthly analysis impractical. Other information was collected but not
used and is included in the data.
When reading the data from the excel data into Stata, we only upload country
years in which there is a ruler correctly matched to the Tompsett data. Only twice
do we identify a ruler who was not able to be matched to Tompsett’s genealogy.
Rulers are read in as beginning their reign at the start of the year in which their
reign commences. Similarly, if a country covariate changes during the course of the
year, it is read as having changed at the beginning of the year. If the covariate shifts
several times during a year, only the last value is read into the final data. Wars are
read in as starting at the beginning of the year they commenced, and ending at the
end of the year they ended.
B.2 Demographic Trends
Figure B·2 displays the amount of individuals alive in our royal data in every year
starting in 1495. Note that the amount of royals alive increases dramatically over
time. It is unclear what percentage of this increase is due to an actual increase in the
quantity of royals versus an increase in coverage.
Figure B·3 lists causes of death by category for all the 263 individuals who die
on a shortest path. We end up dropping 10 of these deaths for being potentially
endogenous to the political situation. These include 6 assassinations, 3 executions,
and one battle death.
Figure B·4 displays trends in the share of states ruled by related monarchs over
time. 62 percent of dyad-years have ruler pairs with a blood connection. The share
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Figure B·2: Number of Individuals Alive in Geneological Data By
Year
of dyads with any common ancestor increases strongly over time, from a low of 14.3
percent in the first year observed to a high of 98.8 percent in 1815. After this peak
the blood connected share decreases again by about 40 percentage points, with a
nadir around 1900. On average 17 percent of dyad-years’ rulers share a common
grandparent or more recent ancestor. 20.6 percent share a common great grandparent
or closer.
While the share of states being ruled by related monarchs grows, the share ruled by
closely related monarchs (i.e. those of blood degree three or less) shows no clear trend.
The fact that there is no clear trend in the share of closely blood connected rulers
should partially alleviate the concern that an increase in living kinship connection,
while directly decreasing the chance of war, had an indirect effect in the opposite
direction by creating more opportunities for succession crises. In both this figure and
figure B·5 personal union observations are not dropped.
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Figure B·3: Causes of Death for the 263 Individuals Dying on a
Shortest Path
Figure B·4: Share of Dyads Ruled by Blood Related Monarchs
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Figure B·5 displays the trend in the share of rulers closely connected by living
kinship ties over time. Recall that if a pair of rulers have married grandchildren, they
have a shortest path distance of at most 5. If a pair of rulers have grandchildren
who are married to a set of first cousins, the rulers have a blood distance of at most
7. Trends in the share of dyads with a close resistance distance and shortest path
distance match each other closely. This information is presented at the decade level,
because the share of states connected has much higher year to year variance than the
blood connection data.
Figure B·5: Share of Dyads With Rulers Sharing Close Network Ties
B.3 Network Concepts
We contend that kinship connections have a causal relationship with interstate con-
flict. In order to test this hypothesis, we use a suite of tools from network theory.
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This section offers a brief introduction to the concepts we employ.9
A kinship network consists of a set of living individuals, I, and the kinship relations
between them. Individuals are nodes of the network and their immediate kinship
relations are edges. Specifically, two individuals are said to have an immediate kinship
relation if they are spouses, siblings, or parent and child. We construct a kinship
network for the European nobility in every year from 1495-1918.
Each year’s network can be represented by an adjacency matrix, Ay. Ay is an
|Iy| × |Iy| square matrix, where |Iy| is the number of living individuals in year y.
The (i, j)th entry in the matrix is 1 if individuals i and j are linked and 0 otherwise.
Formally, these are undirected, unweighted graphs. Another useful concept is the
degree matrix, Dy. Dy is the diagonal matrix where Dy,(i,i) =
∑
j∈I Ay,(i,j). The
(i, i)th entry of Dy is equal to the number of immediate kinship relations individual i
has in year y.
The network of kinship relations evolves yearly. The set of nodes varies as indi-
viduals are born and die. Edges can either exist from birth or be formed through
marriage. They can be dissolved through divorce.
In order to study this changing kinship network, we introduce summary measures
of the kinship network distance between a pair of rulers. We focus on three such mea-
sures. These are shortest path length, resistance distance, and distance to common
ancestor.
Shortest path length is a straightforward yet powerful measure of the kinship
distance between two individuals. Consider two nodes i and j. The shortest path
length between them is the minimum number of edges that must be traversed to move
from node i to node j. If a path exists, we say the pair is connected. When no path
exists, shortest path length is defined as infinite. The longest finite path observed in
9For a more thorough introduction to network methods in economics, see Jackson (2008).
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our sample is of 30 degrees.
The weakness of the shortest path measure is that it only takes into account
a single path. Resistance distance also measures kinship distance, but considers
all simple paths between two nodes.10 When these paths are non-overlapping, this
measure can be calculated as the reciprocal of the sum of the inverse path lengths of
all simple paths from i to j. More generally, resistance distance can be calculated by
R(i,j),y = Γ(i,i),y + Γj,j − 2Γ(i,j),y
where Γ(i,j),y is the (i, j)
th entry of the Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse of (Ay −Dy).11
This measure was popularized by Klein and Randic (1993) who prove it is a metric
in the mathematical sense.
Resistance distance, R(i,j),y, is less than or equal to the shortest path distance.
When there is no shortest path, we similarly define resistance distance to be infinity.
The resistance distance is decreasing in the number of simple paths connecting two
nodes. Resistance distance will also be shorter when these paths are shorter and have
fewer nodes in common. As this distance metric takes into account all paths between
two nodes, it is a natural counter-part to the shortest path distance. Resistance
distance has been widely used in the physical and applied sciences, but has been
much less prevalent in economics.12
Finally, we measure the blood relationship of a pair by the distance to their nearest
common ancestor. None of these ancestors need be alive. This measure is constant
for a pair of rulers. To calculate it, we construct a single directed network of all
10A simple path from i to j is a non-repeating sequence of edges starting at i and ending at j.
11(Ay −Dy) is known as the Laplacian representation of the network
12An alternative all-paths measure is the hearing matrix defined in Banerjee et al. (2016). As-
suming fixed transmission probability, the (i, j)th entry of that matrix is the expected number of
times a message originating at node i will be heard by node j after T periods. Resistance distance
is strongly inversely correlated with hearing closeness.
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individuals in the data. Unlike the (undirected) network above, in this network links
only run in one direction - from children to their parents.
For individuals i and j, we find the set of ancestors common to both individuals.
Distance to one of these shared ancestors is defined to be the maximum of shortest
path distance to the ancestor from either i or j. The minimum of these distances
across the set of shared ancestors is our measure of blood distance for the pair. So, if
a pair of rulers’ closest common ancestor is a mutual great grandparent, their blood
distance is 3. If one ruler’s grandparent is another ruler’s great grandparent, their
blood distance is still 3. If a pair do not share a common ancestor, this measure is
undefined. If a common ancestor exists, we say the pair is blood connected. The
maximum distance searched is 7 generations back.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Association-based expected
utility
C.1 Proofs
Proof of Sufficiency for Lemma 3.1.
For each A, let VA(p) = EpuA(c) be an expected utility (EU) representation of %A.
These representations are guaranteed to exist by C0. Define u ≡ V∅. It is WLOG to
assume u(c¯) = 1 and u(c) = 0.1
Now notice that Axiom C1 ensures that VA is ordinally equivalent to u on both of the
subdomains ∆(A) and ∆(AC). Since the EU representation is unique up to positive
affine transformations, it is WLOG to assume
VA(p) = Ep

u(c) c 6∈ A
αAu(c) + βA c ∈ A
for some real numbers, αA > 0 and βA. Now notice that Axiom C2 together with
continuity implies that there exists a β ∈ [0, 1] such that for pA ≡ βa∗ + (1− β)a∗ it
is true that pA ∼∅ γc¯+ (1− γ)c iff pA ∼A γc¯+ (1− γ)c.
Noting that u(pA) = γ, it follows that βA = γ − αAu(pA) = (1 − αA)u(pA). Sub-
1This proof works whenever maximal and minimal elements exist. When the order is unbounded,
apply this proof to some bounded sub-domain and then use induction to add one element to the
domain at a time to extend the result to the entire (countably infinite) domain.
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stituting for βA gives the desired representation.
Proof of Sufficiency for Lemma 3.2.
Notice in Lemma 1 that pA ∈ ∆(A) was a lottery with a utility unaffected by the
association process. Moreover, from the representation we see that VA(pA) = u(pA).
Axiom C3 assumes that the uniform lottery over A, A|A| is unaffected by priming A.
C2 plus continuity guarantee that pA ∼A A|A| . And using the representation from
Lemma 1, we can see further that
u(pA) = VA(pA) = VA(
A
|A|) = u(
A
|A|) =
1
|A|
∑
a∈A
u(a).
Substituting for u(pA) in the Lemma 1 representation establishes the result.
Proof of Sufficiency for Theorem 3.1.
Step 1: C4 implies that if A|A| ∼∅ B|B| , then αA = αB.
Case 1: Suppose there exists a c ∈ A ∩ B. In this case C4 requires that c ∼A p
iff c ∼B p for every p such that supp(p) ∩ (A ∪B) = ∅. Thus VA(c) = VB(c) = V∅(p).
But this implies
αA(VA
(
A
|A|
)
− u(c)) = αB(VB
(
B
|B|
)
− u(c))
Thus the conclusion holds whenever VA
(
A
|A|
)
6= u(c). But if VA
(
A
|A|
)
= u(c) for every
c ∈ A ∩ B, then notice A|A| ∼∅ A\B|A\B| ∼∅ B|B| and apply the above result to find that
αA = αA\B and similarly αB = αB\A . Finally apply case 2 to find αB\A = αA\B.
Case 2: Suppose A ∩B = ∅. Then notice A∪B|A∪B| ∼∅ A|A| . Thus Case 1 applies.
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The following observations rely heavily on the richness condition which imposes that
C is countably infinite, order dense with respect to %∅, and unbounded in both di-
rections.
Step 2: Trivially, richness implies that WLOG u : C → R is unbounded in both
directions.
Step 3: For every c, c′ ∈ C and p, p′ ∈ ∆(C) such that p′ ∅ p, there exists a fi-
nite subset A ⊂ C containing c and c′ such that p′ ∅ A|A| ∅ p. Moreover, WLOG
for all c there exists A 3 c such that u( A|A|) = ξ ∀ξ ∈ Q.
Step 4: If for some A,B αA 6= αB, then A4 is violated for sufficiently extreme
values of u(c) generating a contradiction and thus proving the theorem.
Specifically, WLOG suppose A improves B and αA > αB. Then Step 3 guaran-
tees that there are sets A′ B′ which share some c with arbitrarily high utility, yet
satisfy A
′
|A′| =
A
|A| and
B′
|B′| =
B
|B| . Step 1 implies αA = αA′ and αB = αB′ . But notice
that C4 requires that
VA′(c) > VB′(c)
αA′ [u(A/|A|)− u(c)] > αB′ [u(B/|B|)− u(c)]
αA′
αB′
<
u(c)− u(A/|A|)
u(c)− u(B/|B|) < 1
αA < αB
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which yields a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 3.2.
This follows directly from proposition 3.3.
Proof of proposition 3.3.
WLOG set u1 = u2 = u throughout this proof. (=⇒) Suppose Agent 1 exhibits
stronger association than agent 2. Choose some p, q, and A such that p %2∅ q and
q 2A p. Let IA be an indicator function for elements in A and let  denote component-
wise multiplication of vectors (or functions). The assumed preference reversal for
agent 2 will occur if and only if
[(q − p) IA] · α2
(∑
a∈A
u(a)
|A| − u
)
> (p− q) · u
Thus this p, q reversal will also occur for agent 1 if α1 ≥ α2. Therefore, (in terms
of set inclusion) agent 1 will have more preference reversals than agent 2 if α1 ≥ α2.
(=⇒) To show this parameter restriction is also necessary for definition 3.4 to hold,
suppose toward a contradiction that α2 > α1. Fix some c
′ 6∈ A and define p′ =
βc′ + (1 − β)p and q′ = βc′ + (1 − β)q where β ∈ [0, 1] is chosen such that p ∼1A q.
This is guaranteed to exist by continuity. This implies
[(q′ − p′) IA] · α1
(∑
a∈A
u(a)
|A| − u
)
= (p′ − q′) · u
but then, clearly, it must be true that
[(q′ − p′) ? IA] · α2
(∑
a∈A
u(a)
|A| − u
)
> (p′ − q′) · u
in other words we find a p′, q′ preference reversal for agent 2 that does not occur for
agent 1, violating definition 3.4. 
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Proof of Proposition 3.4.
Notice, a firm who brand extends can maintain its level of profits by bundling x and
y and selling the bundle at the old optimal monopoly price for x, px. Now suppose
they offered the bundle at price px +  and y by itself at a price of αpx. Notice any
consumers who stops buying the bundle following the price increase will switch to
buying only y. But, the optimal price was determined assuming the consumers would
exit entirely. Since selling y at αpx still yields positive profits, the firm can increase
profits by slightly increasing the price of the bundle. 
Proof of Proposition 3.5.
Under the hypothesis, the demand for the two products are perfectly negatively cor-
related. Intuitively, mixing these two demand curves increases the elasticity of both.
This decreases a monopolists’ obtainable profits in both products relative to not brand
extending.
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